Originally posted by: DealMonkey
Originally posted by: ElFenix
Originally posted by: DealMonkey
Let me ask you this: Essentially at this point, the cats out of the bag. Only the most ignorant, stupid, and isolated terrorist would NOT know about our wiretapping and global surveillance efforts courtesy of the NSA. Do you really think it's wise to underestimate our opponents and assume that our continued surveillance methods are going to catch any of our adversaries saying anything of importance via an unsecured communications channel?
Frankly, much of the value of the various NSA spying program was lost once their existence was revealed. Do you really think our adversaries are not going to shift their communications in a way that prevents our surveillance? This wouldn't be very difficult, when you consider simply meeting in person in an isolated area, or passing information through the mail, or even using hardened encryption would render our efforts useless? And I'm merely mentioning a handful of methods that would work, I'm sure there are others.
There was a time when these programs were valuable, however IMHO that time is over, and now their continued existence, especially with regards to targeting Americans at home or abroad, is merely an affront to our civil liberties and a sad reminder of an Administration who felt like they could ignore the rule of law and do whatever they wish in the name of national security.
some types of things can be communicated just as well via courier or face to face meetings as via electronic communication, but some things need to be done, said, or known *now,* and those will continue to be electronic.
and who says they can't monitor secured communications? these guys have a lot of supercomputers.
It's certainly possible, however hardened encryption would certainly slow them down considerably. I'd find it interesting to know just what plots were unraveled and what suspects were apprehended as a result of the NSA's efforts over the years. While we're probably never get to hear anything either way, I'd bet that the effectiveness rate of the program has diminished over the years.
Intelligence can be effective, even when your adversaries know some of your strategies and methods. IMINT was effective in ending the exposing Soviet efforts to deploy missiles in Cuba, even as the Soviets employed thorough denial and deception. They sent some of their naval crews off with winter gear, so that even they believed they were traveling somewhere cold. The ships which later delivered missiles were laden with agricultural equipment to appear as "aid" shipments. But the images which Adlai Stevenson famously revealed at the United Nations laid the truth bare:
STEVENSON: All right, sir, let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no?don?t wait for the translation?yes or no?
ZORIN: [No answer]
STEVENSON: You can answer yes or no. You have denied they exist. I want to know if I understood you correctly. I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that?s your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room.
...and then the evidence was shown, which proved beyond a shadow of doubt that the Soviets were deploying missiles in Cuba. The Soviets were more or less aware of our capabilities, and a number of techniques were developed to hide from sources and methods they knew the US possessed.
And yet, they couldn't hide.
Similarly, other intelligence collection methods can continue to be effective...are they more effective when the adversary isn't aware of them, or perhaps no concept that such activity could even occur? Of course. Sources of intelligence dry up all the time. New practices attempt to evade existing methods.
Foreign SIGINT is a valuable component of our intelligence capabilities. Modernization of existing policy and statute to allow foreign intelligence agencies to do their jobs in a changing technological landscape was a critical step, one that was certainly accelerated by an attack against US soil by an agile non-state actor.
So my answer is that the activities undertaken by NSA after 9/11 were performed in good faith, and with respect for our laws and Constitution, with supporting legal opinions, in the interests of protecting the United States. Some may disagree, but many of those same individuals are likely not aware of the complexity and gravity of the situation: they are consuming a fairly one-sided view, often with intensely political motivations. And the other issue is that it's difficult for the intelligence agencies themselves to speak. Intelligence agencies not political operators, and the work is performed in secret. The question about SIGINT successes may never be answered in full...
For those still wondering about the legality of various NSA activities from 2001-2007, I
strongly encourage you to read, or at least scan, the following DOJ White Paper detailing the asserted legal authority of early (pre-2007) NSA activity:
LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT, US Department of Justice, 19 January 2006
Note that this is a legal
opinion. It is an assertion of authority that has not been tested, and may never be fully tested, by the courts. Some may disagree with aspects of the assertions. The critically important point to remember for those with a political point of view who believe that the administration egregiously flouted the law and Constitution, and the point I want to make very clear, is that there was always a legal opinion supporting any and all activities undertaken in any systematic or official capacity. All of the activities in question, except for warrantless surveillance of certain US Persons believed to be communicating with terrorist targets claimed allowable under war powers, are also explicitly legal under the current law and judicial review.
Again, please take the time to read the above document, or at the very least glance through the obvious pertinent section.
