Readers occasionally write me complaining that I do not offer any solutions to the problems in Iraq. Let me just step back from the daily train wreck news from the region to complain back that there aren't any short-term, easy solutions to the problems in Iraq.
The US military cannot defeat the Sunni Arab guerrilla movement any time soon for so many reasons that they cannot all be listed.
The guerrillas have widespread popular support in the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, an area with some 4 million persons. Its cities and deserts offer plenty of cover for an unconventional war. Guerrilla movements can succeed if more than 40 percent of the local population supports them. While the guerrillas are a small proportion of Iraqis, they are very popular in the Sunni Arab areas. If you look at it as a regional war, they probably have 80 percent support in their region.
The guerrillas are mainly Iraqi Sunnis with an intelligence or military background, who know where secret weapons depots are containing some 250,000 tons of missing munitions, and who know how to use military strategy and tactics to good effect. They are well-funded and can easily get further funding from Gulf millionnaires any time they like.
The Iraqi guerrillas are given tactical support by foreign jihadi fighters. There are probably only a few hundred of them, but they are disproportionately willing to undertake very dangerous attacks, and to volunteer as suicide bombers.
There are simply too few US troops to fight the guerrillas. There are only about 70,000 US fighting troops in Iraq, they don't have that much person-power superiority over the guerrillas. There are only 10,000 US troops for all of Anbar province, a center of the guerrilla movement with a population of 820,000. A high Iraqi official estimated that there are 40,000 active guerrillas and another 80,000 close supporters of them. The only real explanation for the successes of the guerrillas is that the US military has been consistently underestimating their numbers and abilities. There is no prospect of increasing the number of US troops in Iraq.
The guerillas have enormous advantages, of knowing the local clans and terrain and urban quarters, of knowing Arabic, and of being local Muslims who are sympathetic figures for other Muslims. American audiences often forget that the US troops in Iraq are mostly clueless about what is going on around them, and do not have the knowledge base or skills to conduct effective counter-insurgency. Moreover, as foreign, largely Christian occupiers of an Arab, Muslim, country, they are widely disliked and mistrusted outside Kurdistan.
US military tactics, of replying to attacks with massive force, have alienated ever more Sunni Arabs as time has gone on. Fallujah was initially quiet, until the Marines fired on a local demonstration against the stationing of US troops at a school (parents worried about their children being harmed if there was an attack). Mosul was held up as a model region under Gen. Petraeus, but exploded into long-term instability in reaction to the November Fallujah campaign. The Americans have lost effective control everywhere in the Sunni Arab areas. Even a West Baghdad quarter like Adhamiyah is essentially a Baath republic. Fallujah is a shadow of its former self, with 2/3s of its buildings damaged and half its population still refugeees, and is kept from becoming a guerrilla base again only by draconian methods by US troops that make it "the world's largest gated community." The London Times reports that the city's trade is still paralyzed.
So far the new pro-American Iraqi troops have not distinguished themselves against the guerrillas, and it will probably be at least 3-5 years before they can begin doing so, if ever. Insofar as the new army is disproportionately Shiite and Kurdish, it may simply never have the resources to penetrate the Sunni Arab center-north effectively. There is every reason to believe that the new Iraqi military is heavily infiltrated with sympathizers of the guerrillas.
The guerrilla tactic of fomenting civil war among Iraq's ethnic communities, which met resistance for the first two years, is now bearing fruit. There is increasing evidence of Shiite murders of Sunni clerics and worshippers, and of Sunni attacks on Shiites, beyond the artificial efforts of the guerrillas themselves. Civil war and turbulence benefit the guerrillas, who gain cover for violent attacks, and who can offer themselves to the Iraqis as the only force capable of keeping order. AP reports an Iraqi official saying today that there is a civil war going on in the northern city of Telafar between Sunnis and Shiites. I doubt US television news is even mentioning it.
The political process in Iraq has been a huge disaster for the country. The Americans emphasized ethnicity in their appointments and set a precedent for ethnic politics that has deepened over time. The Shiite religious parties, Dawa and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, won the January 30 elections. These are the parties least acceptable to the Sunni Arab heartland. The Sunni Arabs are largely absent in parliament, only have one important cabinet post, and only have two members in the 55-member constitutional drafting committee. Deep debaathification has led to thousands of Sunnis being fired from their jobs for simply having belonged to the Baath Party, regardless of whether they had ever done anything wrong. They so far have no reason to hope for a fair shake in the new Iraq. Political despair and the rise of Shiite death squads that target Sunnis are driving them into the arms of the guerrillas.
The quality of leadership in Washington is extremely bad. George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, and outgoing Department of Defense officials Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, have turned in an astonishingly poor performance in Iraq. Their attempt to demonstrate US military might has turned into a showcase for US weakness in the face of Islamic and nationalist guerrillas, giving heart to al-Qaeda and other unconventional enemies of the United States.
If the US drew down its troop strength in Iraq too rapidly, the guerrillas would simply kill the new political class and stabilizing figures such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Although US forces have arguably done more harm than good in many Sunni Arab areas, they have prevented set-piece battles from being staged by ethnic militias, and they have prevented a number of attempted assassinations.
