Originally posted by: Number1
Originally posted by: PrinceofWands
Originally posted by: Taggart
I remember seeing some self-defense/home defense expert (something like that) discourage owning a firearm. He claimed it was more dangerous to family members because of the threat of accidents.
He claimed that most gun owners will hesitate before shooting an intruder, so the gun is useless. Are you willing and able to pull the trigger when the time comes?
Most people who talk about the 'more dangerous to family' thing are reciting from a debunked study.
There is NO factual statistic to establish such a thing.
Before you talk out of your behind, why don't you do a little bit of research. Its prety simple: No gun in the home=no dead children.
Gun Injury and Death: United States Data
In 2000 a total of 28,663 people died from firearm injuries.
National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Vital Statistics Report, Volume 50. No. 15, September 16, 2002.
A gun kept in the home is 4 times more likely to be involved in an unintentional shooting, 7 times more likely to be used in a criminal assault or homicide, and 11 times more likely to be used to commit or attempt a suicide than to be used in self defense.
Kellerman, et al. Injuries and deaths due to firearms in the home. The Journal of Trauma; Injury, Infection and Critical Care. Vol. 45, no. 2
The firearms industry is virtually the only manufacturer of a consumer product not required to meet basic product safety standards ? in fact, toy guns are more regulated for safety than are real guns.
Consumer Federation of America Foundation. ?Which One is More Regulated?? Brochure printed 2000.
Over 57% of all suicides are committed with a firearm.
National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Vital Statistics Report, Volume 50. No. 15, September 16, 2002.
Cut/stab wounds killed 1,743 Americans in 2000; gunshots killed 28,663 the same year.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice. ?Crime in the United States 2000.? Uniform Crime Reports. October 2001.
In 1999, for homicides in which the weapon could be identified, 53% of female victims were shot and killed with guns ? more than 63% were shot by male intimates. The number of females shot and killed by their intimate acquaintance was more than 4 times higher than the total number murdered by male strangers using all weapons combined. When Men Murder Women, October 2001. Analysis of 1999 Federal Bureau of Investigation Supplementary Homicide Report data. Analysis conducted by Violence Policy Center.
A child or a teenager commits 55% of all unintentional shootings.
Center to Prevent Handgun Violence. Parents, Kids, & Guns: A Nationwide Survey. 1998. Data collected by Peter D. Hart Research Associates. .Survey conducted from October 31 to November 4, 1998.
One out of three handguns is kept loaded and unlocked in the home.
Cook, Philip J. and Jens Ludwig. Guns in America: Results of a comprehensive national survey on firearms ownership and use. Police Foundation, 1996
Only 30% of parents ask the parents of their children?s friends if they keep a gun in the home.
Center to Prevent Handgun Violence. Parents, Kids, & Guns: A Nationwide Survey. 1998. Data collected by Peter D. Hart Research Associates. Survey conducted from October 31 to November 4, 1998.
In a 1998 study, 80% of clinicians stated that they should counsel on firearm safety, but only 30% do so. Of those clinicians who currently counsel, only 20% counsel more than 10% of their patient families.
Barkin, et al. The smoking gun: Do clinicians follow guidelines on firearm safety counseling? Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine. 1998;152:749-756
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR)
Violence Prevention Program
1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1012, Washington, DC 20009
(202) 667-4260
www.psr.org
Updated 10/02
Or how about this:
Text
Firearm Facts
In 1997, 32,436 Americans were killed with firearms-in homicides, suicides and accidents. In comparison, 33,651 Americans were killed in the Korean War and 58,148 Americans were killed in the Vietnam War. National Center for Health Statistics, 1997
Currently, an estimated 39% of households have a gun, while 24% have a handgun. The University of Chicago, 1998
There are approximately 192 million privately owned firearms in the U.S. --65 million of which are handguns. Police Foundations, 1996
Approximately 29% of adults personally own a firearm, and 18% personally own a handgun. The University of Chicago, 1998
1997, 32,436 people in the United States died from firearm-related deaths - 12,942 (40%) of those were murdered; 17,566 (54%) were suicides; 981 (3%) were accidents; and in 367 (1%) the intent was unknown. National Center for Health Statistics, 1997
In 1998, 8 out of 10 of those murdered with firearms were murdered with handguns. FBI Uniform Crime Report, 1998
In 1997, gunshot wounds were the second leading cause of injury death for men and women 10-24 years of age - second only to motor vehicle crashes. National Center for Health Statistics, 1999
In 1997, the firearm injury death rate among males 15-24 years of age was 42% higher than the motor vehicle traffic injury death rate. National Center for Health Statistics, 1999
In 1997, more than 11 children and teenagers, ages 19 and under, were killed with guns everyday. National Vital Statistics, 1998
In 1998, 77% of murdered juveniles age 13-19 were killed with a firearm. Department of Justice, 1999
From 1993 through 1997, an average of 1,409 children and teenagers took their own lives with guns each year. National Center for Health Statistics
Each year during 1993 through 1997, an average of 1,621 murderers who had not reached their 18th birthdays took someone's life with a gun. Federal Bureau of Investigations
In 1996, handguns were used to murder 2 people in New Zealand, 15 in Japan, 30 in Great Britain, 106 in Canada, 213 in Germany and 9,390 in the United States. FBI Uniform Crime Report, 1996
Kellermans study has been utterly debunked. Many of the listings below are peer reviewed scholarly articles, which Kellermans never was. Kellerman has even gone so far as to state in an interview that he likely inflated the danger of gun ownership and felt the real danger presented was closer to 6 times more likely to cause injury to the family, though again he was unable to provide any factual backing for this number. Kellerman has since left the anti-gun lobby pocket and collaborated with others on PRO-GUN studies (as seen in various references of the half dozen or so articles below).
In other words, for every 'fact' you claim that guns are bad, I'll provide two peer-reviewed that say it isn't. Good luck.
