ThinClient
Diamond Member
- Jan 28, 2013
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Looks like we didn't leave properly. Another Obama failure?
Wrong.
Iraqi failure.
Looks like we didn't leave properly. Another Obama failure?
And yet the Russian counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan were a miserable failure despite an obvious willingness to kill lots of people.
Sudanese counter-insurgency was one of the most brutal operations the world has ever seen. It failed.
Ethiopian attempts against Eritrean insurgents were brutal. They failed.
I could go on for a long time. Simply put, this is just wrong; if you learn more about counter-insurgency you'll see that it's not nearly this simplistic.
Well first, and obviously, the civilians were so demoralized and tired of war that they were at a social point where acceptance of the war ending, even if not on their terms, was tolerated. Also obviously, I'm not advocating reducing Kabul to dust ala WWII style. When we took over these countries in WWII, we didn't allow them to just formulate policy on their terms. We dictated, they obeyed. There was no secret in this. What we didn't allow them to do is setup a quasi sympathetic to us gov that was insanely corrupt, play lip service to our goals, all the while bilking their populace for whatever it could steal/con.
Yes, but they try and accomplish it within the corrupt and/or indoctrinated system. A luxury we enjoyed to not have when we took over Afghanistan and Iraq. This is why they continually fail/make so little progress as to just consider it an overall fail. We will never "win" on any realistic timescale doing that.
A lot of people spend a lot of money and time on studying this. There is no formula for 'doing it right' that is generally applicable. That's why it's so hard.
The Russians would have won Afghanistan if not for US interference on multiple fronts. The Russians effectively crushed the Chechen insurgency.
Assad is almost certain to defeat the Syrian insurgency.
The difference in our cases is the level of resources of those involved. When there is a vast disparity, the superior power wins. My bookshelves are full of historical looks on insurgency up through today's wars. I taught counterinsurgency in the states for 4 years, actually fought an insurgency on the ground, and worked at the headquarters for the Afghanistan COIN Academy. Modern COIN is a failed religion more than it is a viable course of action.
To kill an idea, all you have to do is kill everyone that believes in it. Given what we know of the NSA's capabilities, armed drones with global reach & days long loiter times, among other capabilities, that doesn't seem so hard to achieve these days.
Could have, would have, didn't. Additionally, brutal actions like that tend to bring international actors in against you. It was an unmitigated failure for your strategy.
That word, I don't think it means what you think it means. It was in fact mitigated because the United States directly intervened, and simultaneously caused the collapse of the USSR.
I said Sudanese, not Syrian. Sudan was another unmitigated failure for your strategy.
The actors in Sudan have roughly equivalent resources. Or at least they did until heavy US involvement in the hunt for Joseph Kony.
I mean history is filled with so many cases where this idea is obviously wrong that it's hard for me to imagine you actually take it seriously. It is especially amusing that you would use it in relation to Afghanistan, which I'm sure you know is referred to as 'the graveyard of empires'.
Of course it is hard to achieve. The question is not if the US could eventually kill everyone in Afghanistan if we wanted to badly enough, but how on earth that would possibly serve US interests even if we did?
Again, it's hard for me to think that you actually believe an idea that's so transparently silly. I'm guessing you just wanted to say something provocative.
I think you and Eskimospy may be talking past each other here as you aren't necessarily arguing opposite positions; both can be true. I'd argue both ARE true. However, if killing everyone who believes in an idea were practical, the USSR would have successfully annexed Afghanistan. This is a country of warlords; war is their culture, and they neither value their own lives nor draw the line at any method of killing their enemies.And like I said, those academics are studying strictly "on the reservation." If the answer was to kill 40% of the military aged males outright, or deliberately target soft civilian targets to retaliate for unruly behavior, they'd never find it.
No kidding, people spend a bunch of time and money trying to figure out how to win a war without hurting the people you're fighting? Because it sounds easy.![]()
They bribed the Chechen insurgency to stay dormant while the money is flowing by truckloads from the Russian taxpayers to Chechen warlords like Kadyrov. As soon as the gravy train stops, the war will resume.The Russians would have won Afghanistan if not for US interference on multiple fronts. The Russians effectively crushed the Chechen insurgency.
I think you and Eskimospy may be talking past each other here as you aren't necessarily arguing opposite positions; both can be true. I'd argue both ARE true. However, if killing everyone who believes in an idea were practical, the USSR would have successfully annexed Afghanistan. This is a country of warlords; war is their culture, and they neither value their own lives nor draw the line at any method of killing their enemies.
They bribed the Chechen insurgency to stay dormant while the money is flowing by truckloads from the Russian taxpayers to Chechen warlords like Kadyrov. As soon as the gravy train stops, the war will resume.
Russians are effectively hostages of the people they "crushed."
The goal isn't to kill everyone, it's to demoralize and destroy their will to fight. When you're dealing with relatively uncivilized people, you can't do that by turning off their internet and canceling American Idol. You have to make resisting hurt them enormously. Look at how the Russians handled Chechnya. They put hand selected strong men in positions of power throughout the republic, and made it clear that opposition to the authorities would bring harsh consequences. If a man was found to be a terrorist, his entire extended family would be killed, the man who sells him bread would be killed, his imam would be killed, etc. Such a system would be simple and effective implemented in Afghanistan by squads of soldiers in each village. Over a period of 15-20 years, and with aggressive indoctrination of the youth, that's how you change a culture, and crush an insurgency.