In an ideal world, the United States would relinquish Iraq to a United Nations military command, and the world would pony up the troops needed to establish order in the country in return for Iraqi good will in post-war contract bids. But that is not going to happen for many reasons. George W. Bush is a stubborn man and Iraq is his project, and he is not going to give up on it. And, by now the rest of the world knows what would await its troops in Iraq, and political leaders are not so stupid as to send their troops into a meat grinder.
Therefore, I conclude that the United States is stuck in Iraq for the medium term, and perhaps for the long term. The guerrilla war is likely to go on a decade to 15 years. Given the basic facts, of capable, trained and numerous guerrillas, public support for them from Sunnis, access to funding and munitions, increasing civil turmoil, and a relatively small and culturally poorly equipped US military force opposing them, led by a poorly informed and strategically clueless commander-in-chief who has made himself internationally unpopular, there is no near-term solution.
In the long run, say 15 years, the Iraqi Sunnis will probably do as the Lebanese Maronites did, and finally admit that they just cannot remain in control of the country and will have to compromise. That is, if there is still an Iraq at that point.
Originally posted by: conjur
120,000 guerillas in the western provinces, eh?
Well, here comes the cavalry!
1,000 US Troops Launch New Offensive in Western Iraq
http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGBCSEV259E.html
It's like sending a meter maid into East L.A.
WASHINGTON ? The U.S. military's plan to pacify Iraq has run into trouble in a place where it urgently needs to succeed.
U.S. officials in Washington and Baghdad agree that Al Anbar province ? the vast desert badlands stretching west from the cities of Fallouja and Ramadi to the lawless region abutting the Syrian border ? remains the epicenter of the country's deadly insurgency.
Yet U.S. troops and military officials in the embattled province said in recent interviews that they have neither enough combat power nor enough Iraqi military support to mount an effective counterinsurgency against an increasingly sophisticated enemy.
"You can't get all the Marines and train them on a single objective, because usually the objective is bigger than you are," said Maj. Mark Lister, a senior Marine air officer in Al Anbar province. "Basically, we've got all the toys, but not enough boys."
The Pentagon has made training Iraqi troops its top priority since Iraq's national election in late January. But in Al Anbar province, that objective is overshadowed by the more basic mission of trying to keep much of the region out of insurgent hands.
Just three battalions of Marines are stationed in the western part of the province, down from four a few months ago. Marine officials in western Al Anbar say that each of those battalions is smaller by one company than last year, meaning there are approximately 2,100 Marines there now, compared with about 3,600 last year.
Some U.S. military officers in Al Anbar province say that commanders in Baghdad and the Pentagon have denied their repeated requests for more troops.
"[Commanders] can't use the word, but we're withdrawing," said one U.S. military official in Al Anbar province, who asked not to be identified because it is the Pentagon that usually speaks publicly about troop levels. "Slowly, that's what we're doing."
Such reductions are especially problematic because U.S. commanders have determined that it is the western part of the province to which the insurgency's "center of resistance" has shifted. The insurgency's base of operations was once the eastern corridor between Fallouja and Ramadi. Now, Pentagon officials say, it is in villages and cities closer to the Syrian border.
Commanders also believe the insurgency is now made up of a larger percentage of foreign jihadists than the U.S. military previously believed, an indication that there are not enough U.S. and Iraqi troops to patrol miles of desert border.
Some Pentagon officials and experts in counterinsurgency warfare say the troop shortage has hamstrung the U.S. military's ability to effectively fight Iraqi insurgents.
This was evident during this month's Operation Matador, the U.S. offensive near the Syrian border designed to stem the flow of foreign fighters and their weapons into Iraq. For seven days, Marines rumbled through desert villages and fought pitched battles against a surprisingly well-coordinated enemy.
On the first day of the operation, insurgents appeared to be willing to stand their ground and fight the Marines, but U.S. military officials now believe that may have been a tactic to delay U.S. troops from crossing into the Ramana region north of the Euphrates River. This delay, officials said, could have given many of the insurgents time to escape into Syria.
"It's an extremely frustrating fight," said Maj. Steve White, operations director for the 3rd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment. "Fighting these guys is like picking up water. You're going to lose some every time."
A military news release declared the mission a success, saying that U.S. troops had killed more than 125 insurgents. Nine Marines were killed and 40 were wounded during the operation.
Yet as soon as the operation concluded, the Marines crossed back over the Euphrates River and left no U.S. or Iraqi government presence in the region ? generally considered a major mistake in counterinsurgency warfare.
"It's classically the wrong thing to do," said Kalev Sepp, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., who last fall was a counterinsurgency advisor to Army Gen. George W. Casey, the top U.S. general in Iraq. "Sending 1,000 men north of the Euphrates does what? Sometimes these things can be counterproductive, because you just end up shooting things up and then leaving the area."
Military officials in Iraq and Washington said there was little reason to expect that insurgent fighters would not return to the villages.
