Unless you do not consider war to be a serious consequense, UNSC Resolution 1441 authorized war.
No, it most certainly did not.
cybrsage, true to your unfortunate character (one that has been banned from multiple tech sites for being a seriously dishonest disruption), you intentionally quoted me out of context to dishonestly retort with a needless argument that you knew to have already been concisely addressed:
That was an illegal invasion and the high crime of a war of aggression upon a sovereign state (as per UN Security Council resolution 1441, "Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq," and in that no following resolution initiated Chapter VII of the UN Charter to specify aggressive force against Iraq)
I recall nearly 7 years ago you being thoroughly trounced on
Rage3D for this very same topic. You are not present for an adequate discussion, only to argue and provoke.
cybrsage, as a decade old and consistently dishonest forum provocateur, you are not worthy of any more of my time (and neither to this forum), but for the interest and pleasure of other forum members who have a faint hope of leaving you behind and attaining a higher level of discourse, I offer this:
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Statements that the war upon Iraq in 2003 being legal are unjustifiable. For those who error in using Security Council Resolutions concerning Iraq as evidence for the legality of unilateral action, you are are mistaken. This is a result of public relations fiasco in which sections of text are taken out of context and lie is repeated long enough as to take hold a gospel by those who desire to believe it.
As per US law, US jurisdiction only applies to US territory. Whatever is acted upon internationally must be in legal accordance to relevant international law. US law is bound by international treaties and conventions that have been ratified by the USA. Aggression may not be acceptable without preceding or succeeding internationally ratified mandates (as per the
UN) that may justify a response to clear and active threat against another state, domestic genocide, or aggressive action from one state upon another.
In result of the Iraqi action upon Kuwait, as per the ratified
UN Resolutions since the end of the Gulf War hostilities and up to (..and beyond...) the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there was
NO MANDATE to authorise military aggression against the sovereign authority of Iraq. The fact that there was no existing mandate was evident in an
early 2003 Spanish government transcript between US President G.W. Bush, Secretary of State Rice, and former Spanish Prime Minister Aznar.
PM Aznar pushed President Bush to obtain a UN Security Council resolution that would specifically authorise the use of force against Saddam Hussein:
"This is like Chinese water torture. We have to bring an end to this." The Spanish president replied: "I agree, but it would be good to [be able to] count on the maximum number of people possible" - to have the backing of as many other countries as possible, that is. Aznar advised his American counterpart: "Have a little patience," to which Bush responded: "My patience has run out. I don't think we're going to go beyond the middle of March.
Such a Resolution was never obtained and the forlorn certainty to war came about.
1. Cease-Fire from the First Gulf War
For starters let’s blow away the Iraq breaking the
Cease-Fire Justification theory.
No member state had the authority to authorise its own forces to take aggressive action against Iraq. Of course this would have also involved illegal actions by Britain and the USA in the so called
no-fly-zones. November Resolution 678 (1990) gave participating UN member states the military mandate to intervene against Iraq for its aggression against Kuwait. April Resolution 687 (containing the
Cease-Fire) was drafted to nullify 678’s specific mandate upon the use of military force against Iraq. April Resolution 687 (1991) (containing the
Cease-Fire) was specific upon the further use of military against Iraq:
April Resolution 687 (1991) [Paragraph 4]: [The Security Council] … decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.
Only the Security Council may authorise a military mandate as contained in paragraph 2 of Resolution 687:
November Resolution 678 (1990) [Paragraph 2]: [The Security Council … acting under Chapter VII of the Charter] … authorizes Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements as set forth in paragraph 1 above the foregoing resolutions to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.
As per paragraph 4, the Security Council may re-convene to authorise and revive paragraph 2 – “all necessary means”, as in military force. The SC is the authority as the UN is party to the agreement. The US and Britain cannot unilaterally choose action against Iraq as they
are not unique parties to these resolutions.
Nothing contained in Resolution 687 specified that the Cease-Fire is conditional upon non-compliance with the inspection requirements.
There was
no mandate for an automatic renewal of military actions against Iraq by forces who partook in the 1991 Gulf War. Only following Resolutions may consider it by referencing 687 paragraph 2.
2. “No-Fly Zones”
No UN Resolution supported the existence of “No-Fly Zones” in Iraq. No such aircraft were subjects to any UN Chapter VI Observer mission, and there was
NO chapter VII mission enacted by the UN Security council to authorise air strikes in Iraq since the end of the first Gulf War. The "sovereignty" & "integrity" of Iraq (as re-defined in resolution 687) were consistently violated by aggressive foreign powers who had no UN authority for their actions:
April Resolution 687 (1991), Introduction, Paragraph 3:
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991),
The violations of Iraqi integrity and sovereignty by US and British bombings raids and even patrols (not affiliated with the UNSCOM weapon inspections) were in violation of UN resolutions often held up to defend the non-exist “No-Fly Zones”.