Perhaps the most enduring factoid of the gun prohibition movement is that a person with a gun in the home is 43 times as likely to shoot someone in the family
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as to shoot a criminal. This "43 times" figure is the all-time favorite factoid of the gun-prohibition lobby. It's not really true, but it does tell us a lot about the gun-prohibition mindset.
The source of the 43-to-1 ratio is a study of firearm deaths in Seattle homes, conducted by doctors Arthur L. Kellermann and Donald T. Reay ("Protection or Peril?: An Analysis of Firearm-Related Deaths in the Home," New England Journal of Medicine, 1986). Kellerman and Reay totaled up the numbers of firearms murders, suicides, and fatal accidents, and then compared that number to the number of firearm deaths that were classified as justifiable homicides. The ratio of murder, suicide, and accidental death to the justifiable homicides was 43 to 1.
This is what the anti-gun lobbies call "scientific" proof that people (except government employees and security guards) should not have guns.
Of the gun deaths in the home, the vast majority are suicides. In the 43-to-1 figure, suicides account for nearly all the 43 unjustifiable deaths.
Counting a gun suicide as part of the increased risk of having a gun in the home is appropriate only if the presence of a gun facilitates a "successful" suicide that would not otherwise occur. But most research suggests that guns do not cause suicide.
In the book Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America, Florida State University criminologist Gary Kleck analyzed suicide data for every America city with a population more than 100,000, and found no evidence that any form of gun control (including handgun prohibition) had an effect on the total suicide rate. Gun control did sometimes reduce gun suicide, but not overall suicide.
Notably, Japan, which prohibits handguns and rifles entirely, and regulates long guns very severely, has a
?Japan, which prohibits handguns, has a suicide rate of more than twice the U.S. level.?
suicide rate of more than twice the U.S. level. Many of the northern and central European nations also have very high suicide rates to accompany their strict gun laws. (Of course, if you have any suspicion that anybody in your home might be suicidal, it would hardly be a mistake for you to ensure that they do not have ready access to guns, tranquilizers, or other potentially lethal items.)
Putting aside the suicides, the Kellermann/Reay figures show 2.39 accidental or criminal deaths by firearm (in the home) for every justifiable fatal shooting. Now, 2 to 1 is a lot less dramatic than 43 to 1, but we still have more unjustifiable gun deaths than justifiable gun deaths in the home.
But just as many other people who would commit suicide with a gun would use an equally lethal method if guns are unavailable. Many of the people who kill themselves in firearm accidents may also be bent on destruction, regardless of the means. One study of gun-accident victims found that they were "disproportionately involved in other accidents, violent crime, and heavy drinking." (Philip Cook, "The Role of Firearms in Violent Crime: An Interpretative Review of the Literature," in Criminal Violence).
Or, as another researcher put it, "The psychological profile of the accident-prone suggests the same kind of aggressiveness shown by most murderers." (Roger Lane, "On the Social Meaning of Homicide Trends in America," in Violence in America, Vol. I, 1989.)
Without guns, many accident victims might well find some other way to kill themselves "accidentally," such as by reckless driving.
So by counting accidents and suicides, the 43-to-1 factoid ends up including a very large number of fatalities that would have occurred anyway, even if there were no gun in the home.
Now, how about the self-defense homicides, which Kellermann and Reay found to be so rare? Well, the reason that they found such a low total was that they excluded many cases of lawful self-defense. Kellermann and Reay did not count in the self-defense total of any of the cases where a person who had shot an attacker was acquitted on grounds of self-defense, or cases where a conviction was reversed on appeal on grounds related to self-defense. Yet 40% of women who appeal their murder convictions have the conviction reversed on appeal. ("Fighting Back," Time, Jan. 18, 1993.)
In short, the 43-to-1 figure is based on the totally implausible assumption that all the people who die in gun suicides and gun accidents would not kill themselves with something else if guns were unavailable. The figure is also based on a drastic undercount of the number of lawful self-defense homicides.
Moreover, counting dead criminals to measure the efficacy of civilian handgun ownership is ridiculous. Do we measure the efficacy of our police forces by counting how many people the police lawfully kill every year? The benefits of the police ? and of home handgun ownership ? are not measured by the number of dead criminals, but by the number of crimes prevented. Simplistic counting of corpses tells us nothing about the real safety value of gun ownership for protection.
Finally, Kellermann and Reay ignore the most important factor of all in assessing the risks of gun ownership: whose home the gun is in. You don't need a medical researcher to tell you that guns can be misused when in the homes of persons with mental illness related to violence; or in the homes of persons prone to self-destructive, reckless behavior; or in the homes of persons with arrest records for violent felonies; or in the homes where the police have had to intervene to deal with domestic violence. These are the homes from which the vast majority of handgun fatalities come.
To study these high-risk homes and to jump to conclusions about the general population is illogical. We know that possession of an automobile by an alcoholic who is prone to drunk driving may pose a serious health risk. But proof that automobiles in the hands of alcoholics may be risky doesn't prove that autos in the hands of non-alcoholics are risky. Yet the famous Seattle 43-to-1 figure is based on lumping the homes of violent felons, alcoholics, and other disturbed people in with the population as a whole. The study fails to distinguish between the large risks of guns in the hands of dangerous people, with the tiny risks (and large benefits) of guns in the hands of ordinary people.
But then again, treating ordinary people according to standards that would be appropriate for criminals and the violently insane is what the gun control movement is all about.
· A gun in the home is 43 times more likely to kill a family member or friend than to be used in self-defense. (Kellerman, A., New England Journal of Medicine, 1993)
False. These are two mis-statements of the conclusions of Kellermann-86, "Protection or Peril?". Kellermann was never able to connect a single shooting death with the gun that fired the fatal shot. For all we know, all of the victims in that study were shot by police officers, acting in the line of duty. Or they could have been shot by burglars, who brought their own guns into the house. Kellermann never established a cause-and-effect relationship between the gun kept in the house and the death of a single family member; the relationship is completely inferential.