"The right thing to do would have been to sweep the area with U.S. troops, and hold it with Iraqi troops," said a military official and counterinsurgency expert at the Pentagon who spoke on condition of anonymity because he is not an official Pentagon spokesman.
Yet, there were no Iraqi troops to leave in the area. Just one platoon of Iraqi troops is stationed in the far west Al Anbar province, garrisoned at a phosphate plant in the town of Qaim. But those troops were on leave during the week of Operation Matador, taking their paychecks home to their families.
Lt. Col. Christopher Starling, operations officer for the 2nd Marine Regimental Combat Team, said the slow pace at which Iraqi troops were being trained in Al Anbar province meant that the province could be among the last areas in Iraq to put a substantial number of trained Iraqi troops in the field.
The shortage of Iraqi troops in Al Anbar is due largely to a deadly intimidation campaign by insurgents. Iraqi trainees and recruits have been killed en masse in shootings and suicide bombings. Consequently, U.S. and Iraqi commanders have been forced to rely largely on Shiite troops to patrol the Sunni-dominated province.
Iraqi troops could be particularly effective in helping U.S. troops gain a better understanding of the tribal divisions in Al Anbar province. Some U.S. commanders in Al Anbar have expressed frustration that they have not capitalized on recent armed conflicts between insurgent groups.
Earlier this year, Marines began receiving intelligence about insurgent groups and clans in the area who were fighting foreign militants in towns along the Syrian border.
In the days before Operation Matador, Marines posted on the outskirts of Husaybah reported a series of cross-town mortar attacks by opposing insurgent factions.
Al Anbar province "is a region that is in turmoil and, in some regards, in conflict with itself," said Marine Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, who twice since the war in Iraq began has been the top U.S. commander in Al Anbar and who now is director of operations for the Pentagon's Joint Staff.
U.S. commanders believe they are in a Catch-22: Defeating the insurgency depends on flooding towns and cities with hundreds of reconstruction projects. Yet the persistent insurgent attacks against U.S. troops and civilians, especially in Al Anbar province, prevent reconstruction projects from getting started.
"There are areas where there is relatively little reconstruction because of insurgent activity. You go out to Al Anbar province, for example. It's pretty grim out there in terms of what has been done versus what could be done," Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, chief of U.S. Central Command, said last week.
U.S. and Iraqi military leaders view Al Anbar province as the insurgency's supply line. Insurgents freely cross the long, unguarded border with Syria and have taken over a string of small villages along the Euphrates River to stage guerrilla attacks in cities to the east like Ramadi, Mosul and Baghdad.
U.S. military officers in Al Anbar province say that Jordanian-born militant Abu Musab Zarqawi has been sighted in towns that U.S. forces have not visited for as many as six months.
As a spate of deadly car bombings continues throughout Iraq, U.S. officials now believe it is the foreign jihadists ? who military officials believe are more likely than former Saddam Hussein loyalists to carry out suicide attacks ? who pose the most significant threat to the stability of the new Iraqi government.
"I really want to believe that we are making great progress right now," said the counterinsurgency expert at the Pentagon. "What's killing us right now, literally and figuratively, is the foreign fighters. We just need to catch a few breaks."
At the same time, the official said he expected it would take years to finish the job.
"If we can win this thing in six years, we're setting new land speed records," he said.
During Operation Matador, U.S. troops were surprised to find a large insurgent presence in towns south of the Euphrates in western Al Anbar, such as Ubaydi, where the heaviest fighting of the operation took place.
That the Marines were unaware that there were so many insurgents in that city after having dispatched numerous civil affairs missions there indicates the complexity of the region as well as the military's limited knowledge of the area.
"We're here and they're there," said Maj. Todd Waldemar, head of civil affairs for the 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines, a reserve unit stationed at the Haditha Dam in Al Anbar. "We kind of walk around in a security bubble, so to speak, that makes it kind of hard for us to figure out exactly what's going on."
*
Mazzetti reported from Washington and Moore from Al Anbar province.
Two years ago, Blair put up 147 names on Washington Street. Last year, 880 signs lined 10 miles of roadway. Now, two years after Saddam Hussein was plucked from power, the death toll continues to rise and Blair needed 33.4 miles of road to handle all the signs.
HOLLISTON -- Traffic rolled slower than normal down Rte. 16 yesterday afternoon. Drivers' eyes were drawn to the roadside as the names of fallen soldiers clipped past: Sgt. Jesse Strong, Lt. Anthony King, Cpl. John Olson. Stapled on telephone polls in Holliston, Ashland, Hopkinton, Milford, Sherborn and Medway are signs bearing the names, ages and home states of 1,802 soldiers who have perished in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Kevin Ryan, who drives through Holliston on his way home to Milford every afternoon, said he couldn't help but slow down.
