Any chips that end up in servers undergo pretty rigorous testing by those that ordered them (or manufactured them in the case of Intel).
You would not be able to sneak such a thing under the RADAR as it were without insider help from that vendor.
You mean like all those hardcoded passwords in enterprise Cisco routers that were sleeping there for years? And we're dealing with something Software-level, which would be easier to reverse engineer and audit than say,
decapping a chip to read an embedded ROM, which would be required to actually audit a chip. So no, I don't believe than your "rigorous testing" that can't detect Software (Including Firmware) level security risks would even bother to physically analyze a chip to see whenever it was compromised at either design or manufacturing stages. More so an entire computer with dozens of them. You either blindly trust your vendor products or have your own well geared department that is capable of audit them, and I doubt that there are a lot of people that can do the latter considering the amount of tools and time that you would need...
A few extra wires in a metal layer connecting to a ROM could not compromise the security of a processor unless you had intimate knowledge of the actual uArch you were trying to circumvent.
In any case it would have to be more than just a memory ROM, it would have to comprise of at least some logic circuitry as well.
As for it "not being true" - exactly how versed are you on the post fab testing procedures of AMD or Intel to be able to make that determination?
Again, without significant penetration into said vendor company you could not even be sure that such a hardware patch/hack had not been detected - the first failure would result in your 'mole' being identified within the fab production pipeline.
Are you kidding me? A malicious embedded ROM that gets read before the actual Firmware could do something like creating a SGX enclave, a SMM handler, or other extremely low level stuff that could make it hard to detect Software side or otherwise be completely unstoppable, because such malware can be active even before full Processor initialization and be a physical part of the Processor itself. It means that you have to throw the compromised Processor away.
You don't need that much of intimate knowledge of the architecture to make use of a malicious embedded ROM. I mean, everyone knows what is the first physical address than a x86 Processor reads, which is where the ROM with the Firmware has to be mapped, and the rest of the features should be covered pretty well in any Developer's Manual. You just need an embedded ROM that is mapped there, then unmaps itself and maps the regular SPI Flash ROM so that it does it thing then let the system boot transparently. Voila, permanent Hardware rootkit. And reasons like that is precisely why is dangerous if you can't trust the manufacturer of your chip.