The coalition made much of bringing democracy to the 'liberated' country by handing the reins to the Iraqi government. But, as Jonathan Steele relates in this final extract from his new book, it also ensured that it retained complete control
Wednesday January 23, 2008
The Guardian
A US military transport plane regularly lifts off from Amman in Jordan and lands at the "American side" of Baghdad's international airport. This is the Baghdad shuttle: no visas required, no need to show a passport to any Iraqi official. For embassy staff, contractors, and other civilians working for the occupation it is the perfect beeline into the "other Iraq", the set of vast US-controlled compounds where Iraq's real power resides. If you have access to a helicopter, you can be whisked aloft from Baghdad airport to your final destination in the Green Zone in 10 minutes. For less important people, the trip to the Green Zone entails overland travel, a 30-minute ride in an armour-plated US bus called a Rhino. On this trip you cannot avoid spotting a few Iraqis, but in your sealed vehicle you still do not need to notify any locals of your arrival in their country.
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These high-handed arrangements apply even more starkly to VIPs. US congressmen and senators, the secretaries of state and defense and other cabinet ministers, and of course the vice-president and president of the United States land in Baghdad without even the formality of an invitation. In no other country of the world are foreign leaders able to show up at whim. In Iraq, they can.
Many of these high-level visitors proceed to lecture their "hosts" on how to run the country. In the best imperial manner, they recommend who to sack from the cabinet, and who to appoint. They insist on certain laws being passed or demand changes in the constitution.
They even tell elected Iraqi leaders to resign, as I witnessed on April 3 2006. The scene was Iraqi prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari's office deep in the Green Zone. A fleet of bullet-proofed Chevrolet Suburban SUVs with tinted windows was parked in the drive. American security guards in mirrored sunglasses and baseball caps patrolled the entrance with their forefingers clamped on the triggers of submachine-guns. There was no sign of any Iraqi security personnel.
Inside, almost like a hostage, Jaafari was being harangued by secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and the British foreign secretary, Jack Straw. The two had decided only one day earlier to make the trip to Baghdad, exasperated that the prime minister was continuing to resist a steady flow of hints from the US ambassador that it was time to go. All kinds of arguments were trotted out. Iraq needed a leader who could unify the country. The government must clamp down on Shia militias. The cabinet had to be led by a man who could command support across the spectrum, including from Kurds and Sunni Arabs.
Jaafari did not listen, or at least he did not obey. Not even a phone call from Bush in the White House had done the trick. Now he was being given his marching orders by Rice and Straw in person.