We need to show these savages like the Taliban some real terror from Christian Jews like me. I prefer a campaign of beheadings until we have broken their community.
The nuclear option should have been used after 911. The beheadings should be used to break the Taliban and Al Qaida.
Weakness is complicated. Strength is simple.
As many real and would-be dictators have found to their sorrow, might alone does not make right (for decades and generations, anyway). Killing enemies does ensure they won't return, but new ones always come up. It's like cutting off a hydra; kill some, others pop up.
What I didn't mention in my previous post is that terrorism/counterinsurgency have a political dimension as well. It takes on additional importance since in Iraq and Afghanistan, the intent of the US is not to occupy and permanently take over the respective nations, but eliminate the perceived threat against us and ensure the survival of a friendly government.
And as I said before, brutal tactics can sometimes backfire. I seem to recall that Saddam was sentenced to die by hanging. A (Shiite?) guard managed to sneak in and film Saddam's last moments. What happened? It ENRAGED Sunnis.
Public displays are effective IF they are also backed by effective and PRECISE actions. You can discourage people from openly rebelling by catching and hanging the ringleaders, but indiscriminately killing/pillaging the local inhabitants only ensures support for the insurgents. The political aspect of counterinsurgency/terrorism is every bit as important as the military aspect, as there is NO way to kill every single terrorist without creating new ones in the long run.
Strength is important, but make the young and foolish assumption of thinking that might alone equals strength, when any number of things prove victorious (ie. your interpretation of David vs Goliath). To use yet more examples, the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan, the French lost Vietnam, and the Russians are unable to pacify Chechnya, despite having quite the reputation for taking no prisoners in that hellish country.
Vietnam? It was the epitome of a hand cuffed war. Whole cities were off limits to attack like their capital and enclaves they escaped to cross borders.
Halberstam makes the point that (Bundy's?) idea of a "gradual escalation" was flawed strategy even though the planner(s) envisioned it as moderate since it neither meant a result to total annihilation of the enemy nor withdrawing with the USA's tail tucked between its legs. I think your idea of a 'handcuffed war' is similarly flawed.
The US obviously showed a measure of restraint, but even if what you say is true (and I am not able to agree or disagree with you on your supporting argument), the US certainly spared little expense in attempting to defeat the Vietcong. The air force undertook massive carpet bombings (ie Operation Rollng Thunder), US soldiers went on "search and destroy" missions, etc. The problem was not the lack of political/military support, technological might, and military superiority. The US had all of those. The problem was that the US's strategy and perception of strength as well as what constituted "winning" and "losing" (ie McNamara's infamous obsession with statistics such as the inflated figures of Vietcong body counts) was flawed and wrongly tried to fix a political problem (counterinsurgency) by military means.
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