· Bringing a gun into your home increases the risk of homicide three times, and the risk of suicide increases five-fold. (Kellerman, A., New England Journal of Medicine, 1993)
False. Actually the number was 2.7, not three. And again, Kellermann was not able to connect a single homicide with the gun, or the person, who fired the shot. In this particular 1993 study, of homicide in the home, about 60 percent of the homicides did not involve guns at all. Many victims were stabbed, or strangled, or drowned or even burned to death. But Kellermann referred to these deaths as "gun-related" because there was a gun in the house, even if the victim was stabbed to death and the gun stayed securely locked up in the safe!
Kellermann's findings are subtle and very nuanced. They have to be read very, very carefully. For example, in "Protection or Peril?" he wrote, "For every intruder shot by an armed homeowner, we count 43 dead homeowners or family members. For this reason, the advisablility of keeping a gun in the home for self-protection must be questioned." That is a loooong way from saying that a gun in the home is 43 times more likely to be used against you. The reporters who covered the release of that study over-simplified the findings, particularly in their headlines, as Kellermann knew they would, and the typical headline was, "Researchers say gun-owners 43 times more likely to be slain" or "Gun 43 times more likely to be used against owner, study says".
All of the Kellermann studies suffer from the same two deficiencies: they have never been independently corroborated (if there really are 43 innocent people killed by guns in their home for every dead burglar, where are their bodies? They ought to be stacked up like cordwood, because we know from FBI statistics how many people are killed by guns in lawful self-defense each year...so where are their bodies?) and none of the studies have ever been replicated, or repeated. The latter is one of the most rigorous parts of the scientific method: an experiment must be repeatable to be accepted as fact, and none of Kellermann's studies have ever been replicated, for the simple reason that he never releases his raw data, his "full data set". The Kellermann studies (there about a dozen of them) began appearing almost twenty years ago now, and in all that time, none of them have ever been confirmed by replication.
Another debunking of Kellerman's work was done by Dr. Miguel A. Faria, editor in chief of The Medical Sentinel of the American Association of Physicians and Surgeons.
Kellerman's study was completely disingenuous, and indicates--as does his financing and publication by gun-control zealots James Mercy at the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and Jerome P. Kassirer, editor of NEJM--that the intent of these so-called studies is to produce pro-gun-control soundbites for Sarah Brady's Handgun Control, Inc., rather than scientific knowledge. The CDC's anti-gun propaganda was so flagrant and outrageous that the Congress threatened to cut off its funding entirely.
The Kellerman pseudo-study was refuted by several well-qualified sources, including sociology professor H. Taylor Buckner; Henry E. Schaffner, Ph.D.; and J. Neil Schulman, in his book Stopping Power: The Humanistic Case for Civilian Arms, Centurion Press, 1994. His sampling methods, methodology, analysis of data and conclusions have all been censured as unscientific.
But, perhaps most telling was the study by Professor Gary Kleck, head of the criminology department at Florida State University, which was summarized in his paper Guns and Violence: A Summary of the field prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, which was held at the Washington Hilton, August 29 through September 1, 1991.
Unlike Kellerman, Kleck's award-winning study has been peer-reviewed.
The paper (and his book Point Blank:Guns and Violence in America) are replete with facts, stemming from an extensive telephone survey of 4,978 households in the 48 contiguous states, indicate that American civilians use their firearms approximately 2.4 million times annually defending themselves against criminals, in 1.9 million of those incidents they use handguns. The figures exclude police, security guards and the military.
Fifty out of 5,000 people responded that they had used handguns in an actual confrontation against another human attempting a crime. In 47.2 percent of the cases, the criminal was armed. About one in six were armed with a firearm, the rest with knives, clubs or some other weapon. In 73.4 percent of these gun-defense incidents, the attacker was a stranger to the intended victims. Defenses against a family member or intimate were rare--well under 10 percent. This disproves the Kellerman myth that a gun kept for defense will most likely be used against a family member or someone you love." --- "Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics," by Joe Pierre
Howerter's Debunking of Kellerman's "43-to-1" Lie
*
http://www.otherside.net/43to1.htm
*
http://www.ozemail.com.au/~confiles/overseas.html#43-TO-1
*
http://rkba.org/research/rkba.faq
*
http://www.guntruths.com/GunTruths/guntruthscom_home_page.htm
Kellerman's "43-in-1" Lies Exposed
*
http://www.netdepot.com/~donnybob/rights_home.htm
Caught Lying - CDC's Funding Cut by Congress
*
http://www.ssaa.org.au/blue.html
Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemic of Propaganda?
*
http://www.2ndlawlib.org/journals/tennmed.html
Gun Control Advocates Purvey Deadly Myths
*
http://www.junkscience.com/nov98/lottgun.htm
A Legacy of Government's Monopoly: The Lack of a Right to Protection
*
http://www.public-policy.org/~ncpa/studies/s181/s181d.html
We must work to insure our children are not swayed by the subtle but constant emphasis of liberal "ideals" in the media and in their schools.
*
http://www.kc3.com/freedom_or_gun_control.htm
Caught Lying - Congress Cuts $2.6 Million From CDC Budget Even After Being Exposed; CDC Continues to Spread Lies
*
http://www.claremont.org/doc/bully.cfm
*
http://www.ssaa.org.au/ILA/Feb97.html
Yes, THESE are the People that got caught lying; THESE were the people who got their funding cut and THESE are the people that fed their disinformation to Rosie O'Donnell
"Where Did You Get *That* Statistic?" [Good Question Indeed]
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (NCIPC) of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
*
http://www.vpc.org/studies/whersuic.htm
In contrast, this regarding RKBA research methodology, from an anti-gunner no less:
"I am as strong a gun-control advocate as can be found among the criminologists in this country. If I were Mustapha Mond of Brave New World, I would eliminate all guns from the civilian population and maybe even from the police ... What troubles me is the article by Gary Kleck and Marc Gertz. The reason I am troubled is that they have provided an almost clear cut case of methodologically sound research in support of something I have theoretically opposed for years, namely, the use of a gun in defense against a criminal perpetrator. ...I have to admit my admiration for the care and caution expressed in this article and this research. Can it be true that about two million instances occur each year in which a gun was used as a defensive measure against crime? It is hard to believe." -- Dr. Marvin Wolfgang (The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, Northwestern University School of Law, Volume 86, Number 1, Fall, 1995): Dr. Wolfgang is acknowledged as one of the foremost criminologists in the country.
