Phokus
Lifer
- Nov 20, 1999
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Originally posted by: Phokus
1. Repost for sure, this is from 2004 (plus i had rather lengthy debate on this subject with jbourne here http://forums.anandtech.com/me...R_FORUMVIEWTMP=Linear)
2. This economist debunked the UCLA study
http://www.econ.wisc.edu/works...Eggertsson%20paper.pdf
Can government policies that increase the monopoly power of firms and the militancy of unions increase output? This paper studies this question in a dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal frictions and shows that these policies are expansionary when certain ?emergency? conditions apply. These emergency conditions?zero interest rates and deflation?were satisfied during the Great Depression in the United States. Therefore, the New Deal, which facilitated monopolies and union militancy, was expansionary, according to the model. This conclusion is contrary to the one reached by a large previous literature, e.g. Cole and Ohanian (2004), that argues that the New Deal was contractionary. The main reason for this divergence is that the current model incorporates nominal frictions so that inflation expectations play a central role in the analysis. The New Deal has a strong effect on inflation expectations in the model, changing excessive deflation to modest inflation, thereby lowering real interest rates and stimulating spending.
The Great Depression in the United States From A Neoclassical Perspective
That's cute, there are still economists who cling to overly simplistic economics models
Also, another paper:
http://www.newyorkfed.org/rese...ts/eggertsson/gexp.pdf
Abstract
This paper suggests that the US recovery from the Great Depression was driven by a shift in expectations.
This shift was caused by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt?s (FDR) policy actions. On the
monetary policy side, FDR abolished the gold standard and ? even more importantly ? announced the
explicit objective of inflating the price level to pre-depression levels. On the fiscal policy side, FDR expanded
real and deficit spending. This made his policy objective credible. These actions violated prevailing
policy dogmas and involved a policy regime change as in Sargent (1983) and Temin and Wigmore (1990).
The economic consequences of FDR are evaluated in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
nominal frictions.
