I don't get why this is negative press. This is a highly desirable feature, which is under administrator control, and which is completely reversible. It's absolutely perfect for business laptops or PCs, where theft, and data theft are serious concerns.
Essentially, the way the systems works is as follows:
- A security module is built into the chipset (only the business/pro-level 'Q' series chipsets will have the security module integrated - consumer motherboards/laptops where security is less important, will have the feature left out).
- The BIOS is specifically designed to interact with the hardware security module. If the security module has been set to 'theft mode', then the BIOS will not complete POST, rendering the computer unbootable.
- If secure data is to be stored on the computer's hard drive, then the security module can perform full-disk encryption, using a key stored in hardware. If the security module has been set to 'theft mode', it will deny access to the key, rendering the hard drive unreadable.
There are a number of ways that the security module can be triggered into theft mode:
- It can periodically contact a server run by the computer administrator, to check that authorization hasn't been withdrawn. If it receives a 'reported stolen' message, the security module will lock down. Because the security module is integrated with the BIOS and hardware, it is able to communicate via wired or wireless LAN connections during POST, before the OS is loaded.
- It can time out. The system administrator can trigger a time-out interval - e.g 7 days, without reauthorization. Because the security module is integrated with the RTC in the same hardware, timeout is guaranteed and tamperproof.
- An OS driver can listen to system management messages, and trigger a theft condition if a 'reported stolen' message is received.
- If the computer is a laptop with integrated cellular modem, an encrypted SMS sent to the modem, will trigger 'theft mode' immediately (or when the computer is next booted).
Which methods are used will depend on how the PC is set up by the administrator. Additionally, the messages are matched to the individual hardware security module's private keys - which are held only by Intel. So in order to 'kill' a computer, the registered owner (or their authorized deputy) must contact Intel with the details, and Intel will provide the encrypted message that needs to be transmitted to the computer to trigger a kill. Because the hardware security module can only be triggered by a secure code known only to itself and Intel, it is protected from malware or malicious attack. This is also a premium, subscription service. The computer's owner must have registered the computer with Intel, and have paid the subscription for the anti-theft service, in order to be able to get the lockdown code.
If the computer is returned, then simply transmitting a 'restore' command (via the same process as a 'kill' command), then the security module will unlock, and normal function will be restored.
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