The issue or concept of "states' rights" is not generally considered to include a state's determination of who qualifies for federal benefits . Federal law decides that.
That this (lower court) judge has decided to (mis)use that concept as an artifice to reach his/her desired outcome is unpersausive.
While I do believe in general that it is a state's right to define marriage, I repeat - the federal gov is in court over this because of federal benefits (at least according to yesterday's article which has now been revised, and the link to case is not working for me so can't read it).
The issue of states' rights does not include the states' rights to overrule the federal government regarding federal benefits. It would, however, include the exact opposite - were the federal government to try to tell the states who qualifies for their state benefits. This inversion of the concept of states' rights would more appropriately be referred to as 'federal government rights' (it's rights over it's own domain - federal benefits).
Fern
Who said anything about States Rights?
This is not "State Rights" issue, it's an issue of equal protection under the 5th amendment.
Please actually know what the hell you are talking about by reading the decision.
Oh wait, you must have read MSNBC's retarded summary.
HERE is Summary Judgment Discussion, on the issue of Equal Protection:
D. Equal Protection of the Laws
[T]he Constitution neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.83 It is with this
fundamental principle in mind that equal protection jurisprudence takes on governmental
classifications that affect some groups of citizens differently than others.84 And it is because of
this commitment to the laws neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake85 that legislative
provisions which arbitrarily or irrationally create discrete classes cannot withstand constitutional
Case 1:09-cv-10309-JLT Document 70 Filed 07/08/10 Page 19 of 39
86Id.
87City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
88Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (citing Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 271-72 (1979); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
89Id.
90Id. (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-320 (1993)). This constitutional standard of
review is alternately referred to as the rational relationship test or the rational basis inquiry.
20
scrutiny.86
To say that all citizens are entitled to equal protection of the laws is essentially a direction
[to the government] that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.87 But courts
remain cognizant of the fact that the promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one
purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons.88 And so, in an
attempt to reconcile the promise of equal protection with the reality of lawmaking, courts apply
strict scrutiny, the most searching of constitutional inquiries, only to those laws that burden a
fundamental right or target a suspect class.89 A law that does neither will be upheld if it merely
survives the rational basis inquiryif it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government
interest.90
Plaintiffs present three arguments as to why this court should apply strict scrutiny in its
review of DOMA, namely that:
DOMA marks a stark and anomalous departure from the respect and recognition
that the federal government has historically afforded to state marital status
determinations;
Case 1:09-cv-10309-JLT Document 70 Filed 07/08/10 Page 20 of 39
91Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted).
92Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
93Id. (internal citations omitted).
94Shaw v. Oregon Public Employees Retirement Bd., 887 F.2d 947, 948-49 (9th Cir.
1989) (internal quotation omitted).
21
DOMA burdens Plaintiffs fundamental right to maintain the integrity of their
existing family relationships, and;
The law should consider homosexuals, the class of persons targeted by DOMA, to
be a suspect class.
This court need not address these arguments, however, because DOMA fails to pass
constitutional muster even under the highly deferential rational basis test. As set forth in detail
below, this court is convinced that there exists no fairly conceivable set of facts that could
ground a rational relationship91 between DOMA and a legitimate government objective. DOMA,
therefore, violates core constitutional principles of equal protection.
1. The Rational Basis Inquiry
This analysis must begin with recognition of the fact that rational basis review is not a
license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.92 A
classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded
a strong presumption of validity...[and] courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept
a legislatures generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.93
Indeed, a court applying rational basis review may go so far as to hypothesize about potential
motivations of the legislature, in order to find a legitimate government interest sufficient to justify
the challenged provision.94
Case 1:09-cv-10309-JLT Document 70 Filed 07/08/10 Page 21 of 39
95Matthews v. de Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (internal quotation omitted).
96Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
97Id.
98Id. (citing Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the legislature, its
impartiality would be suspect.).
99Bd. Of Trs. Of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2001) (quoting City of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441).
100Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
101City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447.
22
Nonetheless, the standard by which legislation such as [DOMA] must be judged is not a
toothless one.95 [E]ven in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of
standards, [courts] insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the
object to be attained.96 In other words, a challenged law can only survive this constitutional
inquiry if it is narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context for [the court]
to ascertain some relation between the classification and the purpose it serve
.97 Courts
thereby ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group
burdened by the law.98
Importantly, the objective served by the law must be not only a proper arena for
government action, but also properly cognizable by the governmental body responsible for the law
in question.99 And the classification created in furtherance of this objective must find some
footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.100 That is to say, the
constitution will not tolerate government reliance on a classification whose relationship to an
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.101 As such, a law
Case 1:09-cv-10309-JLT Document 70 Filed 07/08/10 Page 22 of 39
102Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366 n.4 (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-450).
103House Report at 12-18.
104City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
105See Def.s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, 19 n. 10.
23
must fail rational basis review where the purported justifications...[make] no sense in light of
how the [government] treated other groups similarly situated in relevant respects.102