Originally posted by: Common Courtesy
Kennedy increased the "advisors" from Ike's levels
Duh. He inherited Ike's committment - and he also defused the Laos crisis handed to him on the verge of war. You don't turn a battleship on a dime, much less the nation.
Johnson said that he was following the lead of Kennedy in the commitment of troops.
If you can't grasp the massive difference between Kennedy's *no gorund war* policy and Lyndon Johnson's *ground war* policy, you have bigger problems than I can help with.
There was an issue with Kennedy's advisors - who had been more pro-war than Kennedy - misleading LBJ about JFK's position, suggesting to him that Kennedy was more pro-war.
LBJ was different in critical ways - he lacked JFK's years of building credibility, most pointedly in the Cuban Missile Crisis; and he had been far more in favor of going to war in Vietnam than Kennedy all along, calling Diem "The Winston Churchill of Southeast Asia" and recommending ground troops as vice-president. He was livid when Kennedy allowed Diem to be removed, and Diem was killed, and immediately reversed secret Kennedy executive order policies to move towards withdrawal.
As president; either could have not increased and started a withdrawl if desired.
The buck/responsibility stops with them.
No, Common Courtesy has no idea of the options, challenges, repercussions of the policy options available - that's an accurate statement, not the one you wrote.
In the most literal sense they 'could have', the same way the President 'could' order the invasion of Mexico tomorrow, but no, he can't, practically.
JFK had a cold war to fight, he had a militaristic US public to keep happy with his leadership in the cold war, he had a national culture for 'standing strong' against communism and prone to view these issues as requiring the US not to let the world fall to tyranny - there would be big prices to pay in his political support for other policies if he abandoned Eisenhower's committment casually (as, for example, Dougla MacArthur privately advised Kennedy to do, telling him to avoid any ground war in Asia).
You just make crap up to post. 'Oh he could just reverse our policy instantly and easily, so that's the end of that issue, next?'
Forget the worldwide crisis in confidence in American leadership it would bring, the domestic revolt against our 'coward president' allowing the communists to march on under the dominao theory - a theory Kennedy had offered public support for - as people asked where the line would be drawn, if anywhere, Laos? Thailand? India? Japan? Where?
Kennedy knew how to de-escalate, and he was doing so. Again courtesy of Sorensen:
At a press conference on November 14, he said "our object" was "to bring Americans home." Earlier that year, in a May 1963 press conference, he declared that if the South Vietnamese government ever suggested it, "we would have some troops on their way home the next day." In September he said of the South Vietnamese: "In the final analysis, it is their wa. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it."
There are more such statements. He was laying the groundwork for being able to withdraw with a minimal political impact - a President doesn't plant the seed that an ally has to fight a war themselves and raise the possibility they can lose, for fun, and when he's planning to get involved and 'save' them - instead he makes the case why it's essential for them not to fall, to justify keeping the option open. Kennedy said some things on both sides, to let him walk the fine line of 'strength' while paving the way for withdrawal.
As he did with his symbolic
withdrawal of 1,000 of the 16,000 advisors in October, weeks before Diem was allowed ot be removed.
He supported the SV in fighting the Communists and knew that the limited advisors placed in there by Ike was not going to cut it.
Hence his facing the choice of withdrawal or war - and leaning strongly towards withdrawal, and taking many steps to pave the way for it, and constantly rejecting pressure for war.
There's a reason there are many books on this topic, because it's not simple as your made-up comments try to claim.
It takes effort to discern a president's 'real', 'private', agenda hidden at the time from even close advisors, tri-angulating contemporary documents, memoirs, history, and more.
I understand you want to participate in the discussion, but you can't just run around saying how he could 'easily' change the fundmental US-Asia cold war policy.