Whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear. The treaty does not contain a mechanism for
determining that a state-party has violated its obligations. Moreover, there does not appear to be a
formal procedure for determining such violations. An NPT Review Conference would, however,
be one venue for NPT states-parties to make such a determination.
The U.N. Security Council has never declared Iran to be in violation of the NPT; neither the
council nor the U.N. General Assembly has a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations.
However, the lack of a ruling by the council on Iran’s compliance with the NPT has apparently
had little practical effect because, as noted, the council has taken action in response to the IAEA
Board of Governors’ determination that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement.
Iran’s violations of its safeguards agreement appear to constitute violations of Article III, which
requires NPT non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to accept IAEA safeguards, in accordance with
the agency’s statue, “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”Tehran may also have violated provisions of Article II which state that non-nuclear-weapon
states-parties shall not “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices” or “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.”
As noted, the IAEA is continuing to investigate evidence of what then-IAEA Director-General
Mohamed ElBaradei described in June 2008 as “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear
programme.” Such activities may indicate that Tehran has violated both Article II provisions
described above. Moreover, a November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that
“until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop
nuclear weapons.”41 This past program could be a violation of Article II, although the estimate
does not provide any detail about the program. Nevertheless, the IAEA has never reported that
Iran has attempted to develop nuclear weapons.
Despite the lack of such an IAEA conclusion, a 2005 State Department report regarding states’
compliance with nonproliferation agreements argued that the country had violated Article II of
the NPT:
39 GOV/2013/27.
40 Portions of this section are based on interviews with U.N. and State Department officials.
41 Available at
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf. Subsequent U.S. official statements have
been consistent with the NIE.
Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations
Congressional Research Service 11
The breadth of Iran’s nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which
they have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and surreptitious procurement
channels, Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to the IAEA and to
apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable economic justification for
this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear
weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of the
NPT.42
The report also stated that Iran’s “weapons program combines elements” of Tehran’s declared
nuclear activities, as well as suspected “undeclared fuel cycle and other activities that may exist,
including those that may be run solely be the military.”
The State Department’s reasoning appears to be based on an interpretation of the NPT which
holds that a wide scope of nuclear activities could constitute violations of Article II. The 2005
report states that assessments regarding Article II compliance “must look at the totality of the
facts, including judgments as to” a state-party’s “purpose in undertaking the nuclear activities in
question.” The report also includes a list of activities which could constitute such noncompliance.
43