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Nukes for the Wahhabis? Why not?
What could possibly go wrong?
The Saudi royal family sits on a powder keg of some of the most rabidly fundamentalist Islamacists in the world, and that's saying a lot.Obama Team Eyes Saudi Nuclear Trade Deal Without Nonproliferation Terms
Tuesday, Jan. 25, 2011 By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON -- The Obama administration is taking initial steps to negotiate a civil nuclear trade pact with Saudi Arabia that could lack key nonproliferation provisions included in a similar 2009 deal with one of Riyadh's Persian Gulf neighbors, according to U.S. officials and experts (see GSN, Nov. 3, 2010).
(Jan. 25) - King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, left, shakes hands with President Obama last year following a meeting at the White House. A senior U.S. Energy Department official has urged the negotiation of a U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement that does not necessarily include key nonproliferation provisions, according to sources (Roger Wollenberg/Getty Images).
Critics are warning that the approach -- reportedly driven by Deputy Energy Secretary Daniel Poneman -- might signal Washington's tacit blessing for the Saudis to reprocess plutonium or enrich uranium on their soil. Such activities can be useful for atomic energy needs but also introduce the potential to advance a clandestine nuclear weapons effort.
"They've opened the nuclear tinderbox of the Middle East," one senior Republican congressional aide said last week. "They're playing with nuclear fire."
Many nonproliferation experts appear to agree, saying Washington currently has a unique opportunity to head off the further spread of nuclear weapons. However, they say, that opening could disappear if the Obama team fails to seize it.
In its 2009 nuclear trade agreement with the United States, the United Arab Emirates volunteered to forgo any domestic enrichment or reprocessing. The pact, initially signed by the Bush administration and later strengthened by the Obama team, also includes a disincentive for reversing course: it gives Washington the right to demand that its nuclear materials are returned if the Emirates were to abandon its pledge.
Last August, State Department spokesman Philip Crowley called the UAE nonproliferation provisions the "gold standard" for nuclear trade agreements that Washington negotiates with nations around the world.
Leading nonproliferation advocates have urged the White House to pursue a similar commitment to nonproliferation practices from Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries -- if not in other regions, as well. While the Mideast is widely regarded as an area of particular concern, Washington might be reluctant to adopt a policy that singles out Arab nations for stricter limits than those placed on other states, several issue experts noted.
"It goes to the argument over what is possible to achieve in nonproliferation on a global level," said one congressional source.
This staffer and several other Washington officials from both political parties were interviewed on condition of not being named in this story. They were not authorized to speak publicly about the simmering policy debate over global trade in sensitive nuclear materials.
Lawmakers on Capitol Hill signaled their ire last summer after learning that the administration did not intend to advocate a renunciation of domestic enrichment and reprocessing in negotiating nuclear trade deals with Jordan and Vietnam.
In response, the Obama team agreed to review whether the gold standard should be applied to upcoming agreements, even while quietly acknowledging that neither Hanoi nor Amman were inclined to accept the clear type of assurance embraced by the United Arab Emirates.
In a series of closed-door meetings, the National Security Council debated what the policy on the standard should entail, but was unable to reach consensus on the matter, according to administration insiders.
[...]
However, Poneman insisted that Washington must not impose restrictions on what some nations regard as a right to peaceful nuclear power, insider sources said. The outcome of any such effort, he believes, could be that the U.S. nuclear energy industry will be put at a disadvantage, losing business to nations such as France or South Korea that impose fewer restrictions on foreign sales of nuclear technology and materials.
[...]
"This gold standard might be quite difficult to implement, but the U.S. should not stop trying to restrict the spread of these technologies," said Squassoni, who directs her organization's Proliferation Prevention Program. "Otherwise we may find ourselves in a race to the bottom against competitors like the French and Koreans, who are more likely to win contracts."
If U.S. companies are already losing global nuclear energy contracts to foreign competition anyway, Washington might as well take the high road in maintaining a high nonproliferation standard, one congressional aide said.
"If we want this to be a standard, we have to do the legwork with our allies," Squassoni said. It will take concerted diplomacy and arm-twisting to ensure that other nuclear energy purveyors adhere to the same restrictions on their sales, she said.
What could possibly go wrong?
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