"The ages are the thing that gets me: 19, 20, 19, 21," he said coming out of the Holliston post office in yesterday's foggy drizzle. The signs are the work of Bobby Blair -- a postal worker here and a Vietnam veteran -- and his army of 60 volunteers who put up the signs over the weekend. Two years ago, Blair put up 147 names on Washington Street. Last year, 880 signs lined 10 miles of roadway. Now, two years after Saddam Hussein was plucked from power, the death toll continues to rise and Blair needed 33.4 miles of road to handle all the signs. They line the length of Washington Street from Sherborn to Milford Town Hall. They run up Rte. 126 into Ashland, and south to the Bellingham line. They stretch up Hollis Street and Prentice Street into Hopkinton, and down Central Street into Medway.
Ryan, who has seen the signs every year since Blair started, said he is against the war in Iraq, but that doesn't stop him from supporting the soldiers. "I think a lot of people take for granted what's going on over there," he said. "I don't think our military gets enough credit." Blair makes new signs whenever more lives are lost. He said he hasn't had to play catch-up. He did have to remake the first 147 signs though, because he burned them after taking them down. "I thought the war would be over," he said. "I thought it was going to be like Desert Storm." Last week, anticipating the display would stretch more than 25 miles, Blair said he was concerned he wouldn't have the manpower to make it happen. He asked for 30 volunteers. He ended up with more than 60. "I was kind of nervous up to that point," he said. "It really worked out." Roger Gandini, a friend who Blair referred to as "Mr. Patriotic," supplies the poster board for the signs. Selectman Carl Damigella, a lifelong Holliston resident and friend of Blair's, said the sheer number of signs struck him. "It's really overwhelming, the amount of casualties there's been since this conflict started," he said. "He's a remarkable person."
BAGHDAD, Iraq - (KRT) - As Iraq begins writing its new constitution, leaders in the country's southern regions are pushing aggressively to unite their three provinces into an oil-rich, semi-autonomous state, a plan that some worry could solidify Iraq's sectarian tensions, create fights over oil revenues and eventually split the nation.
In the southern Shiite Muslim city of Basra, where the provincial government launched the campaign, signs on the streets encourage residents to support the plan. Local leaders have held several conferences to map out their proposed state and regional government.
Muhammed Musbih al Waely, the governor of Basra province, said Shiites suffered under the last centralized government, Saddam Hussein's, and that they wanted to control the development of their region.
"The next few months are going to witness a big change in the region," al Waely said.
Al Waely's proposal would unite the contiguous southeast Shiite-dominated provinces of Maysan, Basra and Dhiqar into a single state. Basra, the country's second-largest city and the principal port city, would be the new regional government's capital.
Aziz Kadhim Alwan, the governor of Dhiqar - whose provincial capital is Nasiriyah - said he was on board.
The region is rich with resources and trade opportunities. Dhiqar could expand its trading business through Basra's port; Maysan could expand the other two provinces' trade with Iran. Basra would be a more powerful city, with more oil, agriculture, trade and tourism under its control.
The discussion has created tension in Basra between Shiites and the Sunni Arab minority there. Some Sunnis already have left because they think the proposed new region excludes them. That response has some fretting that a state defined partly on religion could fuel the sectarianism that's engulfed the country since the Jan. 30 parliamentary elections.
Ihsan Numan, a Sunni and a Basra University student, said some Shiite students had warned him that a new regional state wouldn't be good for him.
"I was told openly by ... Shiite students, `You better look for a place to go before this region becomes a state. You were protected by Saddam, but not anymore,'" Numan said. "My family and I already feel the threat. Right after I finish my exams I will take my family and try to go abroad."
The minority Sunnis, who already feel marginalized in the country's political process, said they were concerned that discussions about states would split the country. At a Sunni Arab conference earlier this week among the sect's leadership, the group released demands for participation in the national government. Among them was a promise that the new constitution would unify Iraq.
The southeast regional plan already has support in the National Assembly, including from the chairman of the constitutional committee, Homam Hamoodi. Hamoodi said he wanted an Iraq governed by administrative federalism that included at least two states.
"Most everybody agrees on federalism," Hamoodi said.
Another assemblyman, Khudaier al Khuzaie, a prominent member in the Shiite-dominated slate, the United Iraqi Alliance, and a member of the constitutional committee, said the committee was discussing the topic, and that it had many supporters.
"It just needs constitutional development," al Khuzaie said.
The idea for grouping Iraq's 18 provinces into states first appeared in the U.S.-brokered interim constitution, which allowed up to three provinces, excluding Baghdad and Kirkuk, to become "regions amongst themselves." So far, only the Kurds in the north have created such a region.
As the Kurds gained more power in the newly elected centralized government, the Shiites began discussing a region of their own to counter what they thought was too much political power for the Kurds, analysts said.
"They way they played it out, Kurdistan was a behemoth with a disproportionately high amount of power in Baghdad," said Juan Cole, a history professor at the University of Michigan who specializes in Shiite Islam.
The interim constitution governs the country until the National Assembly drafts a permanent constitution, which it's supposed to do by Aug. 15, and it's ratified in a national vote.
Al Waely said he and the governors of the two other provinces planned to bring their proposal to the constitutional committee within weeks, hoping that the permanent constitution would spell out the relationship between their proposed state and the central government.
