'Saddam had 12 years to comply...'

[etech]

Originally posted by: Gonad the Barbarian
Is this really a valid argument? It seems to me the whole scenerio is akin to a teacher making an assignment, not giving a due date, then knocking on your door 12 years later expecting you to hand it in. I'm not posting this to get or start any flames, just looking for info on what was specifically done during those 12 years to get/persuade/remind Saddam to comply.

Operation Desert Fox
On December 16, 1998, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) military forces launched cruise missile attacks against military targets in Iraq. These strikes were ordered by the President of the United States and were undertaken in response to Iraq's continued failure to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as their interference with United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors. The strikes were designed to deliver a serous blow to Saddam Hussein's capability to manufacture, store, maintain and deliver weapons of mass destruction and his ability to threaten or otherwise intimidate his neighbors.

Operation Desert Strike
Despite warnings from the United States, Iraq moved 40,000 troops into northern Iraq, which threatened the Kurdish population. In response, the president ordered a strike on military targets posing a threat to coalition aircraft in the no-fly-zone.

On August 31, 1996, elements of the Iraqi Army attacked and captured the PUK-held town of Irbil in the Kurdish autonomous region of northern Iraq. This renewed Iraqi aggression, led by a Republican Guard mechanized division with the support of regular army troops, alarmed the United States and coalition forces in the region. Rhetoric from Baghdad threatened GCC partners if they assisted the United States in retaliation, while Iraqi air defense forces launched surface to air missiles against USAF fighter aircraft patrolling the northern and southern "no-fly" zones. In response to the seizure of Irbil, USCENTCOM assessed an increased threat to America's interests and moved quickly to bolster its ability to protect those vital national interests on the Arabian peninsula. In close consultation with the National Command Authority, the Command began to develop appropriate military responses to deter further aggression.

Operation Desert Thunder
Operation Desert Thunder was the effort to provide military presence and capability during negotiations between the UN and Iraq over weapons of mass destruction. In late 1997 and early 1998, Iraq demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors. While diplomatic efforts continued in the hope of a peaceful solution, naval presence in the Gulf swelled as Operation Desert Thunder began.
In February and March USTRANSCOM supported the deployment of troops to Southwest Asia in response to Saddam Hussein's defiance of UN inspections. In all USTRANSCOM flew more than 300 airlift missions and nearly 200 air refueling missions, carrying 10,000 passengers and 11,000 short tons of cargo in about three weeks.

Operation Phoenix Scorpion I, II, III and IV
Operation Phoenix Scorpion I - November 1997 - Supported the deployment of bombers and, fighters to the Persian Gulf region. In response to Iraq?s defiance to United Nations weapons inspections in November 1997, the United States rapidly deployed forces to numerous locations throughout the world, in preparation for coercive airstrikes against Iraq.

Operation Vigilant Warrior
Since Desert Storm, Third Army has responded five times to contingency requirements to deploy, command, control and support major Army forces to deter Iraqi adventurism.

Operation Southern Watch
On January 17, 1993, US forces struck 8 buildings at the Zafraniyah Nuclear Fabrication Facility, located just outside Baghdad, in response to Iraq's refusal to cooperate with UN inspectors.