"Also striking is the disparity between claims made in public debates and reality: Although gun control advocates make claims like, "Between 1979 and 1991, nearly 50,000 children were killed by firearms," (4) the actual numbers for the most recent year for which data is available, 1994, were 469 homicides, 188 suicides, 185 accidental gun deaths, and 30 gun deaths of "undetermined intentionality," (5) suggesting that such advocates inflate child homicides by a factor of nearly five. Violence among children is clearly less frequent than gun control advocates would have us believe." -- "Better Lying Through Science II"
*
http://www.grnc.org/may97/lyingiia.htm
"The nationwide crime trends as calculated by the FBI show crime tracking downward in every category for the past five years." FBI Statistics
*
http://www.accessatlanta.com/ajc/crime/
Fatalities Among Children 0-14 - Excellent Pie Chart: Fatalities Attributable to Weapons Being Smallest Category Tallied
*
http://amfire.com/afistatistics/children.html
Surprise! American murder rate LOWER than many European Countries
*
http://www.ssaa.org.au/ILA/Mar97.html
Ten Myths About Gun Control
*
http://www.scfirearms.org/myths.txt
*
"Boys who own legal firearms have much lower rates of delinquency and drug use and are even slightly less delinquent than nonowners of guns." - Source: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention NCJ-143454, "Urban Delinquency and Substance Abuse," August 1995.
Crime, Self-Defense, and the Right to Carry a Handgun by Jeffrey R. Snyder - "Shall Issue" CCW Reform Saves Lives
*
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-284.html
Lott - Guns in the Home; Family Guns a Danger Myths Debunked 2.5 Million Defensive Gun Uses Each Year
*
http://www.kc3.com/lott-editorial.htm
LTE Defensive Gun Use; Accidents; Police 11%, Civilians 2%
*
http://wildcat.arizona.edu/papers/89/104/03_1_m.html
Lott - "How to Stop Mass Public Shootings" When citizens are allowed to carry concealed weapons, death and injuries from shootings decline.
*
http://www.kc3.com/Lott%20Editorial_LATimes.htm
General Firearms Facts & Statistics
*
http://amfire.com/afistatistics/general.html
Out of all the privately owned handguns, legal and illegal, in the United States, the percentage of them are not used in a murder/crime of any type? 99.998% of all privately owned handguns in the U.S. are not used in a murder in any given year. -- Boortz
*
http://www.boortz.com/pontific.htm
Kates/Kleck/Lott - Gun Bans Merely Disarm the Law-Abiding
*
http://teapot.usask.ca/cdn-firearms/Kates/prohib.fails
MURDER STATISICS ARE BEING SCRUTINIZED Wash. Times, 07/02/1998 at C5
"In the first half of 1997, New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles led the nation in slayings. Baltimore placed fifth and the District [of Columbia] sixth, according to statistics released by the Federal Bureau of Investigation."
[interview conducted by Ginny Simone with Keith Tidswell of Australia's Sporting Shooters Association: "Surprise, Surprise" [Archive News]
*
http://www.nralive.com/
["Gun Control and the Subway Class," Wall Street Journal, Jan. 10, 1985.]
* - less than 0.2 % of all firearms and less than 0.4 % of all handguns owned nationally are ever used in crimes:
* - for every homocide committed with a firearm, there are 65 instances where a gun is used to thwart an attack, and perhaps save an innocent life.
UN Gun Control Agenda Planned in Secret, Overseas, with US Tax Dollars
*
http://www.nraila.org/pub/ila/1998/98-04-27_info_opening_closed_doors
"The Constitution shall never be construed to prevent the people of theUnited States who are peaceable citizens from keeping their own arms. "
--Samuel Adams
" ...arms discourage and keep invader and plunderer in awe, and preserve order in the world as well as property...Horrid mischief would ensue were [the law-abiding] deprived of the use of them."
--Thomas Paine
Disarming the Data Doctors: How to Debunk the "Public Health" Basis for "Gun Control"
By Richard W. Stevens**
Copyright 1996 All Rights Reserved
Headlines scream:
"School Violent Deaths Soar - Guns Kill Most Victims"
or:
"Study Confirms Link Between Guns and School Killings"
or:
"Guns are Prime Suspect in 77% of School Violent Deaths"
Data from one recently published study in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) could provoke headlines like these1. Few reporters will check the facts behind such headlines. Readers (and viewers) will likely not question the conclusions of a published scientific study. A news article will seldom do more than summarize the article's key data and conclusions. Gun prohibitionists can use the "scientific" to press for stronger "gun control" laws.
Gun rights advocates might respond by asserting that a study is "biased" or "bogus." Some might fall back on the old argument that "an occasional murder is the price of the Bill of Rights." These sorts of arguments lack substance, and never convince anyone but believers.
How can thoughtful gun rights advocates reply to unfavorable "evidence" from "scientific" studies? There are at least three ways: (1) Understand the "public health" approach behind the studies, (2) Know the methods and terms of the studies, and (3) Identify the key flaws and limitations in the studies. We show you how to apply these methods using one influential study as an example.
Making Crime a Public Health Issue
When people start to view a problem as a "disease," people naturally turn to doctors to "cure" it. Lawyers, criminologists, philosophers, clergymen, and politicians do not cure diseases. The tendency to trust in doctors to diagnose and treat disease offers financially or politically ambitious doctors a clear incentive to call social problems "diseases." Turn a problem into a disease, and doctors become the healers.
Doctors who oppose private ownership of firearms jumped at the chance to become "gun control" experts. The Founding Fathers considered firearms ownership an inalienable right.2 They thought owning guns was a political, not a medical, matter. Recently, some doctors have made firearms ownership a public health problem.3
What brought the doctors into the subject of guns? Doctors got involved with firearms issues by declaring injuries "caused by" guns to be a "disease." The guns themselves became a factor in causing the "disease." If guns became a disease factor, then whoever possesses a gun is a carrier of a disease-causing agent.
