Trump shutdown delayed work on software fix for 737 MAX unexpected nosedive problem

[UNCjigga]

So it looks like a previous crew and an off duty pilot were able to figure out what to do, but, did not give that information to the next crew.

Not sure if that's entirely accurate... I'm not sure if I remember this right, but the segment I watched mentioned how this off duty pilot thought it was a fault with the mechanical system that actuated MCAS...not the software itself. What that off duty pilot did was cut power to the system, so MCAS "thought" it was working. The mechanical system was flushed, reset and tested as working before the next flight...so MCAS could successfully crash the plane.

 

[hal2kilo]

Uh oh, Boeings got some splaining to do.
Justice Dept opens investigation

Looks like they got more splaining to do.
Pentagon ethics investigation by acting secretary

So dedicated to draining the swamp.

 

[K1052]

Jesus Christ.

The Roots of Boeing’s 737 Max Crisis: A Regulator Relaxes Its Oversight

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/business/boeing-737-max-faa.html

In the days after the first crash of Boeing’s 737 Max, engineers at the Federal Aviation Administration came to a troubling realization: They didn’t fully understand the automated system that helped send the plane into a nose-dive, killing everyone on board.

Engineers at the agency scoured their files for information about the system designed to help avoid stalls. They didn’t find much. Regulators had never independently assessed the risks of the dangerous software known as MCAS when they approved the plane in 2017.

The company performed its own assessments of the system, which were not stress-tested by the regulator. Turnover at the agency left two relatively inexperienced engineers overseeing Boeing’s early work on the system.

The F.A.A. eventually handed over responsibility for approval of MCAS to the manufacturer. After that, Boeing didn’t have to share the details of the system with the two agency engineers. They weren’t aware of its intricacies, according to two people with knowledge of the matter.

Late in the development of the Max, Boeing decided to expand the use of MCAS, to ensure the plane flew smoothly. The new, riskier version relied on a single sensor and could push down the nose of the plane by a much larger amount.

Boeing did not submit a formal review of MCAS after the overhaul. It wasn’t required by F.A.A. rules. An engineering test pilot at the regulator knew about the changes, according to an agency official. But his job was to evaluate the way the plane flew, not to determine the safety of the system.

The regulator’s hands-off approach was pivotal. At crucial moments in the Max’s development, the agency operated in the background, mainly monitoring Boeing’s progress and checking paperwork. The nation’s largest aerospace manufacturer, Boeing was treated as a client, with F.A.A. officials making decisions based on the company’s deadlines and budget.

For decades, the F.A.A. relied on engineers inside Boeing to help certify aircraft. But after intense lobbying by industry, the agency adopted rules in 2005 that would give manufacturers like Boeing even more control. Previously, the agency selected the company engineers to work on its behalf; under the new regulations, Boeing could choose them.

Many of the agency’s top leaders embraced the approach. It would allow the F.A.A. to certify planes more efficiently and stretch its limited resources. The regulator had also been finding it harder to compete for talented engineers, their government salaries unable to keep up with the going rates in the industry.

For Boeing, the changes meant shedding a layer of bureaucracy. “The process was working well,” said Tom Heineman, a retired Boeing engineer who worked on the Max. “The F.A.A. was delegating more of the work and the review and the oversight to the manufacturers than it used to.”

Nicole Potter, an F.A.A. propulsion and fuel systems engineer who worked on the Max, said supervisors repeatedly asked her to give up the right to approve safety documents. She often had to fight to keep the work.

“Leadership was targeting a high level of delegation,” Ms. Potter said. When F.A.A. employees didn’t have time to approve a critical document, she said, “managers could delegate it back to Boeing.”

It was a process Mr. Bahrami championed to lawmakers. After spending more than two decades at the F.A.A., he left the agency in 2013 and took a job at the Aerospace Industries Association, a trade group that represents Boeing and other manufacturers.

The F.A.A. engineers were particularly concerned about pieces hitting the cables that control the rudder, according to five people with knowledge of the matter and internal agency documents. A cable severed during takeoff would make it difficult for pilots to regain control, potentially bringing down the jet.

