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Actually BeauJangles, I hope you are right, but the criteria that you cite just shows you have little understanding of terrorism tactics. Its not that the terrorist is too cowardly to take on the US army directly, its a matter that the smart terrorists attack only at points weakly defended. And this has shown true for the recent history of the Afghan war.
Of course the Taliban wants to attack weak targets, but we're seeing that they've become less and less capable of doing so. Engagements directly with US military forces are declining and the 'masses' that were once willing to blow themselves up, pick up a rifle, or provide material support to terrorism are waning.
We have three excellent case studies on this "take the battle to the enemy strategy": Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel. In all three, the terrorized country first reacted by sitting back and doing little (think US reaction after 1993 WTC attacks). By leaving these terrorist groups "alone" and letting them operate unabated in countries like Afghanistan, we let their dialogue dominate the people there.
By taking the fight to these terrorists' homelands they've been forced to use their deadly tactics on the very people that support them. That didn't go over very well. In Hamas' case, a combination of suicide bombings, Israeli incursions, and economic stagnation essentially forced terrorism to take a back seat to people's practical needs and wants. We're seeing the same thing in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
That doesn't mean the war is won. There are still committed terrorists out there (see Iraq), but they are no longer garnering the support of everyone around them and, for the most part, their tactics have turned people against them.
Nato can launch an offensive in any Taliban controlled point, go in with guns blazing , shoot the place up while dislocated civilians in lots greater than 100,000. And then declare the location Taliban free. Then Nato goes somewhere else to rinse and repeat. And as Nato packs off from place A to place B, the Taliban is right at their heels, setting back up their shadow government and control of place A.
In theory, but that theory requires that the Taliban has a limitless supply of bodies. They don't and, after this winter in which the US military forced these combatants to come out and basically fight them to toe-to-toe in freezing cold weather, they're finding it harder and harder to get the young men they need to keep their operations going. Not to mention that those operations targeted important people in the Taliban, the ones who would be out recruiting more young people to join their fight.
Meanwhile, US drone strikes and DA missions by SOCOM have helped eliminate many of their middle managers and kept many others in hiding. Again, it's hard to recruit when your leaders are stuck in caves, running for their lives, or dead.
Let's also consider that the Taliban is actively trying to change tactics from roadside bombings to suicide attacks. Why? Primarily because the US has gotten extremely good at detecting roadside bombs - over 70% are found. Those that aren't found are having a harder time killing Americans thanks to MRAPs and such, but are killing civilians more and more often. These increased deaths are leading to more reports of roadside bombs, the bomb labs, and the bomb makers.
If Nato ever want to consolidate any gains and win the war against the Taliban, they need at least 100,000 more troops and the commitment of development resources.
Those numbers sound pretty arbitrary to me and considering that the Taliban's Spring Offensive this year has been nothing but a bunch of yelling and screaming at the Western media, I would say that there is evidence to the contrary.
Even if the Afghan people may want Nato to win, they also realize they get perpetual anarchy because Nato will never commit enough resources to defeat the Taliban. As the Guerrilla war opponent, the Taliban does not have to defeat Nato, they only have to outlast Nato.
Not particularly true. Most people are eager for a more effective central government. Coalition forces will make significant progress when they realize that having a centralized Western government in Afghanistan won't work. They will have to compromise on some very key issues to build a constituency of local leaders that will act far more like a feudal government than the ones we are used to. That being said, I think it can be done.
Meanwhile the corrupt government of Karzai
Every bit of information the world has says that the Afghans would rather have corruption than the Taliban, who is pretty careless with the lives of the civilians under its control. In border regions corruption can trigger Taliban support, but it seems that it is short-lived. Particularly once the ultra-religious rules return and the "traitors" start being beheaded.
and US drone use, keep the Taliban flush with new recruits.
I think that a few years ago the predator strikes in Afghanistan were driving people towards the Taliban. The Taliban is a lot weaker than it was a few years ago though and the thought of randomly being blown up while training to fight the infidels is a pretty strong motivator to keep people away from the Taliban.
With the US and Nato pullout scheduled in 2014, my best guess is the Taliban will stay the course for at least 3 years more. If anything else, other than some Arab raised Taliban funding, losing OBL is an asset to the Taliban.
Considering AQ and the Taliban had a shaky, at best relationship, the death of OBL, who kept their rather awkward alliance together, is a major blow to their ability to receive outside assistance. They'll try to spin it some other way, but the truth is that most Taliban leaders couldn't stand AQ because they looked down on them and AQ couldn't stand them because they thought they were idiots. Not exactly good grounds for a continued to partnership.
But a Taliban victory could come sooner, if Pakistan tells Nato they can no longer use Pakistani roads as a supply line.
The US will find ways to bring supplies into Afghanistan. That isn't what will turn the war.
What I alluded to above was that the US will have to compromise on a Western-style government in order to end this conflict. If the Taliban can be convinced to lay down its weapons and join some sort of political process (and idea that was impossible two years ago, but is closer to a reality now) and if some of these warlords can also be brought in (issues with drugs are a big problem), then we could have the makings of a relatively stable, if unconventional, government.
Your fundamental assumption is wrong, though. The Taliban aren't very well liked in most of Afghanistan, either, so it's not like they'll be hailed as heroes if they somehow survive the rest of this war.