Cuban history is certainly not remarkable for its successes
in foreign military involvement. This leads scholars who wish to
support a Cuban orientation to the intervention in Angola into some
difficulty. Although exporting the revolution has always been
a tenet of Cuban policy, Angola gave the Cubans their first chance to
attempt to export Castro's brand of communism outside the western
hemisphere. As such, it represents the first chance in many years for
us to examine Cuba's foreign policy and the use of their military forces
to support it. Discussing methods by which the student can
delineate Soviet and Cuban objectives, Bender states:
Most Americans assume that the Cubans in Angola and elsewhere in
Africa are little more than proxies for the Soviet Union. Rarely
is any distinction made between Soviet and Cuban interests, goals,
and actions in Africa. As a result, the Cuban presence in any
part of the continent is generally perceived as a setback for
the United States in its global competition with the Soviet Union.
So much national attention has been focused on a perceived Soviet-
Cuban threat in Africa that many have forgotten some larger, more
important questions plaguing U.S.-Soviet relations. Even if it
could be established that the Cubans are nothing more than the
Soviet proxies, for example, the problem of how to act toward
Soviet-backed regimes or movements in the Third World would remain.8
Domininquez, writing on Cuban foreign policy states that Cuba has
always had a "big countries foreign policy", and says that the first
tenant of that policy is the maintenance of the revolutionary
government. He states:
The survival of revolutionary rule remains the foremost objective
of their foreign policy. And I think it would today be widely
accepted--as it was not, at least in American capitals in the
1960s--that it was the practical imperative of survival,
considerably more than ideological affinity, that made the
Soviet connection as strong as it was from the outset.9
Domininquez further states:
Instead, the Revolutionary government (of Cuba) sacrificed short-
run internal welfare to its principle aim: the survival and
consolidation of its own kind of political regime.10
Thus, at least one purely Cuban objective was probably the maintenance
of power of the Castro government in Cuba. This would seem to be a very
self-evident claim. In order to maintain his position internationally,
Castro had to ensure his domestic power was unchallenged. He had to
maintain the image of the Western hemisphere's leading revolutionary
if he was to remain the leader of the third world nations' struggle for
independence from the superpowers. By showing that he was willing
to expend his most valuable resource, his people, in a struggle for an
emerging nation halfway across the world, he proved his support for
revolutionary solidarity at home and internationally. Castro has used
the presence of his troops in Angola as the strongest possible signal
to other countries of the Third World that he would support, militarily
and economically, those countries that were responsive to his ideas of
revolutionary solidarity.
Castro's international position as a leader in the Non-aligned
Movement was at first enhanced, and then tarnished, by the Angolan
intervention because of the awareness of Cuban reliance on Soviet
assistance. Without Soviet supplies, aircraft, ships, and support to
the Cuban economy, there would have been no or very few Cuban troops
in Angola. Even when the Soviet support is considered, however, one
cannot overlook Castro's desire to further advance his position in the
Third World through his Angolan ventures. As Halperin states:
Nonetheless, to assume that Castro was acting under Soviet orders,
or simply paying back part of his enormous debt to the Soviets,
fails to account for a significant factor in his motivation. The
Revival and expansion of Cuba's (and Castro's) world role,
unprecedented among small Third World states, was its own reward.11