Atreus21
Lifer
The decision can be read here, but a summary is as follows:
1. The women's team made more money than the men. They averaged $220,747 per game whereas the men averaged $212,639.
2. The women's team made less in bonuses, but this was offset by their receiving guaranteed annual salaries and severance pay, which the men don't get. Furthermore, in 2016 the women were offered higher bonuses similar to the men's CBA but rejected it in favor of higher base salary or other benefits.
3. The women's team would've made more under the men's collective bargaining agreement, but the men would also have made less under the women's CBA.
Some excerpts from the decision:
1. The women's team made more money than the men. They averaged $220,747 per game whereas the men averaged $212,639.
2. The women's team made less in bonuses, but this was offset by their receiving guaranteed annual salaries and severance pay, which the men don't get. Furthermore, in 2016 the women were offered higher bonuses similar to the men's CBA but rejected it in favor of higher base salary or other benefits.
3. The women's team would've made more under the men's collective bargaining agreement, but the men would also have made less under the women's CBA.
Some excerpts from the decision:
This approach - merely comparing what each team would have made under the other team's CBA - is untenable in this case because it ignores the reality that the MNT and WNT bargained for different agreements which reflect different preferences, and that the WNT explicitly rejected the terms they now seek to retroactively impose on themselves. The first time the WNT requested bonuses equivalent to those received by the MNT was in January 2016. USSF rejected that proposal, however, because the WNT was not asking for a pay-to-play arrangement similar to the MNT CBA; instead, it was asking for all of the upsides of the MNT CBA (namely, higher bonuses) without any of the drawbacks (e.g., no base salary).
This history of negotiations between the paiiies demonstrates that the WNT (Women's team) rejected an offer to be paid under the same pay-to-play structure as the MNT (Men's team), and that the WNT was willing to forgo higher bonuses for other benefits, such as greater base compensation and the guarantee of a higher number of contracted players. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot now retroactively deem their CBA worse than the MNT CBA by reference to what they would have made had they been paid under the MNT's pay-to-play strncture when they themselves rejected such a structure. This method of comparison not only fails to account for the choices made during collective bargaining, it also ignores the economic value of the "insurance" that WNT players receive under their CBA. One of the defining features of the WNT CBA is its guarantee that players will be compensated regardless of whether they play a match or not. This stands in stai·k contrast to the MNT CBA, under which players are only compensated if they are called into camp to play and then paiiicipate in a match. It is difficult to attach a dollar value to this "insurance" benefit, and neither party attempts to do so here.