While U.S. officials don't oppose a Shiite region, one Western diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity said southern leaders who thought their proposed state would give them control over the oil there probably were wrong.
"The people in southern Iraq assume that if they have this kind of government, they'll have more resources, that they'll have oil revenue," the diplomat said. "That is not self-evident, however, because the oil revenues are treated as national revenues in the transitional" government.
"I think there will be quite a push among Iraqis in the constitutional debates to put oil revenues outside the control of any regional government," he added.
Al Waely said he expected part of that revenue to stay in the south.
Earlier this year, the then-governor of Sunni-dominated Anbar province, Sheik Fasal al Goud, proposed creating a Sunni regional government in the west, but many religious leaders rejected the notion. Part of the problem for the Sunnis is that Sunni Arab areas have few natural resources, prompting many Sunnis to call for more centralization.
Many observers are worried that grouping provinces into states may push the country toward Balkanization.
In a report last month called "Power-Sharing in Iraq," David L. Phillips of the New York-based Council of Foreign Relations, a foreign policy research organization, argued that a three-state system - Kurdish, Sunni Arab and Shiite - would fuel sectarianism.
The University of Michigan's Cole said a system of regional governments might not last long term, particularly if states with enough natural resources to support themselves fought for independence.
"It solves a lot of problems, but I am not sure it leads to long-term stability," Cole said.
Al Waely said there was no intention of splitting off. "Absolutely not," he said.
One U.S. official, who asked not to be named, said the Americans would welcome any plan under one condition: "We insist Iraq must stay unified."
---
(Knight Ridder special correspondents Huda Ahmed and Shatha al Awsy contributed to this report.)
If you want people to read these recent articles, you probably need to start a new thread. I bet many people don't even realize there is new content here.Originally posted by: BBond
I don't know if this was posted yet but I'm posting it again anyway. I don't know if you've been keeping track, Conjur, but very few people are reading this thread. I'm clocking the numbers and it looks like the number of views is staying fairly constant with the number of posts.
Ignorance is bliss. America the apathetic. ...
KARACHI - With the Iraqi resistance showing no signs of wavering and extending its roots deep into the population, the US has realized that to counter this threat it must change its approach.
Asia Times Online has learned that the US, instead of training up a regular professional Iraqi army, will create what in effect will be armed militias, acting under US central command, to take the militias of the resistance on at their own game.
The Iraqi resistance against the presence of foreign forces in the country has had many faces. Initially, the ousted Ba'ath Party's security committee, members of the Iraqi military and para-military forces were the main drivers.
Later, after many of the top brass were arrested and others were forced to flee, many to Syria - including Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri (there are doubts that the former No 2 in Saddam Hussein's regime died while in Syria) - the resistance lost its central command. Various Islamic groups filled the vacuum, and they have dominated the resistance ever since.
In the meantime, various groups, including former communists, members of the Ba'ath Party and even those who were against the Saddam regime, organized themselves in different European countries. These groups played an important role in adding a political face to the resistance: they sent representatives to various Arab countries and finally succeeded in coordinating their activities with those in the field in Iraq.
Recent meetings of the so-called Higher Committee for National Forces (a grouping of Iraqi resistance bodies) and the 16th Arab National Congress held in Algiers played a pivotal role in building consensus among various Iraqi communist, Islamic, Ba'athist and nationalist groups on several issues, such as the right of Iraqis to defend themselves against foreign aggression and imperialism, and the right of Iraq to demand a political process untainted by occupation and which reflects the uninhibited will of the Iraqi people for a pluralistic and democratic Iraq.
The groups also condemned the continued occupation of Iraq and the establishment of any permanent US bases in the country, the privatization of the Iraqi economy and foreign corporations' unrestricted access to Iraq's resources.
On this common ground, the central command of the resistance reorganized its activities, a key to which was merging mohallah-level (street-level) Islamic groups scattered in their hundreds across Iraq to work toward a common goal - defeating the occupation. In turn, these militias would co-opt common folk into their struggle, so that, literally, the streets would be alive with resistance.
Aware of this development, the US has accepted that no conventional military force can cope with such a resistance, and therefore similar mohallah-level combat forces are needed.
According to Asia Times Online contacts, these US-backed militias will comprise three main segments - former Kurdish peshmerga (paramilitaries), former members of the Badr Brigade and those former members of the Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi army who were part of the Saddam regime but who have now thrown in their lot with the new Iraqi government.
All three segments have already been equipped with low- and medium-level weapons purchased from various countries, including Pakistan. Military analysts believe the US military in Iraq will use the Kurd and Shi'ite militias to quell the resistance in central and northern Iraq, while in the south the former Ba'athists and old-guard Iraqi soldiers will be used against anti-US Shi'ite groups.
To date, the Iraqi army has only been supplied with small arms - air and armored forces are still in the hands of the US Army - and there is no indication that the US will hand over any of this, or high-tech equipment, to the Iraqis.
Iraq's future now seems to be in the hands of militias, under the command of the US on the one side and militias under the command of the resistance on the other; reminiscent of wartime Lebanon and Vietnam.
