- Jan 12, 2005
- 9,500
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Wash Post article
In a big front-page Washington Post article today, it is made abundantly clear that the President's program is a dragnet that collects information on thousands of completely innocent Americans via secret eavesdropping and nets almost nothing in the way of uncovering actual terrorist activity.
Wonder why the Administration ignored FISA? Think it's about "agility" in being able to respond quickly to terrorist threats? Think again:
Do you think that the Administration even cares if what it's doing is legal? Do you think opposing viewpoints within the intelligence community are considered seriously, and that honest, open debate is encouraged? Yeah, right:
The "threshold" used by the NSA to determine if a communication between someone in the U.S. and an overseas contact is adequate to justify eavesdropping is "pattern analysis" of behavior:
Apparently, this is a program that yields almost nothing in the way of actual results:
And anyone care to guess how many of those "single digits" of suspicious communications that get "drilled down" from the warrantless program and get presented to the FISA court actually lead to real terrorists? Think just maybe we might have heard about even ONE such terrorist, considering how much negative press the surveillance program has received? I'm guessing the actual number of terrorists ensnared is exactly ZERO.
And do you think that once a surveillance has proven to be of no value, the captured email or phone call is flushed from the system? You don't REALLY think the Bush Administration cares about protecting the private information of innocents, do you:
There's a LOT more to this large article. Read and be disgusted.
In a big front-page Washington Post article today, it is made abundantly clear that the President's program is a dragnet that collects information on thousands of completely innocent Americans via secret eavesdropping and nets almost nothing in the way of uncovering actual terrorist activity.
Wonder why the Administration ignored FISA? Think it's about "agility" in being able to respond quickly to terrorist threats? Think again:
Valuable information remains valuable even if it comes from one in a thousand intercepts. But government officials and lawyers said the ratio of success to failure matters greatly when eavesdropping subjects are Americans or U.S. visitors with constitutional protection. The minimum legal definition of probable cause, said a government official who has studied the program closely, is that evidence used to support eavesdropping ought to turn out to be "right for one out of every two guys at least." Those who devised the surveillance plan, the official said, "knew they could never meet that standard -- that's why they didn't go through" the court that supervises the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA.
Do you think that the Administration even cares if what it's doing is legal? Do you think opposing viewpoints within the intelligence community are considered seriously, and that honest, open debate is encouraged? Yeah, right:
Intelligence lawyers said FISA plainly requires a warrant if the government wants real-time access to that information for any one person at a time. But the FISA court, as some lawyers saw it, had no explicit jurisdiction over wholesale collection of records that do not include the content of communications. One high-ranking intelligence official who argued for a more cautious approach said he found himself pushed aside. Awkward silences began to intrude on meetings that discussed the evolving rules.
"I became aware at some point of things I was not being told about," the intelligence official said.
The "threshold" used by the NSA to determine if a communication between someone in the U.S. and an overseas contact is adequate to justify eavesdropping is "pattern analysis" of behavior:
Pattern analysis . . . does not depend on ties to a known suspect. It begins with places terrorists go, such as the Pakistani province of Waziristan, and things they do, such as using disposable cell phones and changing them frequently, which U.S. officials have publicly cited as a challenge for counterterrorism.
"These people don't want to be on the phone too long," said Russell Tice, a former NSA analyst, offering another example.
Analysts build a model of hypothetical terrorist behavior, and computers look for people who fit the model. Among the drawbacks of this method is that nearly all its selection criteria are innocent on their own. There is little precedent, lawyers said, for using such a model as probable cause to get a court-issued warrant for electronic surveillance.
Jeff Jonas, now chief scientist at IBM Entity Analytics, invented a data-mining technology used widely in the private sector and by the government. He sympathizes, he said, with an analyst facing an unknown threat who gathers enormous volumes of data "and says, 'There must be a secret in there.' "
But pattern matching, he argued, will not find it. Techniques that "look at people's behavior to predict terrorist intent," he said, "are so far from reaching the level of accuracy that's necessary that I see them as nothing but civil liberty infringement engines."
Apparently, this is a program that yields almost nothing in the way of actual results:
Bush has said his program covers only overseas calls to or from the United States and stated categorically that "we will not listen inside this country" without a warrant. [Air Force Gen. Michael V.] Hayden [the nation's second-ranking intelligence officer] said the government goes to the intelligence court when an eavesdropping subject becomes important enough to "drill down," as he put it, "to the degree that we need all communications."
Yet a special channel set up for just that purpose four years ago has gone largely unused, according to an authoritative account. Since early 2002, when the presiding judge of the federal intelligence court first learned of Bush's program, he agreed to a system in which prosecutors may apply for a domestic warrant after warrantless eavesdropping on the same person's overseas communications. The annual number of such applications, a source said, has been in the single digits.
And anyone care to guess how many of those "single digits" of suspicious communications that get "drilled down" from the warrantless program and get presented to the FISA court actually lead to real terrorists? Think just maybe we might have heard about even ONE such terrorist, considering how much negative press the surveillance program has received? I'm guessing the actual number of terrorists ensnared is exactly ZERO.
And do you think that once a surveillance has proven to be of no value, the captured email or phone call is flushed from the system? You don't REALLY think the Bush Administration cares about protecting the private information of innocents, do you:
Many features of the surveillance program remain unknown, including what becomes of the non-threatening U.S. e-mails and conversations that the NSA intercepts. Participants, according to a national security lawyer who represents one of them privately, are growing "uncomfortable with the mountain of data they have now begun to accumulate." Spokesmen for the Bush administration declined to say whether any are discarded.
There's a LOT more to this large article. Read and be disgusted.
