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Looks like The Titanic killed a few more people

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K1052 said:
I recommend that anybody who thinks rescuing people in space is easy (or easier than a deep ocean rescue) take a long gander at Appendix D.13 (STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment) of the Columbia Accident Investigation report.
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I don't need to. They knew that Columbia was screwed from the get-go and they just said the best option is to roll the dice .
Here's a nice write up in ArsTechnica

 
Times running out. Why no comms? Power problem? It's really cold down there. The gear that they have to have to pull up the mini sub will barely be in place. Oh, and, they still don't know where it is, at this point even if the gear gets there.
Not a good outlook.
 
hal2kilo said:
Times running out. Why no comms? Power problem? It's really cold down there. The gear that they have to have to pull up the mini sub will barely be in place. Oh, and, they still don't know where it is, at this point even if the gear gets there.
Not a good outlook.
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Even if they knew the location of it at all times, lifting it from 3800m down in high flowing current is low probability at best. The DSRVs can dive to 600m at most. And it's not like this thing has the mating collar anyway.
 
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skyking said:
I don't need to. They knew that Columbia was screwed from the get-go and they just said the best option is to roll the dice .
Here's a nice write up in ArsTechnica

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We did not know Columbia was screwed from the get go.

It was assumed at the time the leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon material was too tough for shed tank foam to penetrate.

Shuttle program management made the incorrect decision not to pursue better imagery based on that erroneous belief and instead assumed it would be a maintenance issue. Almost (but not quite) all previous foam strikes ended up causing damage requiring thermal protection system maintenance but did not threaten overall vehicle safety.

The results below were shocking when they test fired a chunk of foam into the leading RCC under the conditions on Columbia’s last ascent:
18813968.rccdamage7thtest.jpg


The factors that led to this incorrect assumption was the supposed toughness of the RCC which was strong but brittle and the assumption a chunk of foam couldn’t get enough velocity to cause much damage. In this case the large chunk fell off right during increasing acceleration and while the atmosphere was still thick enough to impart a large drag force.

The other factor was what is called normalization of deviation. The external tank shed foam so often that it became normalized. Efforts to mitigate it were made but only partially successful and since it normally didn’t cause a major issue it was assumed it never would.

If we had gotten imagery on flight day 2 or 3 and seen the extent of the damage we very likely could have done something like in the Ars article.
 
This reminded me of this Douglas Adams quote.

"The major difference between a thing that might go wrong and a thing that cannot possibly go wrong is that when a thing that cannot possibly go wrong goes wrong it usually turns out to be impossible to get at or repair."
 
hal2kilo said:
Times running out. Why no comms? Power problem? It's really cold down there. The gear that they have to have to pull up the mini sub will barely be in place. Oh, and, they still don't know where it is, at this point even if the gear gets there.
Not a good outlook.
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The same sub had to abort an earlier dive to the Titanic last year due to power issues. The batteries were draining too fast so had to abort during the first hour of the dive.
 
Brovane said:
I agree about the lack of redundant systems and emergency beacon on Titan. I was reffering to the lack of escape hatch and the inability to egress the vehicle without assistance from the outside. I really don't consider James Cameron a idiot, foolish or reckless in what he does. So there could be a perfectly good engineering reason for DSV's that the hatch is bolted from the outside before diving and is not capable of being opened from the inside.
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Lil late, but afaik the thing is too heavy to be buoyant at sea level, so it floats a little under. I don't think there's any form of 'remove hatch' (explosive bolt or otherwise) that can separate that cover from the hold. Too much water pressure keeping it in place. It's like trying to roll a car window down underwater.
 
[DHT]Osiris said:
Is buoyancy normalized at all depths? Water doesn't compressed so my smart-lizard brain says it should be equally buoyant... Either way, you still gotta attach a string to something, with something. Not like you're gonna snag it dredging the bottom.
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The buoyancy will vary somewhat depending on the salinity of the water.

More salt = more buoyancy. The salt content at sea is variable. Some areas in the ocean are nearly fresh water.

Salt layers also make it hard to locate an object as it masks sounds and causes a scattering effect.
 
What a shithead.

Stockton Rush's thoughts on safety:

www.thedailybeast.com

Red Flags: Titanic Sub Company Was Warned About Safety

OceanGate heard complaints from ex-employees and industry experts about its vessels well before this weekend’s ill-fated mission.
www.thedailybeast.com

Rush was quoted in a 2019 Smithsonian magazine piece expressing similar sentiments, bemoaning the fact that the submersibles industry “hasn’t innovated or grown—because they have all these regulations.” He specifically criticized the Passenger Vessel Safety Act of 1993, which imposed new standards on passenger vehicles for hire, for prioritizing passenger safety over commercial innovation, according to the profile.

The company posted an article on its website that same year about why its vessels are not “classed,” or assessed by outside inspectors like those the letter-writers recommended. In the post, first unearthed by Vice, the company claimed that “bringing an outside entity up to speed on every innovation before it is put into real-world testing is anathema to rapid innovation.”

“This does not mean that OceanGate does meet standards where they apply,” it added, “but it does mean that innovation often falls outside of the existing industry paradigm.”
 
pcgeek11 said:
Carbon Fiber Hull. No attachment points for hauling. The carbon fiber hull would probably tear apart from the stress.
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ooo, good call. it has to have some sort of framed reinforcement, know...or does that just compromise the carbon fiber at those pressures? pushing against a frame like that?

anyway, makes sense to me, maybe sounds stupid. haha.
 
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