Kim's Targets
Sunday's North Korean missile was aimed at the Obama Administration, Middle Eastern missile buyers and impoverished North Koreans.
North Korea's Kim Jong Il and his henchmen are often described as "irrational" or "mad." This description does them a great disservice, for they have stayed in power for decades by manipulating great powers. Sunday's missile launch is just another step in a complicated political game whose aim has not changed since the 1960s: to ensure a steady influx of foreign aid without making any concessions which might put regime at risk.
For decades, North Korea's inefficient economy has been kept afloat by international aid. At the beginning, this aid -- mainly food and energy -- flowed from the Soviet Union and China. Since the mid-1990s, South Korea, China and, surprisingly, the United States provided it. (Throughout the last decade there were years when the U.S. was the major provider of food aid to the North.) Pyongyang ensured this flow continued by creating international crises and then demanding payment for solving them.
This approach works very well, mainly because Mr. Kim and his lackeys do not care about obedience to the international law, nor about the survival of their country's own population. Sunday's missile launch is simply the reapplication of this old tactic.
The first target of the North Korean missile is, of course, the White House -- not literally, but figuratively. Pyongyang's leaders know that under Barack Obama's administration, North Korea will drift downward in Washington's foreign policy agenda -- in favor of hotter spots like Afghanistan -- and they do not like it. To survive, North Korea has to appear a serious threat. Therefore their message to Washington runs something like this: "Mr. Obama, do not forget: We're here, we're dangerous, and we're defiant -- so you had better deal with us and give us some aid and diplomatic concessions."
Skeptics will argue such blackmail will not work. History does not support this position. In October 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon. For a while, Washington and other capitals talked about repercussions and "international solidarity." But few months later, in February 2007, the U.S. dramatically changed its approach -- and after years of saber-rattling, chose to resume negotiations with Pyongyang. North Korean leaders believe this change in the U.S. attitude was related to the nuclear test. Therefore, they expect that this time, nothing will come out of the rising wave of diplomatic condemnation. They are probably right.
The second target of Sunday's launch is more commercial then diplomatic. North Korea is a desperately poor country with a broken command-and-control economy. The sale of short- and medium-range missiles are an important currency earner for the regime, with buyers largely from countries of the Middle East. During the 2006 missile launch and nuclear test, Iranian scientists were present -- as they were Sunday. A successful satellite launch will serve as a sales pitch for all North Korean missiles, thus increasing the regime's revenue.
The third target of Sunday's launch is aimed squarely at the North Korean audience. The rocket was launched days before the country's major national holiday: the birthday of Kim Il Sung, the founder of the North Korean state, and also father of the current dictator Kim Jong Il. The launch will help regime to boost its own credibility and support inside the country. The masses will be told that brilliant guidance of Mr. Kim and his government made possible modern technology that few countries would even dream of.
Pyongyang has used these tactics before; the famine of the late 1990s, for instance, was explained by official propaganda as the price Koreans had to pay for developing modern powerful weapons. The government argues these weapons alone can ensure the survival of the Korean nation against genocidal Americans and bloodthirsty Japanese. Until recently, North Korean propaganda has been able to point only at the nuclear program, but now the country's missile program can be cited as a proof of newfound military might.
Will North Koreans succeed in their brinksmanship? History demonstrates that it's likely. The Obama Administration underscored its commitment to diplomatic talks as late as last week. Middle Eastern buyers will soon start frequenting Pyongyang and common North Koreans will feel a bit of patriotic pride which might make them to forget for a while about their empty stomachs.
And who knows: perhaps, later this year, when the first wave of righteous indignation fades, the White House will express its interest in talks about missile control. Needless to say, the North Koreans will demand a huge monetary compensation for freezing their "peaceful space research program."