WASHINGTON (AP) -- The death rate in Iraq this month among members of the National Guard and Reserve is the highest since January and one of the highest of the entire war, Pentagon figures show.
At least 21 part-time soldiers and Marines have died in May, although the number may be higher since the Pentagon has not yet identified most of the 14 U.S. troops who have died since Sunday.
As of May 20, the Pentagon had identified 16 Guard and Reserve members among the month's dead.
The Marine Corps said four killed Monday were members of the 155th Brigade Combat Team, a Mississippi Army National Guard unit attached to the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force. Also, the Pennsylvania Army National Guard said one of its soldiers was killed Sunday in a suicide bombing.
The 21 deaths account for a little over one-third of the total of 58 U.S. troops who have died so far this month. That is about in line with the ratio of Guard and Reserve troops to regular active-duty troops deployed in Iraq -- now about 40 percent Guard/Reserve and 60 percent regular troops.
In April, 11 members of the Guard and Reserve died in Iraq. In March, there were 13, and February's total was 16. That means the May toll already is the highest since January, when there were 30 for the entire month. January was one of the bloodiest months of the war for U.S. forces, with a total of 107 deaths, including 30 Marines and one Navy corpsman who died in a single helicopter crash.
Prior to January, the highest monthly toll among Guard and Reserve members was 28 in November 2004, when many died in the assault on Fallujah and the total death toll for U.S. forces was 138.
Since the war began in March 2003, at least 163 members of the National Guard, plus 45 in the Army Reserve and 45 in the Marine Reserves had died in Iraq, according to an unofficial count as of Friday. The Pentagon does not release an official death toll for the Guard and Reserve.
Originally posted by: Duckzilla
I just thought of something most odd. I just realized that there's always been trouble afoot in Iraq, only now the "sole remaining superpower" is in the mix.
BAGHDAD ? Explosions rip through marketplaces, scattering blood and vegetables and leaving women wailing in the alleys. Bodies bob in rivers and are dug up from garbage dumps and parks. Kidnappers troll the streets, sirens howl through morning prayers and mortar rounds whistle against skylines of minarets.
Iraqis awake each day to the sounds of violence. With little respite, many wonder whether strange, terrible forces are arrayed against them. They fear that weeks of sectarian and clan violence, claiming the lives of all types from imams to barefoot fishermen, are a prelude to civil war.
"I'm worried 24 hours a day," said Zainab Hassan, a university student majoring in computer science. "Whenever I hear bomb or shooting, I call my mother and husband to check if they're OK. I can see a civil war coming, it's obvious. Everybody is talking about it. We have to be more careful."
Iraqis such as Abu Mohammed, who sells books along the Tigris River, struggle to comprehend how the euphoria of January's election has withered so quickly. They find contradictions rather than answers. Life has become a vicious thrum, with boys clinging to courtyard walls and gun battles beneath the date palms appearing live on TV.
Interviews with Iraqis from Basra to Baghdad to Mosul suggest that much of the nation fears that intensifying strains between Sunni and Shiite Muslims could ignite a conflict that would overwhelm the increasingly unpopular Iraqi government and 140,000 U.S. troops. Abu Mohammed blames, among others, Saddam Hussein, who, even from his jail cell, seems to taunt the country.
"Saddam created hostile sentiments between Sunni and Shiite," Mohammed said. "It was like a fire hidden under a cover and waiting to turn into a blaze. The remnants of Saddam Hussein are now trying to stoke and enlarge this fire. I blame both the Shiites and the Sunnis for playing parts in stirring up hostilities."
Nearly 700 people have been killed in car bombings and by shootings and beheadings in the last month. What concerns U.S. officials and ordinary Iraqis is that militant leaders such as Abu Musab Zarqawi are attempting to instigate a two-track war: one, the continuing battle between insurgents and American and Iraqi forces, and another between Shiite and Sunni Arabs that could possibly draw in Kurds from the north.
"It's time for Iraqis to stand together to foil the dirty attempts of the enemies to implant sectarian war on this injured country," said Naim Salman, a civil servant in Baghdad. "The government is trying its best, but it is still not enough. It is a new government and it needs time, especially when terrorists are infiltrating ministries."
The Sunnis were the beneficiaries and power behind Hussein's Baathist regime. Many of them, including influential leaders, opposed the Shiite-dominated government that followed Hussein and formed the heart of the insurgency.
Some Sunnis have begun to rejoin the political process. But so far, the government has been unable to persuade the nation's minority Sunni population to abandon its suspicions, and the squabbles in the corridors of the National Assembly have inspired violence tied to religion and clan.
Nafi Alfartoosi, editor of a newspaper in Samawah in Shiite-dominated southern Iraq, said, "The failure of the government to stop sectarian terrorism of Sunnis against Shiites has deepened the gap between the government and the people. I am sure that many of the millions who voted are sorry for going out on Jan. 30. This weakness in stopping sectarian terrorism and halting bloodshed is encouraging" those seeking a civil war.
