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DANIEL SNEIDER: SADDAM FEARED IRAN, NOT UNITED STATES
The most incredible revelation in the new CIA report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is not that there were no biological, chemical or nuclear weapons in Iraq. We knew that.
It is that Saddam Hussein deliberately deceived the world -- even members of his own regime -- into believing he still had WMDs in order to deter Iran.
Saddam emerged from the nearly decadelong war with Iran in the 1980s believing that only the use of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles had staved off an Iranian conquest. His decision to accelerate the Iraqi nuclear program in the late 1980s was driven by concerns about Iran's nuclear program. As his intelligence service came back with reports on Iran's progress toward the bomb in the 1990s, Saddam concluded he had to create the deception that Iraq still had WMDs to hold off the Iranian threat.
Those insights come from extensive interviews with Saddam and his captured inner circle, along with documents and tape recordings of their deliberations. The detailed account of the regime's "Strategic Intent" that opens the huge report issued last week by Charles Duelfer is in sharp contrast to the cartoon images drawn for the American people.
"Saddam did not consider the United States a natural adversary, as he did Iran and Israel, and he hoped that Iraq might again enjoy improved relations with the United States," the report found. In fact, Saddam made repeated overtures during the 1990s, including through Duelfer personally, to improve ties with the United States.
The nuclear and chemical weapons, along with the missiles, were destroyed in 1991 under the supervision of United Nations inspectors. Saddam tried to hide his bioweapons, but after the defection in 1995 of his son-in-law, who had run the WMD programs, that program also was destroyed.
Increasingly, Saddam was desperate to lift the effective international sanctions that brought Iraq's economy to ruin.
"This led to a difficult balancing act between the need to disarm to achieve sanctions relief while at the same time retaining a strategic deterrent," the CIA report said. "The regime never resolved the contradiction inherent in this approach."
Saddam bears the chief responsibility for his grandiose ambitions and the consequences of his tragic bluff. It is also evident that the Bush administration, and the Clinton administration before it, had a dangerous lack of understanding of this foe.
Read this report and think of North Korea, whose leader is also portrayed as a caricature but who also clearly shares Saddam's belief that WMDs, or the claim to have them, are needed to deter a real threat.
And think, too, of the radical Islamic regime in Iran, moving steadily (as Saddam feared) toward nuclear status, now emboldened by the American removal of its foe.