__________

Security Council Resolutions on Iraq
2000
Resolution 1302 09 June 2000 -- Iraq Oil-For-Food Program
Resolution 1293 (2000) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4123rd meeting, on 31 March 2000 - Iraqi oil-for-food
1999
RESOLUTION 1284 on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 17 December 1999 - Establishes, as a subsidiary body of the Council, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
RESOLUTION 1281 on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 10 December 1999
RESOLUTION 1280 on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 3 December 1999
RESOLUTION 1275 on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 19 November 1999
RESOLUTION 1266 on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 4 October 1999
Situation between Iraq and Kuwait S/RES/1242 (1999) 21 May 1999
1998
UNSC Resolution 1210 ON IRAQ'S OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM 24 November 1998 --
Resolution 1205 (1998) SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON IRAQ 05 November 1998
Resolution 1194 (1998) Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA 9 September 1998
Resolution 1175 (1998) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 19 June 1998
Resolution 1158 (1998) Extending "Oil-for-Food" provisions 25 March 1998
Resolution 1154 (1998) Endorsement of the MOU on access to Presidential sites 02 March 1998
Resolution 1153 (1998) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 20 February 1998
1997
Resolution 1143 (1997) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
4 December 1997 - Extending "Oil-for-Food" provisions of Res 986 (1995) for 180 days.
Resolution 1137 (1997) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
12 November 1997 - Condemns Iraqi restrictions on access by UNSCOM, and restricts international movemennts of Iraqi officials.
Resolution 1134 (1997) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
23 October 1997 - Condemns the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access to certain sites by UNSCOM, decides that such refusals to cooperate constitute a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1060 (1996).
Resolution 1129 (1997) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
12 September 1997 - Decides that the provisions of resolution 1111 (1997) remain in force, with specified exceptions on quotas for oil exports to pay for the purchase of humanitarian supplies.
Resolution 1115 (1997) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
21 June 1997 - Condemns the repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by UNSCOM as a clear and flagrant violation of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1060 (1996).
Resolution 1111 (1997) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
4 June 1997 - Extends the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) for another period of 180 as a temporary measure to continue to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.
1996
Resolution 1060 (1996) on Iraq's refusal to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission
12 June 1996 - Deplores the refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites by UNSCOM in a clear violation of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991).
Resolution 1051 (1996) on approval of the mechanism for monitoring Iraqi imports and exports, pursuant to Resolutions and decisions 715 (1991)
27 March 1996 - Approves the provisions for the mechanism for export/import monitoring established by the Special Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
1995
Resolution 986 (1995) on authorization to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, as a temporary measure to provide for humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people
14 April 1995 - Expands the "Oil-for-Food" exceptions to the trade embargo.
1994
Resolution 949 (1994) demanding that Iraq immediately complete the withdrawal of all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions and that Iraq not again utilize its military or any other forces in a hostile or provocative manner to threaten its neig
15 October 1994 - Condemned and demanded the immediate and complete the withdrawal of all Iraqi military units recently deployed to southern Iraq.
Resolution 899 (1994) on compensation payments to the Iraqi private citizens whose assets remained on Kuwaiti territory following the demarcation of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait
4 March 1994 - Decision on compensation payments to private citizens in Iraq.
1993
Resolution 806 (1993) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
5 February 1993 - Extends the terms of reference of United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).
1992
Resolution 778 (1992) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
2 October 1992 - Decides that all funds of the Government of Iraq from the sale of Iraqi petroleum after 6 August 1990 shall be placed in the escrow account provided for in resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991);
Resolution 773 (1992) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
26 August 1992 - Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission
1991
Resolution 715 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
11 October 1991 - Approves the plan of the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for future ongoing monitoring and verification.
Resolution 712 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
19 September 1991 - Provisions for financing the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs.
Resolution 707 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
Demands that Iraq provide full, final and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.
Resolution 706 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
15 August 1991 - "Oil-for-Food" - Authorizes proceeds of limited sales of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products to be paid into an escrow account for the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs.
Resolution 705 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
15 August 1991 - Decides that compensation to be paid by Iraq arising from resolution 687) shall not exceed 30 per cent of the annual value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq.
Resolution 700 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
17 June 1991 - Approves the Guidelines to Facilitate Full International Implementation of of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
Resolution 699 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
Confirms that the Special Commission and the IAEA have the authority to conduct activities under resolution 687 (1991), for the purpose of the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified in that resolution.
Resolution 692 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
20 May 1991 - Liability of Iraq for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
Resolution 689 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
9 April 1991 - Establishment of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission.
Resolution 688 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
5 April 1991 - Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including in Kurdish populated areas, and insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations.
Resolution 687 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
8 April 1991 - Decides that, as a condition of a cease-fire, Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities, as well as all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities, and that a Special Commission shall carry out on-site inspection of any locations in Iraq.

______

Nope, we pretty much just ignored Saddam all of these years.

 

[phillyTIM]

actually i believe the US has some blame for this too, sorry i can't elaborate but others here have explained

 

[etech]

Originally posted by: phillyTIM
actually i believe the US has some blame for this too, sorry i can't elaborate but others here have explained

Then don't post your BS unless you are willing to take the time to back it up punk.