Sunni and Shiite organizations, along with Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari, have sought to calm tensions over the last week. But the effort is hindered by spiraling violence that since April 29 has included the killing of at least 10 Sunni and Shiite clerics, among them Mohammed Tahir Allaq, a representative of one of the nation's top Shiite leaders, Ayatollah Mohammed Saeed Hakim.
Some Shiite and Sunni leaders have blamed each other for the assassinations.
Images of the coffins of clerics being carried through the streets have unnerved a public that has had scant peace since Hussein was toppled two years ago and the country occupied by U.S.-led forces that quickly encountered an insurgency. The January election brought a brief gust of normality, but that has shattered with the surge in car bombings.
In a Baghdad University poll taken earlier this year, more than 80% of the Iraqis questioned expected their government to gain strength in coming months. That has dropped to 45% today.
With the insurgency killing more civilians, anger against American forces has intensified. Many Iraqis view the U.S. as an unwanted godfather who, despite his prowess and streams of military convoys, can't provide the basics let alone protect them from extremists who badger the nation with Internet screeds and jihadist rants on the radio.
"I only want to put this question to you," said Sana Abdul-Kareem, a dentist with four children. "Why can't the U.S., with all its might and capabilities, impose security here? How come with all our oil they cannot provide us with electricity? My son was so happy when the American soldiers first came. But after two years of failure to make good on their promises, he abhors them."
Baghdad resident Ali Jalal said: "The Americans are behind these problems. They don't want the country to be stabilized?. The Iraqi government is like a doll in the hands of the Americans."
Many Iraqis choose denial to cope with the seething times around them. A Shiite will tell you he is married to a Sunni, or a Sunni to a Shiite. They will tell you their families are an intermingling of Iraq's classes and religions and that they have lived in harmony for generations. But every day new families line up outside morgues and new markers are added to graveyards. They blame it on terrorists and outside forces, who, they say, manipulate their lives much as Hussein did.
"It's a policy of divide and conquer being applied by our occupiers," said Abu Izz, a Baghdad antiques dealer who was born in Fallouja. A civil war will not succeed because Iraqis are all brothers and relatives, he added.
"You may not believe this, but some of my relatives are promujahedin [Sunnis], and others are members of the Badr Brigade [Shiites] and others are clergy. This is how we are interrelated."
"Iraq is one nation, one land and one heart," said Sinaa Ali Musa, a state worker from Samawah.
But Musa, a Shiite, conceded there were divisions. "I think the Shiites are being subjected to all kinds of terrorism because the Sunnis are losing power."
Others consider Sunnis the victims. "There has been a flagrant violation of Sunni rights," said Saad Abdul Aziz Siqar, a Sunni from Basra. "This is affecting relationships between the two sects and could lead to war?. The Shiites have power and authority over us and are treating us like a minority."
Navigating such chaos psychologically, and even on rural roads and city streets, has trapped many Iraqis.
"It's the same problem everyday ? traffic, traffic, roads are closed and in addition to that, we have national guards aiming their weapons toward us," said Tanya Mazin, a student at Baghdad University.
"We are living in stress and fear. I do not think this will end one day because it's going from bad to worse."
And the students here think they have it bad with traffic and working jobs while going to school? Try taking your life into hands every day you go to school.BAGHDAD, Iraq - (KRT) - Eighteen students were missing from Wissam Samarraie's engineering class one recent day. Furious that college seniors would skip lessons right before finals, the professor demanded to know where they were. "Sir," one student volunteered in a soft voice, "fifteen have been detained and the other three were killed."
Samarraie was devastated, but not surprised. He teaches at Anbar University, where heading to class means passing through a gauntlet of checkpoints, dodging bullets flying between Iraqi insurgents and American troops, ignoring masked insurgents who roam the halls and sometimes arriving to find class canceled because the professor was hauled away by U.S. forces for interrogation.
"Students leave their families in the morning as if they're going to a battlefield," Samarraie said by phone.
BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - The U.S. military nearly set off a sectarian crisis Monday by mistakenly arresting the leader of Iraq's top Sunni Muslim political party, while two suicide bombers killed about 30 police, and U.S. fighter jets destroyed insurgent strongholds near Syria's border.
Northeast of Baghdad, an Iraqi military aircraft crashed Monday during a mission with four American troops and one Iraqi on board, the U.S. military said. It was not immediately clear what their condition was or even what kind of aircraft it was.
A spokeswoman for the U.S. military in Baghdad, Sgt. Kate Neuman, said the four Americans were military personnel.
And on Memorial Day, the U.S. military said American soldier Spc. Phillip Sayles, of the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, was killed in an attack Saturday in the northern city of Mosul. As of Monday, at least 1,657 members of the U.S. military have died since the beginning of the Iraq war in March 2003, according to an Associated Press count.
The arrest of Iraqi Islamic Party leader Mohsen Abdul-Halim, his three sons and four guards did little to help efforts to entice Iraq's once-dominant Sunni community back into the political fold. The Sunnis lost their influence following Saddam Hussein's ouster two years ago.
