All in all, quite a number prominent people have been advocating Taliban Nato talks for years. Including Hamid Karzai, US ambassadors, and British and US generals. And the Saudis, as I recall tried to broker such talks a number of years ago. And it was the Taliban who basically refused then.
But IMHO, it was a giant mistake to lump the Taliban and Al-Quida together after 911, but when Nato started a shoot on sight policy for the Taliban, its somewhat understandable that the homegrown movement is equally anti Nato and now totally violent.
But we also have to understand, what the Taliban was then and what it is now are two almost totally different things, if nothing else, because its leadership and membership is totally different.
At one time, Mullah Omar may have been the spiritual leader of the Taliban, but now that many new members have been added who had no previous use for Taliban dogma and still do not, I very much doubt that Mullah Omar is any longer a unifying figure or the only go to guy in such negotiations.
To get more specific on new elements in a changing Taliban, we should note many former militants active against the Russians, Tribal leaders on both sides of the border not formerly favored by the old Taliban, and worse yet many war lords, drug dealers, and corrupt Afghan government officials who want to enjoy the fruits of corruption without excess risky violence. And as Obama discovered in early 2009, the areas of Afghanistan that had the least violence had already been quietly rolled up in such a new Taliban type coalition of you scratch my back and I will scratch yours.
As for Al-Quida, I very much doubt its all that effective, and such a Taliban negotiation strategy could drive a wedge between Al-Quida and the new Taliban if Nato can convince the new Taliban they are a liability.
As for any such new Taliban future in Afghanistan, I have to remain optimistic that the Taliban can't last all that long. Mere modernity and economic development are the cures and universal panacea for such reactionary movements. And if Nato, through such negotiations can achieve a large reduction in violence like in Iraq, time, economic development, and the inevitable pace of modernity can achieve a much improved Afghanistan long term even though the short term will not be pretty.
Because the other alternative is Nato coming up with the 600,000 plus troops to win on Nato terms. Since the 600,000 troops is unlikely, all we have proved is that Nato can't win with the troop numbers we are willing to come up with.
And we also have to realize that the Taliban came to power initially on a platform of corruption fighting. And to some extent, female rights and human rights may be negotiable in exchange for power sharing.
But none of that is now known and won't be until negotiations start. But right now, Nato is in a mess in Afghanistan and is probably worse off than when they started in
late 2001.