In the long run the premiums will go down.
No, no, no, no, no. In the long run premiums for the chronically sick will be lower, but premiums for the remainder of the population will be higher.
Insurance is a risk-transfer mechanism. Through insurance those who are at risk of an adverse event happening in the future transfer a portion or all of that risk to a disinterested party in exchange for payment to compensate for the risk assumed. The key is that while both parties know the general probabilities of the adverse event happening, neither party knows certainly that the adverse event will occur to the transferor. By this mechanism an insurer can accept risk from enough people to make the occurrence a near-certainty and still remain profitable.
Example: Let's say the population is subject to a 1:1000 chance of contracting skin cancer. I, as a member of that risk group, know that treatment for the cancer runs about $100,000. My expected probable cost is $100 ($100,000/1000). I decide that I would be willing to pay $100 to an insurer for $100,000 in skin cancer coverage. The insurer can accept risk from 1000 people and still remain profitable because, while each individual risk is 1:1000 having 1000 risks does not guarantee a 100% chance of one person getting skin cancer.
Under current insurance laws, the insurer is allowed to price discriminate based on statistically-proven factors such as age, gender, race, lifestyle, family history, etc. This allows them to price coverage relative to the risk accepted.
Example 2: Let's say the population is subject to a 1:1000 chance of contracting skin cancer and treatment still costs $100,000. Furthermore, let's say that the population is split evenly into two sub-populations: those who tan regularly and those who don't. Those who tan are subject to a risk of 1:10 while those who don't are subject to a risk of 1:100,000. The pure expected premium for those who tan is $10,000 and for those who don't is $1.
Under "Obamacare" laws, the insurer is not allowed to price discriminate based on pre-existing conditions. Under this scenario there is no risk transfer; the 'patient' already has the averse condition, their risk is 1:1. The insurer is not allowed to charge a different price based on that fact and must price the coverage based on the other factors like age, race, sex, etc. This has the effect of obliterating risk-based insurance markets.
Example 3: Let's say the population is subject to a 1:1000 chance of contracting skin cancer and treatment still costs $100,000. Furthermore, let's say that the population is split evenly into two sub-populations: those who tan regularly and those who don't. Those who tan are subject to a risk of 1:10 while those who don't are subject to a risk of 1:100,000. The pure expected premium for those who tan is $10,000 and for those who don't is $1. All members of the population elect not to purchase insurance knowing that if they contract skin cancer they cannot be denied coverage. A person does contract skin cancer and they do not tan, so if they apply the insurer is legally obligated to charge them $1. The 'patient', knowing they gambled and lost, elects the skin cancer coverage, pays their $1 and gets $100,000 of treatment. Net loss to the insurer is $99,999.
"Obamacare" gets around this by mandating that everyone purchase insurance. Those who do not purchase insurance are subject to fines. Employers with 50 or more employees must offer group coverage or be subject to fines of $2,000 per employee. In many cases it is in the employees best interest to pay the fine as the annual fine is equal to only a month or two of insurance premium. If a relatively healthy person can go three months w/o needing health care they save money by paying the fine and only purchasing insurance when needed, then letting it lapse when treatment is complete.
Of course, when you mandate that everyone purchases insurance you no longer have a valid risk-based scenario. All of your statistics become true population statistics and probabilities become certainties, from the insurer's viewpoint. At that time the only way to remain profitable is to charge a premium in excess of the pure premium. When you do that, the premium exceeds the probable cost of loss, which encourages people to not buy coverage and if the fine is low enough they will elect to pay that. That leads to adverse selection in the risk portfolio of the insurer which leads to insolvency.
Of course, when you mandate that everyone purchases insurance you no longer have a valid risk-based scenario. All of your statistics become true population statistics and probabilities become certainties, from the insurer's viewpoint. At that time there is no shared risk by the insurer, you no linger have an insurance product, and what you effectively have is a pure tax upon the healthy to subsidize the unhealthy.
Another provision of "Obamacare" is that States must establish health "insurance" exchanges to provide coverage for those risks that insurers are unwilling to accept. There are two problems:
1) Insurers are still subject to adverse selection which
will lead to insolvencies.
2) Beginning in 2014 and running through 2018 the Federal government will saddle the health insurance industry with $58.8 billion in taxes, just for the hell of it. Those taxes will be passed along through higher premiums. That will make "insurance" premiums offered through the exchanges (which are provided by private insurers) just as uncompetitive as group premiums.
In the end "Obamacare" does nothing to reduce the overall cost of insurance premiums.