Canadian nuclear lobbyists often refer to the "thorium cycle" as an alternative to the "plutonium economy." By itself, thorium -- which is more plentiful than uranium -- cannot be used to build an atomic bomb or to fuel a nuclear reactor. However, when thorium is placed inside a nuclear reactor, it "breeds" a new substance called uranium-233, which does not exist in nature. If the thorium is then reprocessed, the uranium-233, can be separated from the rest of the radioactive garbage and used as a reactor fuel. But uranium-233 is also an excellent weapons-grade material, in many respects superior to plutonium. Thus the thorium cycle in no way avoids the security problems associated with a plutonium economy. In January 1982, AECL announced plans to build a laboratory at Varennes, Quebec, to produce uranium-233 as an "artificial substitute" for natural uranium. (In technical terms, the AECL thorium cycle involves a "near-breeder" rather than a "breeder" concept.)
The new enthusiasm for the plutonium economy and the thorium cycle shows that, as before, any attempt to change the priorities of Canada's nuclear industry will run up against the wall of technological complexity that has given it a certain degree of immunity from lay scrutiny. But there is a larger obstacle: because of huge investments of public money and extensive public ownership, the goals of the nuclear lobby are inextricably intertwined with those of governments at various levels. It sometimes seems that the nuclear industry is a force unto itself, operating with impunity. On one of the rare occasions when AECL was held publicly accountable, during the investigations into financial wrongdoing by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, unsettling revelations came to light. In its final report, tabled on 27 February 1978, the committee concluded:
Some witnesses of AECL management were reluctant and uncooperative in testifying, and in the case of the chief witness, J. Lorne Gray, evasive as well.
Mr. Gray, then President of AECL, on his own initiative, committed the Crown corporation, and therefore the Government and the people of Canada, to immense expenditures of public funds for agents' fees. Furthermore, Mr. Gray did not know what services were being performed by the agents nor who ultimately received the payments. In the case of the Argentine sale, he stated that he did not even want to know the agent's identity.
Mr. Ross Campbell, Chairman of the AECL, not only failed to put the agreement [ with sales agent Shoul Eisenberg] on a better footing, but also appointed Eisenberg as exclusive agent for the sale of a second [CANDU] unit to South Korea without specifying the charges to be made for these services.
AECL management did not follow acceptable business practices ... nor did it have due regard for the high standard of business ethics which Crown corporations should observe.
The senior management of AECL, including the Secretary, the Treasurer, and the Internal Auditor, did not properly discharge their responsibilities as officers.