 

[phillyTIM]

its too bad you resort to personal attacks

 

[etech]

Originally posted by: phillyTIM
its too bad you resort to personal attacks

Be willing to back up your posts or that is all you deserve.

 

[Loralon]

Originally posted by: Gonad the Barbarian
Is this really a valid argument? It seems to me the whole scenerio is akin to a teacher making an assignment, not giving a due date, then knocking on your door 12 years later expecting you to hand it in. I'm not posting this to get or start any flames, just looking for info on what was specifically done during those 12 years to get/persuade/remind Saddam to comply.

This is a small, but relevant section of UNSCR 687 passed on April 3, 1991 in the immediate aftermath of Gulf War I:

8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;

(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:

(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;

(b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval:

(i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;

(ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above, including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above;

(iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and cooperation to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below;

10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of this resolution;

I can't take your original premise seriously for obvious reasons. The suggestion that Iraq never really understood the substance of the sanctions being placed on it after the first Gulf War is rather silly given the number of UNSCRs passed in the 12 years, economic sanctions and limited military actions undertaken by the United States and United Kingdom throughout this period.

 

[Ornery]

"Why didn't we have the same pressure from bush1/clinton/shrub that we had for the few months before the war started?

9-11 made all the difference. OBL showed it didn't take much to execute a sh|tload of destruction. We won't be caught with our pants down again. I love Bush's proactive approach. We left Hussein screw us around way too long.

BTW, nice post up there Etech. You have every right to jump on that lazy tool!

 

[Gonad the Barbarian]

Originally posted by: Loralon

I can't take your original premise seriously for obvious reasons. The suggestion that Iraq never really understood the substance of the sanctions being placed on it after the first Gulf War is rather silly given the number of UNSCRs passed in the 12 years, economic sanctions and limited military actions undertaken by the United States and United Kingdom throughout this period.

That's why I asked.

etech, thanks for the post.

 

[Conky]

Originally posted by: Loralon

I can't take your original premise seriously for obvious reasons. The suggestion that Iraq never really understood the substance of the sanctions being placed on it after the first Gulf War is rather silly given the number of UNSCRs passed in the 12 years, economic sanctions and limited military actions undertaken by the United States and United Kingdom throughout this period.

It's obvious that Iraq did understand the sanctions and the reasons for them existing but simply didn't care.

He thought he could continue to play the same old hide-and-seek game he played for the last 12 years. He also thought the UN didn't have the balls to do anything beyond the inspections. He was basicly right on these two assumptions.

He didn't count on Bush getting sick of of this French-led nonsense and taking the matter into his own hands. Bush, despite being a horrible public speaker, put it rather succinctly when he said we didn't need the UN's approval to protect ourselves.

Personally, I think Bush is going to go down in history as one of our greatest presidents. And Clinton will go down in history for staining a dress. It's nice to know there is finally responsible leadership in the Whitehouse.

 

[rbV5]

The suggestion that Iraq never really understood the substance of the sanctions being placed on it after the first Gulf War is rather silly given the number of UNSCRs passed in the 12 years, economic sanctions and limited military actions undertaken by the United States and United Kingdom throughout this period

Except, it looks like they lost interest sometime in 2000. When you take the resolutions, the invasion of Kuwait, the decade before the invasion, the confusing foreign policy over the last couple decades, the complacency over using CW against Iran, Misinformation by the press, his aides, who knows what behind the scenes...its not so cut and dried. I saw an interview of Saddam by Barbara Walters where Saddam looked absolutely perplexed that Americans weren't subject to some kind of severe punishment for critical remarks of our President, to me that shows the depth of his understanding of the American political system in general...I'd say its obviously possible he didn't truly understand, look at the results.

 

[yoyofatjo]

Personally, I think Bush is going to go down in history as one of our greatest presidents. And Clinton will go down in history for staining a dress. It's nice to know there is finally responsible leadership in the Whitehouse.

Actually if Bush's tax cut gets passed, he will go down in history...by cursing the US economy for the next decade. His leadership in the war will get him percentage points this year, but after the war is said and done, the Dems will have a ball showcasing the miserable state of our economy during the next Presidential bid.