BIDEN: Dr. Rice, I suspect your press office has been asked by the press as often as I have in the last 24 hours how there could be such a discrepancy in our individual assessment of the trained troops in Iraq.
And I want to just -- "set the record straight" implies that I know I'm right. I don't. So I'm not setting the record straight. I'll give you how I arrived at my numbers and why I think it's important.
BIDEN: It's not about criticizing the administration. It's about what I believe is a recognition on the part of our trainers, our folks in the field, that we made, understandably, the wrong judgment early on as to how to train; that we went for, as I will not mention the general's name but last trip, I think my friend -- I don't want to get him in trouble because maybe he didn't. He said, "We went for quantity, not quality, at the front end, and it hasn't worked," end of quote.
Now, here is what I know to be the facts, as told to me by your administration personnel in charge of training, not by anybody from the outside.
First of all, the claims there is 53,520 trained police. That's what the administration says in the last report. These consist of police who receive a three-week refresher course and new recruits who get an eight-week course.
Parenthetically I'll point out that we talked about lack of automobiles and lack of equipment for the police. At the training center, when I asked whether they received the automobiles, the person in charge of training said, "We have them, but they're not much use. I found out they don't know how to drive." Literally. My word. They don't know how to drive.
So we're teaching them how to start automobiles mainly, paraphrasing, I don't know the exact quote, to get out of the way of an explosion. So that's the quality of the stuff -- people we're sending.
There's a 24-week field training course by U.S. trainers in the manual. It has never begun. Not a single one of these claimed 53,000 cops have gone through that.
They don't even know when they send the police back to -- you should know this, if you don't -- back to Iraq, they have no notion where they go. They have no notion who they've been assigned to. They don't have any idea where they are and no way to follow up.
BIDEN: Instead of the 5,700 international trainers recommended by your administration, your assessment team, in June of '03, it took until this fall, '04, to get 500 -- U.S.-only, nobody else, U.S.-only trainers.
You stated yesterday, Doctor, this is not an environment for, quote, "beat cops," it's an insurgency. Witness Mosul in November, where nearly the entire police force deserted after insurgent attacks.
On September 15th, 2004, the administration claimed it had 32,000 trained police. Notice that they now claiming -- you all are now claiming you've gone from 32,000 to 53,000 -- 20,000 just since September 15th.
In that hearing, the deputy assistant secretary of state, Joe Bowab, who I think will still be there when you get there, who was in charge of overseeing the training program from State's end, I asked him the following question.
Quote: "Do we have 32,000 trained Iraqi cops on the street? Trained. Not cops on the street, but trained Iraqi cops?"
Bowab: "No, sir." Quote: "No, sir."
I won't bother with you the rest of it. I went on to say, "My impression is you don't have one trained Iraqi cop, having gone through all of the training." His answer to that question was, "Yes. We don't."
National guard, 40,063 in the latest report. Training consists of three weeks by the individual and three to four weeks collective training. Training is not standardized, there have not been good results. The report of high absenteeism. Large casualties from insurgents have led to a climate of intimidation. Reports of infiltration by insurgents -- they think infiltration in the Mosul attack of the U.S. base.
Allawi himself dismissed the national guard before the interim assembly, saying it was a concept not understood by Arab societies.
So who's equipped, trained, led and experienced to fight the insurgency? As General Petraeus said -- and he's a first-rate guy, please listen to him -- we have to change, quote, "the operational concept. This is an insurgency, not regular police work." That's Petraeus.
Police commandos, led by General Adnam, I think A-D-N-A-M, a former Iraqi general, with whom I met last time around.
BIDEN: Petraeus introduced us to him in December.
He will eventually have about 1,000 -- he probably has about 600 now -- that's an educated guess -- able to operate independently and collectively on their own intelligence.
But Petraeus has figured out don't send the cops back to their home town. Send the cops you finally do train to another town. Focus on -- what we've been arguing you should do for two years -- focus on training essentially SWAT teams, people relied on, heavy training, heavily armed, send them in. So we're finally doing that. Petraeus is doing that.
But just to put it in perspective, there's about 600 of those folks now. And this General Adnam (ph) is a pretty tough guy. I'm convinced he knows what he's doing, and Petraeus does, too.
Intervention force, latest report: 9,159. All of them don't have the experience to stand up to the insurgency.
Special operation forces, latest report: 674.
Some elements of the army, the latest report pushed the number at 4,159 are trained. That's where I got the number roughly 4,000. That's what were's saying. The latest report puts the number at 4,159 though the mission is supposed to be national defense, not fighting internal battles against fellow Iraqis.
