That's not how the theologians predicted the campaign would unfold. The theory was that the initial display of military might by U.S. warplanes and ground troops would "shock and awe" the Iraqi military and high-ranking officials into the conviction that resistance was futile. The despot's regime, Administration officials insisted, was too "brittle" to survive such an onslaught. Iraqi troops would defect en masse, they suggested. Intelligence and military officers had selected likely turncoats among the military's highest echelons. Just two days before the opening salvo, Richard Perle, a leading war booster on the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, predicted, "Even those closest around the [Iraqi] President will understand they have no chance in the face of what's coming after them."
Pentagon officials told reporters last week that "I think we underestimated" the strength and capability of Iraq's paramilitaries. Last fall a Defense official dismissed them as insignificant, predicting, "the Fedayeen will run with their tails between their legs."
The CIA says it distributed a classified report in early February to policymakers warning that the Fedayeen could be expected to employ guerrilla tactics against U.S. rear units. These Washington intelligence analysts now complain that their views were softened as the report moved up the chain of command. The intelligence was there, an official told TIME, but "I have no idea how much attention they paid to it."
So far those paramilitary attacks are what an Administration official shrugged off as a "major annoyance." Most Bush aides believe the resistance will melt away once Saddam is gone. Yet allied troops have had to adjust tactics to deal with snipers and surprise attacks as well as adopt a wary attitude when confronting civilians. Although most of the Iraqis' assaults are both suicidal and futile, they have stirred up an image of Iraqi resistance wholly at odds with the quick capitulation the U.S. had hoped for. Even when Saddam's power is broken, some of the diehards could go underground to continue the struggle against a U.S.-occupied Iraq.
"I really do believe we will be greeted as liberators," said Vice President Dick Cheney on March 16?and he was hardly the only Administration warrior to believe it. In the White House vision, freed Iraqis would dance with joy from the very first days of the war. Pictures of happy, liberated Iraqis were crucial to the plan, since the Bush team counted on those images to help persuade Saddam's army to surrender, inspire civilians across the country to rise against the regime and defuse global opposition to the U.S. campaign. Iraqis may yet exhibit gratitude, but the "rose petal and rice" scenario hasn't materialized yet. This doesn't hurt too much on the battlefield, but it is a real setback in the political arena.
The Administration has operated by the simple equation that Iraqis who loathe Saddam would welcome America as liberator. Yet many Iraqis don't much like the U.S. They blame America for a harsh decade of suffering under economic sanctions that destroyed their livelihoods but not Saddam's power. Like most other Arabs, they resent American support for Israel at the expense of the Palestinians. In the end, many will judge the invaders by the conduct of the war: the growing prospect of a protracted conflict that kills many innocent civilians could forestall a successful postwar era.
"It's a plan that's on track," Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, kept saying last week, and in the broadest sense, he is probably right. But as 19th century Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke famously said, "No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy." Shifting circumstances on the ground last week posed a test for the Administration's skill at adaptation. Although the Bush Administration seemed unwilling to recognize it, there's actually nothing wrong in trumpeting U.S. flexibility in the face of new facts on the ground.
The question openly debated last week was whether Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld bet right when he decided on the scope of the invading force. Deployment is now at 250,000, but only the Army's 3rd Infantry Division is a heavy fighting force, and just 150,000 of the total are ground-combat troops. Chairman Myers insisted last week that the U.S. had deployed "just the right forces." Certainly those forces had a lot to do, from taking Baghdad to searching for Saddam's bio-chem weapons to delivering water and food to civilians. An additional 2,000 soldiers reach the war theater each day, and the total will rise to 340,000 in the weeks ahead. Rumsfeld says his plan called for just such a "rolling start." But these reinforcements were originally intended for occupation duty; now they will see combat.
Bush the elder fielded 540,000 U.S. troops to kick Saddam out of the desert wastes of Kuwait. For the more ambitious task of driving Saddam from power, Rumsfeld pushed Franks to fight with half that number, fewer troops and less armor than the general originally wanted. But the current battle plan is all part of the Defense Secretary's conviction that a more potent, smaller, higher-tech force can win in new ways. Army officers have complained throughout the planning process that Rumsfeld was relying too much on air power and wasn't calling for enough boots on the ground. "The issue isn't, was there enough," says an Army general. "The issue is, was there more than enough."
Critics say Franks needs an additional heavy Army division. The Administration sent Franks into combat without the 4th Infantry and other reinforcements that he expected to have. Those heavyweight 62,000 troops were supposed to swoop down on Baghdad from bases in Turkey to open a second front. The Administration assumed a multibillion-dollar aid gift plus permission to put Turkish troops across the Iraq border into Kurdish territory would persuade its nato ally to allow U.S. forces to use Turkish territory. What the Administration didn't seem to factor in was the strong opposition of Turkey's mainly Muslim population and an election bringing Islamic leaders to power. But when the parliament in Ankara refused at the 11th hour, Bush made the decision to launch the war anyway. The Pentagon officially discounted the need for an immediate northern front. They were more wary about giving Saddam extra time to ready his defenses.
If U.S. forces run into trouble as they close in on Baghdad, there are scant units in reserve to rescue them. "We're basically betting that won't happen, and it probably won't," an Army officer says. "But if it did, we'd be in trouble." The 4th Infantry and its tanks are dribbling into Kuwait and should be ready to roll by early April. The Bush war plan is predicated on momentum; slowing down wasn't part of the program. But the pause imposed by last week's reversals may prove a godsend, allowing the allies to muster extra firepower and more robust supply lines and giving soldiers a chance for a little shut-eye.
For the Bush Administration, some of the unexpected turns of Gulf War II reflect a perhaps too rigid adherence to ideology at the expense of on-the-ground practicality. But whatever the weaknesses in some of the Administration's early assumptions, they probably won't alter the outcome of the conflict?though they may prolong it. There have been many signal successes on the ground: after all, U.S. forces have moved to within 50 miles of Baghdad in a week, and American forces have defeated the Iraqis in every head-to-head encounter. Despite individual setbacks last week, U.S. fortunes can switch course at any moment. But in this media age, expectations are almost as much a part of any war as the battlefield. As even military strategists note, flexibility and muscle, not theories, lead to victory. That's something the military planners of Gulf War II are now taking into account.