Many believe the Sunni fall from grace, and parallel rise to power of Iraq's majority Shiite population, is spurring the raging insurgency, driving many disenchanted Sunnis to launch attacks that have killed more than 760 people since the April 28 announcement of the Shiite-dominated new government. Bringing Sunnis back into the political fold could soothe some tensions.
In a commitment to end the violence, Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari vowed that "Operation Lightning," the large-scale campaign that began Sunday, would rid Baghdad of militants and, in particular, suicide car bombers, the deadliest and regular weapon of choice for insurgents.
"We needed to clean up some of our problem districts and that's why Operation Lightning was launched ... to quickly come to the protection of civilians and stop the bloodshed," al-Jaafari said at a news conference.
But renewed carnage south of the capital showed the difficulty of his job.
Two suicide bombers blew themselves up outside the mayor's office in Hillah, 60 miles south of Baghdad. The attackers waded into a crowd of 500 policemen staging an early-morning protest of a government decision to disband their special forces unit.
Staggering the detonations by one minute and 100 yards apart to maximize the casualties, the bombers killed at least 27 policemen and wounded 118 in an attack that scattered body parts, blood and shards of glass across a wide area, said police Capt. Muthana Khalid Ali.
The Polish military, which controls the area, said about 30 Iraqis were killed. The conflicting tolls were apparently linked to the difficulty in trying to count the dead because of all the body parts strewn around the blast site.
"I just saw a ball of fire and flying pieces of flesh. After that, confused policemen started firing into the air," he said.
In an apparent claim of responsibility, al-Qaida in Iraq said in an Internet statement that one of its members carried out an attack "against a group of special Iraqi forces." The statement's authenticity could not be verified.
Militants regard Iraqi security forces as prime targets in their campaign against the U.S. military, which hinges its eventual exit from Iraq on the ability of local soldiers and police to handle the insurgency.
Violence across northern Iraq killed at least nine others, with gunmen slaying a senior Kurdish official in Kirkuk and a Sunni tribal leader in Mosul, a roadside bomb killing a civilian in Baqouba and Iraqi soldiers shooting to death six insurgents in Mosul and northern Anbar province.
U.S. warplanes and helicopters attacked insurgents near Husaybah, on the Syrian border, west of Baghdad, the military said.
"There were enemy casualties, but due to the destruction of the buildings from which they were firing, we are unable to determine the number of enemy fighters killed and wounded," military spokeswoman Lt. Blanca Binstock said.
U.S. forces have launched several offensives in western Iraq aimed at rooting out Sunni extremists crisscrossing the desert frontier with Syria to smuggle in foreign fighters and weapons.
Fears of sectarian violence have whipped across Iraq amid the latest violence, which has seen Shiite and Sunni clerics kidnapped, tortured and shot.
In recent weeks, Shiite and Sunni leaders have met to try to settle their differences, with both camps declaring their intent to work to end the violence.
But Monday's roughly 12-hour detention of Abdul-Hamid flared tensions yet again, causing Sunni leaders to condemn his arrest and accuse American authorities of trying to alienate their community.
Few details were available on why the Americans arrested the Sunni leader, but it appeared to be related to the ongoing Sunni-led insurgency and fears of a broader sectarian conflict starting up.
The U.S. military acknowledged it had made a "mistake" by detaining Abdul-Hamid.
"Following the interview, it was determined that he was detained by mistake and should be released," the military said. "Coalition forces regret any inconvenience and acknowledge (Abdul-Hamid's) cooperation in resolving this matter."
Iraqi authorities suggested someone had planted "lies" against him in a bid to stir up "sectarian sedition."
Abdul-Hamid himself said U.S. forces questioned him about the "current situation," an apparent reference to the wave of attacks.
Following his release, Abdul-Hamid told reporters how "U.S. special forces" blew open the doors to his home "and dragged (his sons and guards) outside like sheep."
"They forced me to lay on the ground along with my sons and guards and one of the soldiers put his foot on my neck for 20 minutes," he told Al-Jazeera TV.
Soldiers later put him into a helicopter and flew him to an unknown location for more questioning, he said. He said he did not know the whereabouts of his sons and guards.
"At the time when the Americans say they are keen on real Sunni participation, they are now arresting the head of the only Sunni party that calls for a peaceful solution and have participated in the political process," said Iraqi Islamic Party Secretary-General Ayad al-Samarei.
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, expressed "surprise and discontent" over the arrest.
"This way of dealing with such a distinguished political figure is unacceptable," he said.
The country's largest Shiite political party, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, condemned the arrest and demanded U.S. forces "be more accurate and not take action against political figures without legal justification."
The influential Association of Muslim Scholars and Sunni Endowment charity group, which have merged with Abdul-Hamid's party to form a powerful bloc to protect Sunni political interests, also condemned the arrests.
Abdul-Hamid's party had in recent weeks taken steps to become more involved in the political process after boycotting the Jan. 30 parliamentary elections, which were dominated by parties drawn from Iraq's majority Shiite population.