The F.A.A. engineers suggested a couple solutions, three of the people said. The company could add a second set of cables or install a computerized system for controlling the rudder.

Boeing did not want to make a change, according to internal F.A.A. documents reviewed by The Times. A redesign could have caused delays. Company engineers argued that it was unlikely that an engine would break apart and shrapnel would hit the rudder cable.

Most of the F.A.A. engineers working on the issue insisted the change was necessary for safety reasons, according to internal agency emails and documents. But their supervisors balked. In a July 2015 meeting, Jeff Duven, who replaced Mr. Bahrami as the head of the F.A.A.’s Seattle operation, sided with Boeing, said two current employees at the agency.

F.A.A. managers conceded that the Max “does not meet” agency guidelines “for protecting flight controls,” according to an agency document. But in another document, they added that they had to consider whether any requested changes would interfere with Boeing’s timeline. The managers wrote that it would be “impractical at this late point in the program,” for the company to resolve the issue. Mr. Duven at the F.A.A. also said the decision was based on the safety record of the plane.

The engineers, who had a combined 50 years of experience, had joined the office at its creation, taking on responsibility for flight control systems, including MCAS. But they both grew frustrated with the work, which they saw as mostly paper pushing, according to two people with knowledge of the staff changes.

In their place, the F.A.A. appointed an engineer who had little experience in flight controls, and a new hire who had gotten his master’s degree three years earlier. People who worked with the two engineers said they seemed ill-equipped to identify any problems in a complex system like MCAS.

When company engineers analyzed the change, they figured that the system had not become any riskier, according to two people familiar with Boeing’s discussions on the matter. They assumed that pilots would respond to a malfunction in three seconds, quickly bringing the nose of the plane back up. In their view, any problems would be less dangerous at low speeds.

So the company never submitted an updated safety assessment of those changes to the agency. In several briefings in 2016, an F.A.A. test pilot learned the details of the system from Boeing. But the two F.A.A. engineers didn’t understand that MCAS could move the tail as much as 2.5 degrees, according to two people familiar with their thinking.

This constitutes a growing argument that the aircraft was improperly certified and may contain other potentially serious design issues.

 

[Paratus]

Jesus Christ.

The Roots of Boeing’s 737 Max Crisis: A Regulator Relaxes Its Oversight

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/business/boeing-737-max-faa.html




























This constitutes a growing argument that the aircraft was improperly certified and may contain other potentially serious design issues.

I’ll have to read the article but this is about what I was expecting after hearing the FAA sub’d out the regulatory oversight.

They should have had a full up safety process including system hazard reviews.

 

[SlowSpyder]

Trump is to blame for plane crashes now.

Got it.

 

[senseamp]

If it's that Boeing, I am not going.

 

[DarthKyrie]

Trump is to blame for plane crashes now.

Got it.

Actually, that would be George W Bush that cut those expensive regulations that Boeing couldn't possibly afford to follow because the shareholders demand MILLIONS of dollars every quarter. So they just had to cut corners to meet deadlines and the demands of the shareholders', people that could die because of those corners being cut are just collateral damage so fuck em all.

We need to cut even more regulations on the aircraft industry, maybe we will be able to have planes falling out of the sky on an hourly basis.

 

[K1052]

If it's that Boeing, I am not going.

I'd flown on some Maxes from a couple airlines before they got grounded. Has to be the most uncomfortable new aircraft I've experienced. Decreased seat pitch, higher density seating, thinly padded chairs with tiny armrests, and bathrooms that my towering 5'5" frame even managed to make feel tight. The narrower fuselage compared to the A320 really becoming apparent these days. The airlines were in love because of the operating cost, nothing more.

No thanks for anything more than an hour or two.

 

[ivwshane]

Trump is to blame for plane crashes now.

Got it.

Too bad you weren't on one of those planes. Then maybe you'd give a shit about somebody other than your cult leader, trump.

 

[HomerJS]

Trump is to blame for plane crashes now.

Got it.

Deregulation is to blame for the crash. You'll have to ask what's left of your brain who is to blame for the deregulation.