One "gun control" advocate explains how they did it:
How on earth do handgun injuries relate to public health? Anything that unnecessarily contributes to human disease, injury, or death is a proper concern of public health ... If enough people were injured and killed in hang glider accidents, hang gliders would become a concern of public health professionals (as, for example, motorcycles are today.)4
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has led the movement to treat firearms injuries as a disease and to apply public health methods to suggest "treatment."5 The CDC's strategy has three main elements:
(1) Tracking "firearm deaths" and injuries to monitor changing rates and to define high-risk groups;
(2) Using epidemiological studies to define risk factors and to suggest "possible intervention strategies";
(3) developing and evaluating specific remedies.6
Put simply, whatever affects the health of "the public" is a "public health" issue. Firearms use causes a "disease" (injuries and deaths) affecting thousands of people. Therefore, the logic goes, the use of firearms is a public health issue.7
Epidemiology: Public Health's Chief Weapon
Epidemiology is often used to address a public health problem. Epidemiology is the study of how and why disease is distributed in a population. Epidemiology tells us how much disease there is, who gets it, and what specific factors put individuals at risk.8
Epidemiologists gather and use statistical data to explain disease conditions in a population. Epidemiological studies try, among other things:
(1) to calculate the number of diseased persons there are;
(2) to predict the number of diseased persons there will be in the future;
(3) to predict the future costs of treating and caring for the diseased persons;
(4) to isolate the cause(s) of the disease;
(5) to determine how the disease is transmitted.9
The gun prohibitionists used a clever ploy to gain "scientific" support for their position and then multiply its public relations value. First, the doctors devised and published epidemiological studies in medical journals, which showed that the problem of gun injuries is large and serious. Then, follow-up studies and articles would quote the earlier studies' conclusions as fact, without ever mentioning the limitations or qualifications on those conclusions.10
How Epidemiological Studies Work
Epidemiology has a good reputation for helping to find the causes and modes of transmission of some kinds of occupational and endemic diseases.11 The epidemiological study measures the incidence of disease.12
There are several types of epidemiological studies.13 One common type is the "retrospective" study. A retrospective study looks at the occurrence of disease in the past. By contrast, the "prospective" study starts in the present and charts the occurrence of disease in the future.
The retrospective type of study begins with the researchers precisely defining the "disease."14 The researchers then select the possible risk factors that might be causing the disease. Next, the researchers choose a population to study. They will try to find a relationship between the risk factors and the disease in this selected population. Finally, they select a study method.15
Researchers often conduct "retrospective case-control" studies. Here is how such a study works. From the selected population, the researchers:
(1) Gather a list of persons who have the disease;
(2) Gather a list of persons who do not have the disease, but whose relevant characteristics match those of the first (diseased) group;
(3) Interview every person on both lists -- ask questions to determine whether each person has been exposed to the suspected risk factor or not; if the person has been exposed, try to determine how much exposure the person has had;
(4) Using standard statistical methods, compare the percentage of diseased persons who were exposed to the risk factor, to the percentage of "healthy" (non-diseased) persons who also were exposed to the risk factor.
[Researchers compared the percentage of lung cancer patients who had smoked, to the percentage of lung cancer patients who had never smoked. The researchers found that a much larger number of lung cancer patients had been smokers than had been non-smokers.]
(5) If the statistics show that persons exposed to the risk factor were more likely to develop the disease than persons who were not exposed to that risk factor, then there is a "positive association" between the risk factor and the disease.
[Researchers did find a "positive association" between exposure to the risk factor (smoking) and the disease (lung cancer).]16
The 1993 Kellermann Study: Guns as Homicide Risk Factor
A. The Headliners
One well-known researcher, Arthur C. Kellermann, M.D., with a variety of co-authors, has published several articles based on epidemiological studies which promote "gun control."17 One such article was "Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for Homicide in the Home," published in the widely- cited New England Journal of Medicine in 1993.18 The headline-grabbing conclusions of that article were:
* "Keeping a gun in the home was strongly and independently associated with an increased risk of homicide."
* "Rather than confer protection, guns kept in the home are associated with an increase in the risk of homicide by a family member or intimate acquaintance."19
These sweeping conclusions deserve scrutiny because they influenced policy makers and citizens. Gun rights advocates can defeat the Kellermann article's conclusions if they understand the study, its assumptions, and its limitations.
B. The Background Facts
Here is how Dr. Kellermann and his colleagues set up their study. They defined the target "disease" as any death by homicide in or very near the victim's home.20
They selected a number of possible risk factors in the victim's life, including the victim's use of alcohol, trouble because of alcohol, use of illicit drugs, trouble because of drugs, history of fights inside or outside the home, history of injuries from fights inside the home, arrest history, guns kept in the home, dogs kept in the home, use of security devices, and living alone.21
The Kellermann researchers studied a population of 388 cases (net) of homicides which occurred in the victims' homes. Victims had to be at least 13 years old to be included in the study. The homicide cases were drawn from the records of homicide investigations in the most populous county in Tennessee, Washington state, and Ohio. The study examined records for part or all of the period from August 23, 1987 to August 23, 1992 (depending upon the county).
The researchers chose the retrospective case-control study technique. As the victims were dead, the researchers used proxies -- a friend or relative -- to get information about the victims.22
C. How the Study Was Conducted
The Kellermann researchers collected all of the 1,860 official reports of homicides in the three counties. They excluded all homicides that did not occur in the victim's "home." Cases involving the homicide victim under 13 years old were excluded, too. They counted multiple murders and murder-suicides as single homicides to avoid double counting.23 They excluded cases where homeowners killed intruders.24
The Kellermann researchers wanted to see whether having a gun in a person's home increased or decreased that person's security. They wanted to compare the residents' risk of homicide in homes with and without guns. The specific question was whether, all other things being equal, persons who possessed firearms in their homes were more likely to be homicide victims than persons who did not possess firearms in their homes.