None of this of course addresses the fundamental problem that it is extremely hard to see how 15-20 years of systematic slaughter would be in the US's best interests geopolitically, economically, or otherwise, which is of course the whole point.
30-50 years of sending US troops to get blown up while we funnel money to warlords, druglords, corrupt politicians and chinese concerns doesn't seem to be in the US's best interests either, but that's what we're gonna do.
My way is better than that way, if we're operating under the assumption that Afghanistan has geographical importance to the US. It's human capital has a net negative value. The people are less than worthless, they're a danger to the civilized world.
The Russians would have won Afghanistan if not for US interference on multiple fronts. The Russians effectively crushed the Chechen insurgency.
Assad is almost certain to defeat the Syrian insurgency.
The difference in our cases is the level of resources of those involved. When there is a vast disparity, the superior power wins. My bookshelves are full of historical looks on insurgency up through today's wars. I taught counterinsurgency in the states for 4 years, actually fought an insurgency on the ground, and worked at the headquarters for the Afghanistan COIN Academy. Modern COIN is a failed religion more than it is a viable course of action.
To kill an idea, all you have to do is kill everyone that believes in it. Given what we know of the NSA's capabilities, armed drones with global reach & days long loiter times, among other capabilities, that doesn't seem so hard to achieve these days.
The counterinsurgency strategy employed in Vietnam is, as far as I am aware, considered a failure. I've just spent a half hour perusing Petreaus's COIN manual written in 2006 and I didn't see anything highlighting the differences between it and the 1970s vintage. Does anyone have the knowledge base to share why success is considered more likely now?
Actually I understand the definition of the word perfectly well; you are not using it correctly. Unmitigated is an adjective that is attached to the noun 'defeat', meaning that it is describing the quality of their defeat (which was total), not the cause of their defeat.
Additionally, the US attempts to aid in the hunt for Joseph Kony have nothing to do with the insurgency that existed in Sudan and resulted in the creation of South Sudan.
Simply the assumption of importance isn't enough. The question is HOW important is it. I see no plausible circumstances where a military operation on the scale you are suggesting meets any likely cost/benefit ratio.
I touched on this a few years ago:
Counterinsurgency was discredited after Vietnam. What's changed?
I ended up updating that thread six months later, with Petraeus having resigned and people starting to speak up about COIN - it was almost universally negative. What did seem to be helping the (relatively small) tide was the unending air assaults and targeted assassinations via drones and special forces.
And the quality of their defeat was subject to US interference. And their defeat was hardly total. As of today, Russian-Afghanistan relations are healthier than US-Afghanistan relations, and take a look at how Afghan soldiers march sometime, look familiar? Their military command structure, pay system, etc. are all copies of the old Soviet system.
And I specifically said that the US hunt for Joseph Kony had nothing to do with the insurgency, which took place when the two sides were roughly equivalent in resources. How did you possibly misread that?
I'd say that rather than almost being successful, the Soviets were convinced they were eternally on the brink of being successful. Put it this way - I had a buddy who fought the mujahadeen for a year. The thing that freaked him out was the suicide attacks - the guy who would run up to a truck holding a mortar shell, the guys who would run into the center of a camp shooting everywhere with no possible escape. There were other things to be sure - being in a BTR with no one who spoke Ukrainian, having no mounted weapons able to bear on the people firing down on them - but the main thing was the suicide attacks, which gave the feeling that nowhere was ever safe.The USSR was very nearly successful. Their influence (and followers) live on today in Afghanistan. If not for direct US intervention in terms of arms and training for mujahadeen, and indirect US intervention in terms of financially crippling the USSR and radicalizing\creating the mujahadeen (that one turned out grrrreat)
The Afghans do in fact value their own lives. That's why their allegiances are so fickle and their casualty rates so low. War is more like a game to them. They'd prefer that no one dies, but that one side just gives up. When that happens, as many of the people on the losing side change sides as possible, and usually only the die-hard followers and leaders end up dead. This has happened repeatedly throughout their history. They'll throw their lot in with whoever they think is going to win. That used to be us. That used to be the Taliban. That used to be the Soviets too.
Sudan and the area that became South Sudan did not have anywhere remotely close to equivalent resources. Sudan has approximately four times South Sudan's population and at the time had an economy somewhere around ten times as big. That's a very generous application of 'roughly equivalent'.
I'd say that rather than almost being successful, the Soviets were convinced they were eternally on the brink of being successful. Put it this way - I had a buddy who fought the mujahadeen for a year. The thing that freaked him out was the suicide attacks - the guy who would run up to a truck holding a mortar shell, the guys who would run into the center of a camp shooting everywhere with no possible escape. There were other things to be sure - being in a BTR with no one who spoke Ukrainian, having no mounted weapons able to bear on the people firing down on them - but the main thing was the suicide attacks, which gave the feeling that nowhere was ever safe.
Kadyrov is Putin's boy. He is the highest ranking of the hand-selected strongmen running Chechnya for Putin. Sure, he's getting paid handsomely, but he's also beheading entire families to send messages to the remaining insurgency.
I literally cannot imagine living with that. You have my thanks and my admiration; I could not do it short of America herself being threatened.Usually it's kids that carry out the suicide attacks. They indoctrinate them young at madrassas in Pakistan, so that death for Allah is all they ever know. Eventually the shock of seeing BOLO reports for "11-14 year old, between 4'0" and 4'4" tall, between 70-90lbs, wearing sequin gold hat, blue shirt & pants and mickey mouse sandals. Believed to be carrying home-made explosive vest targeting xxxxxx" fades.