Though, there were zones in Iraq that were specified for certain non-Iraqi military forces to enter:
April Resolution 687 (1991), Paragraph 5:
... a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khawr 'AM AUah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the "Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq...
- US & British fighter and attack planes were not under the command nor part of the sanctioned UN observer unit
- there was zero reference in 687 to support any area the size of the no-fly zone, only the enactment of a small demilitarised zone.
Here, at the time, is
the opinion of the Secretary-General of the United Nations:
The US and also British governments justify it by claiming they have a UN Security Council resolution. To be sure about this, I asked Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who was Secretary General of the United Nations in 1992 when the Resolution 688 was passed. "The issue of no fly zones was not raised and therefore not debated: not a word," he said. "They offer no legitimacy to countries sending their aircraft to attack Iraq."
April Resolution 687 (1991), Paragraph 5:...to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone and to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State against the other;
Resolution 687 considered Iraq's conventional forces against
another state and
not domestic situations within Iraq...
The April Resolution 687 reaffirmed Iraq's sovereign integrity to external forces......
April Resolution 687 (1991), Paragraph 5:
and also requests the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Council on the operations of the unit and to do so immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace;
Again, no authorisation for a lone member state to judge and take action. The resolution only left it to the Secretary-General to present to the Security Council for
ASSESSMENT.
For Iraq targeting or even firing upon invading military aircraft, a 10km demilitarised zone into Southern Iraq hardly encompassed the vast and unauthorised “no-fly zones”.
Further 'The Safwan Accords' were nullified with the passing of UN Resolutions and there is no record of nor even a presentation to the Security Council of any UN Observer Force being engaged by Iraqi forces.
April Resolution 687 (1991), Paragraph 34:
Decides (Secretary-General and to the Security Council) to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the region.
If anyone still feels that April Resolution 687 alone give military action upon Iraq, the former is an unequivocal statement within one of the pertinent resolutions where an "
ASSESSMENT" and a new draft must be made by the UN Security Council before further action may be taken.
USA and Britain (
et all...) could not make an independent judgement and course of action. To conduct their own aggressive actions against Iraq were in violation of its "sovereignty" and "integrity" and a flagrant violation of international law of which they are parties to.
3. Resolution 1441
In early May 2005 news concerned PM Tony Blair's potential legal troubles over the Iraqi invasion. That news was too new, as a month before a former aid to the British AG came forth and stated he had informed his government that aggression against Iraq would be illegal.
As I referred to earlier, no nation (member UN state) is justified in using military force to assist a Security Council request without a direct request for assistance from the Security Council. The only two parties involved in all Resolutions upon Iraq were the Security Council and Iraq.
A key argument that was proposed in the fall of 2002 was that Resolution 1441 provided the only necessary mechanism for resumed state aggression against Iraq. That argument is false.
The adopted Resolution 1441 made no reference to a new Chapter VII action nor to re-enact Paragraph 2 of Resolution 678 (1990). That is the mechanism for the SC to authorise force (Chapter VII under the UN Charter) against Iraq. In Resolution 1441 no resumption of hostilities against Iraq are stated. Past resolutions are cited (including 678). There is no direct dismissal of Resolution 687 (1991 ceasefire agreement). That's the legal writing. Case closed there.
This is the portion of 1441 that brought a mechanism to re-evaluate Iraq's "final opportunity" (Paragraph 2, 1441) to comply with UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections:
Paragraph 4, Resolution 1441 (2002) : (Iraq) .... cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below"
In 2003 the USA and UK failed in their pressure to have the SC pass a further resolution to authorise force. Some perpetuate the false spin that 1441 offered all of necessary SC authorisation for renewed hostilities against Iraq. A common theme in marketing can be to repeat a lie long enough and then enough of the market will faithfully accept it. Now, what were the intentions of the authors in Resolution 1441?
There is a telling quotation from a primary source for the draft of 1441. An adopted draft for 1441 came from the UK and the USA. In November of 2002 an article from the LA Times concerning the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, John D. Negroponte’s, view upon the adoption of 1441:
LA Times, November 8, 2002: "There's no 'automaticity' and this is a two-stage process, and in that regard we have met the principal concerns that have been expressed for the resolution," U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte said. "Whatever violation there is, or is judged to exist, will be dealt with in the council, and the council will have an opportunity to consider the matter before any other action is taken.
From the horses mouth…. An author of Resolution 1441 – the prime US participant to drafting it.
Despite this unambiguous spoken record and clear statements within Resolution 1441, the months that followed had White House and Whitehall spokespeople spreading a falsehood that authorisation existed and an invasion being legal.