From the official homicide investigation records the researchers got the victims' age, race, sex, and the police reconstruction of the incident. Three weeks after the death of the homicide victim, the researchers contacted a friend or relative of the victim. That friend or relative would serve as the "proxy" for the victim. The proxy would answer the researchers' questions on behalf of the victim. Each victim's proxy described that victim's use of alcohol or drugs, living arrangements, security precautions, history of previous violence, and gun ownership.25 In epidemiology jargon, each victim was a "case."
The researchers also selected a "control group." A control group is supposed to be made up of persons who matched the "cases." Thus, the "control" for each "case" was a person who lived in the same neighborhood as the victim, and who was also of the same sex, age range, and race as the victim.26
The Kellermann researchers interviewed the proxies and an equal number of matched "controls." Before they conducted the interviews, the researchers sent letters to the proxies "outlining the nature of the [research] project" and offered a $10.00 incentive to sit for the interview.27 The researchers also explained the project to the "controls" and offered them the $10.00 incentive.28
The Kellermann researchers reported that their interviews with the proxies and controls were "identical in format, order and content ... [and] brief, highly structured, and arranged so that more sensitive questions were not broached until later in the interview."29 The only sample interview question Kellermann published in the article was:
Many people have quarrels or fights. Has anyone in this household ever been hit or hurt in a fight in the home?30
D. The Reported Study Results
The Kellermann researchers wanted to show which "behavioral factors" and "environmental factors" were associated with homicide in one's home. They used statistical methods common in epidemiology. Here is a sample of their published statistics and their meaning.31
(1) Table 1 Data
Table 1 in the Kellermann article provided information about the homicide victims in the study:32
Characteristic % of victims
Sex of Victim
Female 37
Male 63
Race or Ethnicity of Victim
White 33
Black 62
Native American 1
Asian / Pacific Islander 2
Other 2
Age group of victim
15-24 yrs 14
25-40 " 41
41-60 " 25
61-up " 20
Circumstances
Altercation or quarrel 44
Romantic triangle 7
Murder-suicide 5
Felony-related 22
Drug dealing 8
Homicide only 13
Other 2
Relationship of offender to victim
Spouse 17
Intimate acquaintance 14
First-degree relative 10
Other relative 3
Roommate 12
Friend or acquaintance 31
Police officer 1
Stranger 4
Unknown (unidentified) 17
Other 1
Method of homicide
Handgun 43
Rifle 2
Shotgun 4
Unknown firearm 1
Knife or sharp instrument 26
Blunt instrument 12
Strangulation/suffocation 6
Burns/smoke/scalding 2
Other 1
Victim resisted assailant
Yes 44
No 33
Not noted 23
Evidence of forced entry
Yes 14
No 84
Not noted 2
(2) Comments on Table 1 Data
Look at the "Circumstances" data. Notice how the categories are artificially broken down. A very large fraction of the homicides (86%) fell into one of two more general categories: a conflict between friends or relatives (56%), or illegal activities in the victim's presence (30%). The remaining number (15%) are not adequately described. By subdividing these major categories, for no apparent reason, the researchers lessened the impact of the percentages in any one category in the table.33
They used the same technique in the "Relationship to offender" categories in the table. Using multiple categories tends to obscure the underlying common features. In the text of the article, however, the authors grouped the categories back together and admitted that "the great majority of victims (76.7 percent) were killed by a relative or someone known to them."34
By contrast, under "Method of homicide," the table emphasizes firearms' role by separately listing different types of firearms. When the firearms and non-firearms homicides figures are totaled, however, the results seem different: 50% firearms-related, and about 50% non-firearms related.
The vast majority of homicides (84%) reported in the table did not involve forced entry. In these cases, the killer likely had permission to enter the area or had a key to the house.
The study offered no data about whether the victim tried to get his or her gun, or other weapon, before being killed. The study also omits any mention of whether the killer used the victim's own gun or other weapon. These are critical points. The Kellermann researchers could not properly conclude that guns in the home provide no protection against homicide, if they did not know whether the victims tried to get them, or even if the victims knew where their guns were? The Kellermann researchers could not properly conclude that having a gun in the home is a "risk factor" when there are no data about whether the gun was even involved in the killing?
Most journalists are not trained to look carefully at epidemiological studies to raise unasked questions. They may tend to overemphasize individual studies.35 To understand the full meaning of a study, and its limitations, requires reading the study carefully and then thinking about whether its data support its conclusions. Headlines based on ill-founded or misunderstood conclusions can seriously mislead policy makers and the public.36
(3) Table 3 Data
Table 3 in the Kellermann article shows the degree of association between various "risk factors" and the "disease" (death by homicide in the victim's residence).37 Portions of Table 3 are set forth below.38
Behavioral Factors Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval
(a) Victim or control drank alcohol 2.6 1.9 - 3.5
(b) Drinking caused problems in the household 7.0 4.2 - 11.8
(c) Any household member had trouble at work because of drinking 10.7 4.1 - 27.5
(d) Victim or control had trouble at work because of drinking 20.0 4.9 - 82.4
(e) Any household member used illicit drugs 9.0 5.4 - 15.0
(f) Victim or control used illicit drugs 6.8 3.8 - 12.0
(g) Any physical fights in the home during drinking 8.9 5.2 - 15.3
(h) Any family member required medical attention because of a fight in the home 10.2 5.2 - 20.0
(i) Any household member arrested 4.2 3.0 - 6.0
(j) Victim or control arrested 3.5 2.4 - 5.2
Environmental Factors Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval
(k) Home rented 5.9 3.8 - 9.2
(l) Victim or control lived alone 3.4 2.2 - 5.1
(m) Controlled security access to residence 2.3 1.2 - 4.4
(n) Gun(s) in the home 1.6 1.2 - 2.2
Handgun 1.9 1.4 - 2.7
Shotgun 0.7 0.5 - 1.1
Rifle 0.8 0.5 - 1.3
(o) Any gun kept unlocked 2.1 1.4 - 3.0
(p) Any gun kept loaded 2.7 1.8 - 4.0
(q) Guns kept primarily for self-defense 1.7 1.2 - 2.4
(4) Understanding the data in Table 3
Table 3 is a typical "univariate analysis of risk factors." Here is how it works. Consider entry (a), "Victim or control drank alcohol." The "Odds Ratio" tells you how much more likely it is that the victim drank alcohol than did the "control" person.39 In this case the victims were 2.6 times more likely to be "exposed" to the risk factor of drinking alcohol, than were the controls.
