e. Review policies towards Iraq with the aim to lowering anti-Americanism in the Middle East
and elsewhere, and set the groundwork to eventually ease Iraqi oil-field investment
restrictions. Iraq remains a destabilizing influence to U.S. allies in the Middle East, as well as
to regional and global order, and to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle
East. Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon
and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets. This would display his personal
power, enhance his image as a “Pan-Arab” leader supporting the Palestinians against Israel,
and pressure others for a lifting of economic sanctions against his regime.
The United States should conduct an immediate policy review towards Iraq, including
military, energy, economic and political/diplomatic assessments. The United States should
then develop an integrated strategy with key allies in Europe and Asia and with key countries
in the Middle East to restate the goals with respect to Iraqi policy and to restore a cohesive
coalition of key allies. Goals should be designed in a realistic fashion, and they should be
clearly and consistently stated and defended to revive U.S. credibility on this issue. Actions
and policies to promote these goals should endeavor to enhance the well-being of the Iraqi
people. Sanctions that are not effective should be phased out and replaced with highly
focused and enforced sanctions that target the regime’s ability to maintain and acquire
weapons of mass destruction. A new plan of action should be developed to use diplomatic
and other means to support U.N. Security Council efforts to build a strong arms-control
regime to stem the flow of arms and controlled substances into Iraq. Policy should rebuild
coalition cooperation on this issue, while emphasizing the common interest in security. This
issue of arms sales to Iraq should be brought near the top of the agenda for dialogue with
China and Russia.
Once an arms-control program is in place, the United States could consider reducing
restrictions on oil investments inside Iraq. Like it or not, Iraqi reserves represent a major asset
that can quickly add capacity to world oil markets and inject a more competitive tenor to oil
trade. However, such a policy will be quite costly as this trade-off will encourage Saddam
Hussein to boast of his “victory” against the United States, fuel his ambitions, and potentially
strengthen his regime. Once so encouraged and if his access to oil revenues were to be
increased by adjustments in oil sanctions, Saddam Hussein could be a greater security threat
to U.S. allies in the region if weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sanctions, weapons regimes, and the coalition against him are not strengthened. Still, the maintenance of
continued oil sanctions is becoming increasingly difficult to implement. Moreover, Saddam
Hussein has many means of gaining revenues, and the sanctions regime helps perpetuate his lock on the country’s economy.
Another problem with easing restrictions on the Iraqi oil industry to allow greater
investment is that GCC allies of the United States will not like to see Iraq gain larger market
share in international oil markets. In fact, even Russia could lose from having sanctions eased
on Iraq because Russian companies now benefit from exclusive contracts and Iraqi export
capacity is restrained, supporting the price of oil and raising the value of Russian oil exports.
If sanctions covering Iraq’s oil sector were eased and Iraq benefited from infrastructure
improvements, Russia might lose its competitive position inside Iraq, and also oil prices
might fall over time, hurting the Russian economy. These issues will have to be discussed in bilateral exchanges.