These same outfits refused to fight in Fallujah in April.
This is my staff assessments, and I agree with it.
At the high end, assuming every one of these forces is battle- ready, that would give you about 14,000 forces. But in reality, it's probably no more than a third who are actually battle-ready. Most are rookies and will not take time for them to gain the experience, the skills that are needed unless they're embedded like our reporters are in U.S. forces.
And the delays in the NATO staff colleagues helping, that hasn't helped at all, either.
Now, Peter Khalil, a former director of national security in the CPA. This is the guy who was in charge of training. In the New York Times in December 20 said, "The answer lies with specially trained Iraqi internal security forces separate from the standard military, including mobile counterterrorism, light infantry police battalions and SWAT teams. There are now only a handful of battalions with such training."
BIDEN: Continue to quote, "Unfortunately, the coalition was late off the mark in building up these units and training as long, a minimum of 16 weeks for each man, as compared to the two weeks of boot camp now given to a guardsman."
Continued quote, "Training these special units will take time. The United States should be prepared to shoulder the main burden in Iraq security for the next six to 12 months."
Now, Khalil also did a piece in the New York Times. He's now a visiting fellow of the Center for Middle East Study.
And he says, and I'll end this, "150,000 Iraqis who have so far joined the state security services can do little to stand in the way of our problem. In fact, even if their ranks increased to 500,000, through rushed training, they would be largely ineffective.
"However, a force of 25,000 or so highly trained Iraqi internal police troops operating at the point end of the spear with the remaining bulk of Iraqi forces in supportive role might be able to do the job. That's because counterinsurgency is not about numbers, it's about quality of security force, not the quality. That is the key."
Every single person I have spoken to on the ground in Iraq in my four trips, three since Saddam was found, every hard -- every tough Marine, every single military guy I've spoken to says that, been saying it for two years.
And yet you guys -- I'm not asking people to say, "Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa, we made a mistake." Forget that.
You all don't do anything except parrot, "We've trained 120,000 forces." So I go home and people ask me the same thing they ask the senator from Illinois: "Why are we still there? 120,000 trained Iraqis. Why are we still there?"
So do me a favor -- as my mother would say, God love you, please do me a favor. Start to tell the whole deal.
And let's agree -- not agree. Let me cite a new definition of trained: If you're able to take the place of a U.S. force. Let's call it that.
And I'd like you to think about and in private tell us later after you're secretary, which I'm going to -- about to vote for you in about five minutes.
BIDEN: Tell us, how many of those folks you think, you think -- and for God's sake, don't listen to Rumsfeld. He doesn't know what in the hell he's talking about on this.
(LAUGHTER)
Thank you very much. You want to comment? I welcome it.
RICE: I only want to say, Senator, that we talked yesterday about the fact that the 120,000 is those trained. I said there are problems with leadership. There are problems with desertion. There are problems with some absenteeism, as well.
And I also said, in response to Senator Obama, that the real test is do they fight when they're put in the field? In some places they've fought well and other places they've not fought well.
BIDEN: What's your overall assessment?
RICE: I think that we have had problems with the training. I'd be the first to say that. That's why General Petraeus says what he says.
And we're working to address those problems. And that's one reason that General Luck is out there is to get an assessment of what we need to do.
Part of it is that the circumstances do keep changing. We thought we were training beat cops. We were training cops who were going to have to face insurgents.
BIDEN: In truth they haven't changed in 19 months.
RICE: Well, that piece of it has changed because the cops were taking a real beating.
But in any case, we are absolutely clear that the key for the administration, the key for America is to get Iraqi forces trained. We understand that. We are working on it.
BIDEN: That translates then we have to keep American forces in large numbers there for at least six months to a year, right?
RICE: Well, Senator, we can -- let's have this discussion later. I will say that I don't know if the standard is...
BIDEN: What do you mean? "I'd rather have it after I'm confirmed?"
RICE: No, no. I don't know what the standard is that they have to be able to one-for-one replace American soldiers. There are some things that they will do better than American soldiers because they know the neighborhood. There are many things that they will not do as well.
And so I think I would not accept as a standard a one-for-one exchange of an Iraqi for an American soldier.
BIDEN: What is your standard? You tell me your standard.
RICE: My standard is that they are able and capable of carrying out the tasks that are required to deal with the insurgency and to begin to root out the insurgency and to work in a counterinsurgency way.
Frankly, they may not do it the way an American soldier would do it.
BIDEN: As long as they do it so we can come home.