Epidemiological statistics often are reported in this way: "Exposure to second-hand smoke is associated with increased future health problems." The term "is associated with" simply reports a statistical result. An odds ratio greater than 1.0 shows a "positive association." The more the value exceeds 1.0, the stronger the association. An odds ratio equal to 1.0 means there is indicates "no association." An odds ratio less than 1.0 shows a "negative association." A negative association suggests that the exposure to the factor actually decreases the likelihood of contracting the disease.40
The size of the odds ratio shows the strength of the association. The larger the odds ratio, the more likely that exposure to the risk factor might have caused the disease. Epidemiologists classify the strength of an association according to the size of the odds ratio. An odds ratio from 1.1 to 3.0 shows a "weak or nonexistent" association. An odds ratio between 3.0 and 8.0 shows a "moderate" association; between 8.0 and 16.0 shows a "strong" association; and above 16.0 shows an "extremely strong" association.41
Odds Ratio
(Relative Risk) Association
Type Association
Strength
Less than 1.0 Negative --
1.0 None --
1.1 - 3.0 Positive None / Weak
3.0 - 8.0 Positive Moderate
8.0 - 16.0 Positive Strong
Over 16.0 Positive Exteremly Strong
On other public health issues, a survey of scientists showed that most "would not take seriously a single study reporting a new potential cause of cancer unless it reported [an increased risk factor or odds ratio of at least] 3."42 Even then, these scientists would remain skeptical unless the study were "very large and extremely well done, and biological data support the hypothesized link."43
A positive association, even an "extremely strong" association, does not by itself prove that the factor caused the disease.44 Here is an obvious example: there is a perfect positive association between having lived in New York and eventually dying. Everyone who has lived in New York will eventually die. That association by itself does not prove that living in New York causes death.
In Table 3 (a), the drinking of alcohol is positively associated to being a victim of homicide in one's own home. The odds ratio of 2.6 shows a weak association.
Consider entry (l), "Victim or control lived alone." The odds ratio for that entry shows that the victims were 3.4 times as likely to live alone, as compared to the controls. The victims were thus 3.4 times as likely to be "exposed" to living alone than were the controls. Living alone was associated with being a victim of homicide in the home. With an odds ratio of 3.4, this association is "moderate."
Table 3 also reports the "95% confidence interval" for each odds ratio. The confidence interval describes the uncertainty surrounding the odds ratio.
Consider again Table 3 (a). The odds ratio is 2.6. The 95% confidence interval is 1.9 - 3.5. In other words, there is a statistical 95% chance that the actual effect of having drunk alcohol could be anywhere between 1.9 and 3.5.45
Here are some important things to know about the confidence interval. First, if the 95% confidence interval for a given odds ratio ranges from below 1.0 to above 1.0, then there is a likelihood that exposure both causes and prevents the disease. This contradiction makes the odds ratio statistically insignificant; epidemiologists can draw no conclusions from it.46
Second, when the confidence interval is a narrow range around the odds ratio, then it tends to reinforce the accuracy of the odds ratio.47 For example, the association (measured by odds ratio) between drinking alcohol and being a victim of homicide was 2.6. The 95% confidence interval for this figure was fairly narrow (1.9 - 3.5). It is fair to conclude that the odds ratio of 2.6 is an accurate estimate of the risk in the study population.
Third, when the confidence interval is a wide range, it suggests that there is an increased likelihood of risk from exposure, but also that the risk cannot be accurately measured.48 Table 3 (d), "victim or control had trouble at work because of drinking," indicates an odds ratio of 20.0, with a 95% confidence interval of 4.9 to 82.4. This result suggests a strong association between the victim's trouble with drinking at work and his eventual death by homicide, but that the actual risk cannot be accurately measured.
(5) Comments on Table 3 Data
Having a grasp of odds ratios and confidence intervals, consider Table 3 again. Which factors have the largest odds ratios? The top 7 are (d), (c), (h), (e), (g), and (b). These factors all implicate using alcohol, using drugs, and a history of physical fighting in the home. The confidence intervals for all of these factors show at least a moderate to strong association between them and death by homicide. The factor most strongly associated with homicide in the home was (d) (trouble at work because of drinking).
The five factors in Table 3 with the lowest odds ratios, from lowest to highest, are (n), (q), (o), (p), and (m). The four factors with the lowest odds ratios involve having a gun in the residence. All five odds ratios are below 3.0, suggesting a weak or nonexistent association between them and the incidence of homicide in the home. The confidence intervals for all 5 of these factors are relatively narrow, suggesting that these odds ratios more accurately reflect reality.
Because of their relative weakness, the data in Kellermann's Table 3 do more to undermine than to support the claim that guns in the home are a risk factor for homicide. This conclusion comes from a careful look at the data. The data simply do not support the researchers' conclusions in their article.
(6) Table 4 Data
Kellermann's Table 4 shows the results of additional mathematical massage of the data.49 Table 4 provides this information:
Variable Odds
Ratio 95% Confidence
Interval
Home rented 4.4 2.3 - 8.2
Lived alone 3.7 2.1 - 6.6
Any household member hit or hurt in a fight in the home 4.4 2.2 - 8.8
Any household member used illicit drugs 5.7 2.6 - 12.6
Gun(s) kept in the home 2.7 1.6 - 4.4
(7) Comments on Table 4 Data
Table 4 shows how critical it is to read the actual study, rather than relying on headlines about its conclusion. Of the five factors analyzed, the factor with the lowest association with homicide was "guns kept in the home." The odds ratio of 2.7 for this factor suggests that the association is "weak" at best. The 95% confidence interval reinforces the weak association.
