I'd be interested in the actual training requirements of US pilots vs some of the other programs. I see the pilot was well experienced, but the copilot was much greener than any US pilot would be in that scenario. A 20+ year friend needed a lot more hours to get a copilot gig on an executive jet service. He'll likely work that for a bit, switch seats and continue to gather jet flight hours before moving up the ladder so to speak of commercial aviation.
I teach folks to operate fire apparatus, which while obviously less complex than a jet, have both theory and practical components. There's actually a bit of hydraulic theory in calculating different fire scene scenarios, and then translating that to various hands on tasks.
One thing I notice, is that some folks (and programs) ask how much training does it take so someone can get it right? Others ask how much training it takes so folks can't get it wrong? As in true understanding of what you are doing, (virtually) anything that can go wrong, and what can be done. I know our career drivers far exceed the minimum national standards, as in an 800+ person department running as many calls as we do, know the problems will eventually come up and bite us if we aren't prepared. Others are ok with good enough vs the price and time of exceeding the minimum.
But, I have noticed this trend exists elsewhere. I was in a position to reorient our military reservists as they returned from deployment (we give veteran preference, so we have a lot of current and former military). The high speed units (we have several Ranger Regiment/Special Forces) vs regular infantry were given more time and money to train and drill. And they kept going until they were convinced they had drilled any scenario they could think of, and a response to it. (By no means am I saying other units weren't well trained, just that some get a bigger ammo budget, training allowances, etc)
Bringing this back to the airplane issue, I understand the MCAS issue is new, but appears to cause the same symptoms as a "runaway trim." Both end up with the electric trim pushing the nose down, just for different reasons. The fix for both issues is to manually disable the electric trim to resume intended pitch/altitude, get on the ground quickly/safely and get it fixed ASAP (which unfortunately could have been done in the first crash at least and wasn't, as the plane was allowed to fly a second time after having the issue on a prior flight). It seems like a pilot well versed in all prior emergency operations would have fixed this, regardless of the new issue.
I teach folks to operate fire apparatus, which while obviously less complex than a jet, have both theory and practical components. There's actually a bit of hydraulic theory in calculating different fire scene scenarios, and then translating that to various hands on tasks.
One thing I notice, is that some folks (and programs) ask how much training does it take so someone can get it right? Others ask how much training it takes so folks can't get it wrong? As in true understanding of what you are doing, (virtually) anything that can go wrong, and what can be done. I know our career drivers far exceed the minimum national standards, as in an 800+ person department running as many calls as we do, know the problems will eventually come up and bite us if we aren't prepared. Others are ok with good enough vs the price and time of exceeding the minimum.
But, I have noticed this trend exists elsewhere. I was in a position to reorient our military reservists as they returned from deployment (we give veteran preference, so we have a lot of current and former military). The high speed units (we have several Ranger Regiment/Special Forces) vs regular infantry were given more time and money to train and drill. And they kept going until they were convinced they had drilled any scenario they could think of, and a response to it. (By no means am I saying other units weren't well trained, just that some get a bigger ammo budget, training allowances, etc)
Bringing this back to the airplane issue, I understand the MCAS issue is new, but appears to cause the same symptoms as a "runaway trim." Both end up with the electric trim pushing the nose down, just for different reasons. The fix for both issues is to manually disable the electric trim to resume intended pitch/altitude, get on the ground quickly/safely and get it fixed ASAP (which unfortunately could have been done in the first crash at least and wasn't, as the plane was allowed to fly a second time after having the issue on a prior flight). It seems like a pilot well versed in all prior emergency operations would have fixed this, regardless of the new issue.
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