Jaskalas
Lifer
- Jun 23, 2004
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Israel has long said it would use tactical nukes vs Iran nuke sites. I think parts of the ME are about to be turned into glass.
I do not believe Israel would want to preemptively take it that far.
Israel has long said it would use tactical nukes vs Iran nuke sites. I think parts of the ME are about to be turned into glass.
The S-300 order was canceled?
Or would that be too close to that other extremist religious group the Mormons?
Israel has long said it would use tactical nukes vs Iran nuke sites. I think parts of the ME are about to be turned into glass.
Israel has long said it would use tactical nukes vs Iran nuke sites. I think parts of the ME are about to be turned into glass.
Link please....
To my knowlwdge you have no clue.....
If nothing else, I think its safe to say, Obama is not going to give Israel any bunker busters, and the new Turkish anger at Iran gives Israel many new reasons not to be crazy enough to try a preemptive strike on Iran.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Turkey isn't going to do anything to Israel militarily. Not going to happen. As for the rest of it, I think it's the opposite - while their reputation is this poor, they may as well do it now, then think about building back their reputation over time. Better to get all the stuff that's going to piss everyone off out of the way at once.
- wolf
It's taken me awhile to get around to this position, but I think Israel should just go ahead and do it. The MIT study, which has been linked a few times here, makes it clear that Israel has super-adequate capability to pull it off. It is dated by about 3-4 years as memory serves, but it takes into account future SAM/AAA acquisitions by Iran, and since the Israeli capability was super-adequate 3 years ago, it seems likely to be at least adequate now. Israel only has to neutralize three critical sites.
So far as the political question, this is the singular advantage to Israel being a pariah state. With the whole world reflexively condemning every Israeli act at every possible opportunity, I really don't think they have much to lose. In the end, it will be similar to when they bombed the Iraqi reactor. The whole world condemned them, but privately everyone (including other ME nations), breathed a sigh of relief, and in historical retrospect, few people are any longer critical of that act.
- wolf
Highly enriched uranium... Source, please... good luck finding a credible one...
Israel can't attack other than across American controlled airspace, and not even the Bush Admin was stupid enough to let 'em... Nor do the Israelis have the capacity to sustain their efforts in the long run w/o American assistance.
Rotsa Ruck, Ziocon Ravers.
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How stupid is wolf? If Israel is crazy enough to think they can piss of the entire world in a preemptive strike on Iran just all by themselves? Israel may be too stupid to be allowed to be a country in the first place. Don't herd Israelis into gas ovens, just cart them off to mental institutions that are designed to deal with such mental illnesses and delusions of grander.
But yes Wolf, be it resolved, its well past time to take away Israeli WMD before Israel can harm themselves and others.
You have about 100K Iranian Jews held hostage for this eventuality. Sorry Israel will not attack Iran unless Iran attacks first.
Wiki says its 11-25K Iranian Jews. If you have another source, let me know.
Anyway, if Israel cannot attack any country with any Jewish residents, then their military option is perpetually off the table.
- wolf
Oh Jesus Christ on a crutch, its truly gotta be the anand tech silly season if anyone is fool enough to believe the number of Jews in Iran drives any Israeli or Iranian thinking.
Please report to your nearest mental health clinic now because you have lost all your marbles and your incipient rage over being shortchanged a few fruit loops in your latest breakfast bowl has clearly unhinged your grip on reality.
The number of Jews in iran will have no bearing WHEN israel strikes!
You have to be delusional if you believe for oen minute israel does not have the bunkerbusters that Obama said -- in public mind you, not behind closed doors, that israel ...would not gte--which they already have..lolol
I am not the one saying that the Iranians can produce two nuclear weapons with the amount of enriched uranium they now have, the IAEA is. They presented this conclusion to the UN on Monday.
For some reason you doubt their conclusion, having read their report. Or have you? You wouldn't contradict something that important without having read the source document, would you?
Are you in denial because you have solid information to the contrary, please link if you do, or maybe you are a nuclear weapons designer that believes the Iranians can't build nuclear weapons with the at least two tons of enriched uranium the IAEA reports they have produced thus far?
Saudi has already given Israel permission no need to go through American Airspace.
I don't think you're lame, but rather intentionally obtuse and misleading. The whole "weapons" angle is interpretation by the Israeli and American media, that the Iranians have enough LEU, if reprocessed, "could" be enough for a couple of weapons.
Latest Safeguards Reports Circulated to IAEA Board 31 May 2010
The IAEA Board of Governors will discuss the latest safeguards reports when it next convenes in Vienna on 7 June.
IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano circulated his latest reports on nuclear safeguards in Iran and Syria to the Agency´s Board of Governors, the 35-member policymaking body. The reports outline developments since the Director General´s reports of 18 February 2010.
The IAEA Board of Governors will discuss the reports when it next convenes in Vienna on 7 June. The reports are entitled Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran; and Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic.
Their circulation is restricted and cannot be released to the public unless the IAEA Board decides otherwise.
E. Possible Military Dimensions
40. In order to confirm, as required by the Safeguards Agreement, that all nuclear material in Iran is
in peaceful activities, the Agency needs to have confidence in the absence of possible military
dimensions to Irans nuclear programme. Previous reports by the Director General have detailed the
outstanding issues and the actions required of Iran,12 including, inter alia, that Iran implement the
Additional Protocol and provide the Agency with the information and access necessary to: resolve
questions related to the alleged studies; clarify the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium
metal document; clarify procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies
that could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of nuclear related equipment and components
by companies belonging to the defence industries.
41. The information available to the Agency in connection with these outstanding issues is extensive
and has been collected from a variety of sources over time. It is also broadly consistent and credible in
terms of the technical detail, the time frame in which the activities were conducted and the people and
organizations involved. Altogether, this raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or
current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. These
alleged activities consist of a number of projects and sub-projects, covering nuclear and missile related
aspects, run by military related organizations.
42. Among the activities which the Agency has attempted to discuss with Iran are: activities
involving high precision detonators fired simultaneously; studies on the initiation of high explosives
and missile re-entry body engineering; a project for the conversion of UO2 to UF4, known as the
green salt project; and various procurement related activities. Specifically, the Agency has, inter alia,
sought clarification of the following: whether Iran was engaged in undeclared activities for the
production of UF4 (green salt) involving the Kimia Maadan company; whether Irans exploding
bridgewire detonator activities were solely for civil or conventional military purposes; whether Iran
developed a spherical implosion system, possibly with the assistance of a foreign expert
knowledgeable in explosives technology; whether the engineering design and computer modelling
studies aimed at producing a new design for the payload chamber of a missile were for a nuclear
payload; and the relationship between various attempts by senior Iranian officials with links to military
organizations in Iran to obtain nuclear related technology and equipment.
43. The Agency would also like to discuss with Iran: the project and management structure of alleged
activities related to nuclear explosives; nuclear related safety arrangements for a number of the alleged
projects; details relating to the manufacture of components for high explosives initiation systems; and
experiments concerning the generation and detection of neutrons. Addressing these issues is important
for clarifying the Agencys concerns about these activities and those described above, which seem to
have continued beyond 2004.
44. Since August 2008, Iran has declined to discuss the above issues with the Agency or to provide
any further information and access (to locations and/or people) to address these concerns, asserting
that the allegations relating to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme are baseless and
that the information to which the Agency is referring is based on forgeries.
45. With the passage of time and the possible deterioration in the availability of information, it is
important that Iran engage with the Agency on these issues, and that the Agency be permitted to visit
all relevant sites, have access to all relevant equipment and documentation, and be allowed to
interview relevant persons, without further delay. Irans substantive engagement would enable the
Agency to make progress in its work. Through Irans active cooperation, progress has been made in
the past in certain other areas where questions have been raised; this should also be possible in
connection with questions about military related dimensions.
F. Summary
46. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran
has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in
Iran is in peaceful activities.
47. Iran is not implementing the requirements contained in the relevant resolutions of the Board of
Governors and the Security Council, including implementation of the Additional Protocol, which are
essential to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to
resolve outstanding questions. In particular, Iran needs to cooperate in clarifying outstanding issues
which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Irans nuclear programme, and to
implement the modified text of Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part on the early
provision of design information.
48. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has
continued with the operation of PFEP and FEP at Natanz, and the construction of a new enrichment
plant at Fordow. Iran has also announced the intention to build ten new enrichment plants. Iran
recently began feeding low enriched UF6 produced at FEP into one cascade of PFEP with the aim of
enriching it up to 20% in U-235. The period of notice provided by Iran regarding related changes
made to PFEP was insufficient for the Agency to adjust the existing safeguards procedures before Iran
started to feed the material into PFEP. The Agencys work to verify FFEP and to understand the
original purpose of the facility and the chronology of its design and construction remain ongoing. Iran
is not providing access to information such as the original design documentation for FFEP or access to
companies involved in the design and construction of the plant.
49. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has
also continued with the construction of the IR-40 reactor and related heavy water activities. The
Agency has not been permitted to take samples of the heavy water which is stored at UCF, and has not
been provided with access to the Heavy Water Production Plant.
50. The Director General requests Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its
Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including the implementation of its Additional
Protocol.
51. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