D. The Kellermann Researchers' Admitted Limitations on the Study Results
News stories reporting epidemiological study results often omit the authors' own statements about the limitations in the study.50 The Kellermann researchers admitted the potential for several sources of bias in their study,51 including:
(1) the emotional impact of a homicide in the home can "powerfully" affect the survey respondents' accuracy and completeness of their recollection;
(2) respondents might misreport sensitive information;
(3) respondents might have under-reported instances of domestic violence;
(4) respondent controls might have to under- reported gun ownership.
The Kellermann researchers also commented on "four limitations"52:
(1) the study was restricted to homicides occurring in the victim's home. "The dynamics of homicides occurring in other locations ... may be quite different."53
(2) the studied urban counties did not have any substantial Hispanic population. Accordingly, their "results may not be generalizable to more rural communities or to Hispanic households."54
(3) possible "reverse causation": some of the association between gun ownership and homicide may have come from the victims having previously "acquired a gun in response to a specific threat."55
(4) possible confounding:56 "we cannot exclude the possibility that the association we observed is due to a third, unidentified factor."57
The many admitted potential biases and limitations in the study do not appear in headlines. They are rarely reported in news magazines, newspapers, or on broadcast news.58 Also, follow-up journal articles often recite the conclusions without checking whether the underlying data support the conclusions claimed by the authors. Moreover, other kinds of limitations and biases possible in the Kellermann study might not be obvious to the lay reporter or reader. Few, if any, of these sobering considerations seem to matter much to the doctors and others who seize on these study results to support their "gun control" agenda.
Potential Flaws, Limitations, and Biases in Epidemiological Studies and Their Conclusions
Epidemiological studies and the validity of their conclusions are subject to a number of limitations. Understanding these limitations is the key to being able to rapidly separate epidemiological hogwash from solid research. The following discussion of these limitations draws some examples from the Kellermann study.
A. When can a Risk Factor be considered a Cause of the Disease?
The public health approach to "gun control" has relied heavily on epidemiological studies to support its conclusions that "gun control" is an effective and desirable cure for "gun violence." This approach to "gun control" argues that possession of firearms is a cause of deaths and injuries by firearms. Therefore, by eliminating possession of firearms, the number of deaths and injuries will decrease. The key word in this argument is "cause."
The Kellermann researchers, for example, tried to show a link between the presence of a firearm in a person's home and the death of that person by homicide, particularly homicide involving a firearm. In other words, the Kellermann researchers wanted to add evidence that the possession of firearms is a cause of death (by homicide). By showing a statistical association between firearm possession and homicide, the researchers sought to establish a causal link.
The Kellermann researchers did not use the methods that epidemiology normally use to prove a causal link. Statistical association does not alone prove that a factor caused the disease. Epidemiologists use several criteria to prove a causal link.59 These criteria are set forth below, together with a brief analysis of the Kellermann study.
(1) Probability: A statistically significant association between the risk factor and the disease tends to support the case that the risk factor caused the disease.
In this Kellermann study, there is a statistical association between the presence of a firearm in the victim's home and the victims death by homicide in that home.
(2) Strength of Association: A strong association supports the case.
In the Kellermann study, the associations for the gun factor were weak, not strong.
(3) Dose-Response Relationship: If there is a steady increase in disease with an increase in exposure, then the case for causation is supported.
In the Kellermann study, there was no analysis of a "dose" of exposure. The study considered a homicide victim to have been "exposed" if the victim's home had contained a firearm in it before the homicide. The study does not analyze whether the length of time the firearm was in the home was a relevant factor. The study does not even report whether the victim actually knew there was a gun in the home or where it might be located there.
(4) Time-response relationship: If the incidence of the disease rises at some time after the exposure to the factor, and then later decreases, then that fact supports the causation case.
The Kellermann study did not consider any time-response effects.
(5) Predictive Performance: If facts about the risk factor help predict the occurrence of the disease, then this supports the causation case. If not, then it weakens the case.
The Kellermann study did not analyze the predictive performance of their model or data.
(6) Specificity: If the disease is related to only one risk factor or a related set of risk factors, then this may support the causal link between the risk factor and the disease. (The fact that a risk factor is linked to only one disease contributes little to the conclusion.)
In the Kellermann study, homicide in the victim's home was linked to a number of risk factors -- but there was no physical link between the victim's gun ownership and his or her death. The Kellermann study did not even determine whether the victim's gun was used in the victim's homicide. The homicides were not related only to gun ownership or possession -- they were much more directly and physically related to a number of other factors, such as the killer's possession of a weapon, and other behavioral factors such as drinking, drug use, and previous violence. The Kellermann study did not establish that homicide in the home was related only to a related set of causes.
(7) Consistency: If the same association between the risk factor and the disease appears repeatedly in different studies, that would support the argument for causation. Other (different) study results that are inconsistent, and cannot be reconciled, will weaken the argument.
The Kellermann article said that the subject of the study -- the supposed link between firearms ownership and homicides in the home -- was "poorly understood. This admission suggests that the Kellermann study was not similar to previous studies. Thus there is little evidence of "consistency" in study results on this subject. The lack of consistency limits the conclusions which can properly flow from the Kellermann study.
(8) Coherence: If the proposed causal link fits in with current theory and knowledge, then that supports the case. If the causal link is incompatible with known facts, then that weakens the case.
The Kellermann study fits into the current public health approach to "gun control." The authors, however, admitted several facts that make their conclusions "valid" only for their study. Moreover, the public health approach to "gun control" is suspect on other grounds.
B. Problems with the Definition of Disease
As noted above, an epidemiology study must start with a clear definition of the disease to be analyzed.60 In the Kellermann study, the researchers defined the "disease" as death by homicide in the victim's home. The causal link they sought to establish was:
Risk Factor
Disease
Presence of gun in victim's home -----> Homicide of Victim
Kellermann's s
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