Since the end of hostilities (as outlined in April 1991 Resolution 687) between Iraq and 'Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait' there has never again been "authorization" for "all necessary means" by member states to uphold a single resolution against the sovereign government of Iraq.
Any unauthorised member state military entry into Iraq was in violation of April Resolution 687. Reaffirmed in 1441 (as per 687), all member states were to retain recognition and respect of the "
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq". The cessation of hostilities and affirmation of Iraqi sovereignty and integrity as per 687
WAS recalled within 1441, and was
NOT repealed. That ALONE is cemented grounds for the 2003 Iraq war to be illegal.
Beyond that, never was there the passing of a UN Resolution that called for the invasion and the disbandment of the Iraq government.
In 2007, the Spanish press published a transcript of a meeting between former Spanish President Aznar and President Bush. What was recorded support that a campaign of deception was instigated for the USA to lie to the public upon any existing mandate for military aggression upon Iraq. This was recently solidified after
Bush's quotations from a meeting with the former Spanish President:
President Bush: We're in favor of obtaining a second resolution in the Security Council and we'd like to do it quickly. We'd like to announce it on Monday or Tuesday [February 24, 2003].
...
President Bush: It could be Monday afternoon, taking the time zone differences into account. In any case, next week. We're looking at a resolution drafted in such a way that it doesn't contain mandatory elements, that doesn't mention the use of force, and that states that Saddam Hussein has been incapable of fulfilling his obligations. That kind of resolution can be voted for by lots of people. It would be similar to the one passed during Kosovo [on June 10, 1999].
...
Condoleezza Rice: In fact there won't be a parallel declaration. We're thinking about a resolution that would be as simple as possible, without too many details on compliance that Saddam could use as [an excuse to stall via] phases and consequently fail to meet. We're talking with Blix [the UN chief inspector] and others on his team, to get ideas that can help introduce the resolution.
President Bush: Saddam Hussein won't change and he'll continue playing games. The time has come to get rid of him. That's it. As for me, I'll try from now on to use a rhetoric that's as subtle as can be while we're seeking approval of the resolution. If anyone vetoes [Russia, China, and France together with the US and the UK have veto power in the Security Council, being permanent members], we'll go. Saddam Hussein isn't disarming. We have to catch him right now.
...
We'd like to act with the mandate of the United Nations. If we act militarily, we'll do it with great precision and focus very closely on our objectives.
...
Prime Minister Aznar: It's very important to [be able to] count on a resolution. It isn't the same to act with it as without it. It would be very convenient to count on a majority in the Security Council that would support that resolution. In fact, having a majority is more important than anyone casting a veto. We think the content of the resolution should state, among other things, that Saddam Hussein has lost his opportunity.
President Bush: Yes, of course. That would be better than to make a reference to "all means necessary" [he refers to the standard UN resolution that authorizes the use of "all means necessary"].
Bush is on the record for recognising that he did not have a
UN 'mandate' to take military action against Iraq. He is on record that he intended to act with or without such a legal mandate.
In Britain, there was also the position that warfare would be illegal. Yet through political pressure to appease the absolute warfare policy of the USA, Downing Street was quite adamant in coercing the Attorney General's office into changing their view (into a falsified opinion) to match the
political policy or face consequences:
The Guardian, 'Revealed: the rush to war' Wednesday February 23, 2005
The attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, warned less than two weeks before the invasion of Iraq that military action could be ruled illegal.
The government was so concerned that it might be prosecuted it set up a team of lawyers to prepare for legal action in an international court.
And a parliamentary answer issued days before the war in the name of Lord Goldsmith - but presented by ministers as his official opinion before the crucial Commons vote - was drawn up in Downing Street, not in the attorney general's chambers.
The full picture of how the government manipulated the legal justification for war, and political pressure placed on its most senior law officer, is revealed in the Guardian today.
It appears that Lord Goldsmith never wrote an unequivocal formal legal opinion that the invasion was lawful, as demanded by Lord Boyce, chief of defence staff at the time.
The Guardian can also disclose that in her letter of resignation in protest against the war, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, deputy legal adviser at the Foreign Office, described the planned invasion of Iraq as a "crime of aggression".
She said she could not agree to military action in circumstances she described as "so detrimental to the international order and the rule of law".
That was corroborated in the infamous
Downing Street memo:
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult.
...
Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action..... It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.
War was the policy. War was not to be averted, regardless of the true lack of justification and legal positions. It remains illegal. Despite what was stated in public, by all state parties involved, behind closed doors, it was known that the venture had no legal mandate.
As Habayausa Rider said, the open destruction of Fallujah occurred as a result of the larger stragetic picture of the optional invasion of Iraq and the declared goal of attaining submission upon any segement of the justifiably revolting population.
Such an option to war was not necessary nor was it legal, and when states blatently commit to such high of a crime, it of little surprise that further misuse of their forces result in crimes against humanity.
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