Originally posted by: LegendKiller
Originally posted by: Jhhnn
LOL, I like the simplistic explanation of fractional lending, it shows you really don't know what you're talking about. You don't get to "bend the rules". I know, because I deal with this all of the time. You wouldn't believe how anal they are about capital treatment of different assets.
You do get to bend the rules, just not on the bank's books. You create a hedge fund or a private equity firm, lend it money, use it as a vehicle to bring others in on the deal. Leverage ratios of 30 or 40 to 1 have been quite common in such scenarios... reference LTCM and the 2 failed Bear Stearns funds...
Plausible deniability doesn't work the same way in banking as it does in politics...
But the investment in the hedge fund must be reported also. Provided the fund isn't a direct obligation of the bank, then the bank isn't on the hook for all of it. What they are on the hook for is covered under the capital ratios, provided they are modeled and accounted for correctly.
Using 3 failures as an example isn't even accounting for the successes. LTCM wasn't supported by the banks directly and failed for completely different reasons.
Of course the investment in the hedge fund must be reported. The actual operations of the hedge fund do not. As we've seen, the banks are often big players in each others' hedge funds, establishing huge systemic risk by using such funds as leverage magnifiers. Not to mention that banks have used essentially overvalued MBS holdings as the basis for fractional reserve lending practices, and still have huge inventories of unsold MBS they had underwritten, securities they never intended to hold. When the hedge funds crumple, the value of the securities used to support lending go with them, same with the unsold inventory. Banks are the first to realize this, and since they don't know what kind of shape the other guy is in, interbank lending locks up, ceases to exist, exacerbating the situation. When forced to mark to market, the banks no longer have the required reserves to meet federal standards and are essentially insolvent. They'd have to call huge numbers of good loans to meet reserve requirements, pulling the rug out from under many going concerns. The situation could easily snowball. So the Fed, who doesn't have to mark to market, steps in, accepts those securities at face value as collateral against loans to keep the banks afloat.
When/if the going price of those securities recover or when/if the banks can absorb the losses w/o going broke or radically reducing lending, the Fed won't have to continue the loan program.
That's reasonably accurate, isn't it?
All of this occurred against a backdrop of explosive real estate prices and lending practices that even financial naifs, guys who just fell off the turnip truck, recognized as absurd and insupportable... Bankers knew, or should have known, that somebody would be left holding the bag, they just hadn't counted on investors getting wise all at once and all of a sudden... It's what can happen when throwing caution to the winds, believing that the potential for big returns completely offsets the risk involved.
Which is not to say that I'm opposed to fractional reserve lending per se, or the essentially imaginary money created. The value of money in the marketplace is faith-based, anyway, and the total amount of it extant thru modern banking practices far exceeds the amount of currency in circulation, so there have to be rules governing that relationship. When monetary policy and banking regulation fail to contain upswings in economic activity to reasonable and supportable levels, huge and sudden contractions are inevitable. The crash of '29 didn't cause the Depression, but both were the consequence of the policies and practices leading up to them...
I didn't use the example of LTCM in reference to real estate, at all, but rather in terms of how the downside of extreme leverage can be very dangerous...
What many fail to perceive in the current situation is that while the Fed's actions may soften the decline rate and prevent some of the usual overshoot, that decline is inevitable, simply because the conditions for it have already been created... Can't change the past...
One of the things that I don't understand about the current situation is the role of mortgage insurors in all of this. I'd think it would be them getting the hammer rather than the banks, which apparently isn't happening, or if it is, nobody's talking about it...