Originally posted by: AFMatt
WMDs, U.N. Resolutions, false intelligence data, Bush likes war, we want their oil, Hussein was a monster, etc etc, enter reason here..
The bottom line, in my opinion, is no country, group, or person was seen as an imminent threat to the U.S. until the moment those planes struck the WTC. Once that happened, reality set in that we could be attacked on a large scale by a non-domestic terrorist and every little game Saddam played with the inspection process was in the spotlight. Then the false intel data comes around and everyone gets their panties in a bunch, including respectable/reputable individuals like Colin Powell, and we pass a resolution to go into Iraq. Polls at the time showed a majority of the U.S. in support of it as well.
Would Gore have done the same? Who knows? Gore was highly critical of Bush Sr. in the 90s for not taking action against Iraq/Saddam for his past involvement with WMDs, his treatment of the Iraqi and Kurdish people, and his support of terrorists. Maybe he would have, maybe not. Either way, Bush says he regrets it and I bet most, if not all of the 374 that voted for it regret it as well.
And Iraq was not an 'imminent' threat to the US at any time. There were absurd attempts made to 'fit the facts' to the need for it to be one, such as the speculation about how it 'could' fly WMD around on cropdusters, but no credible threat. To the extent people believed there was one, they were wrong.
It was a political failur. I'll explain with an analogy in a moment.
The real issue was that everyone wants more power, some more aggressively than others, and the neocons more aggressively than most. Newly in power after a frustating period of irrelevance, they looked around not for 'what's right', but for 'how can the US be further enhanced as the world's only superpower?' Their ideology equates the US with "good" and justifies any military force used for helping the US as therefore justified.
They decided that a power like the US needs to flex its muscles to enhance its power; they decided that a war somewhere was helpful. But where? They looked at China, Syria, Iraq...
Iraq was the nice choice for a variety of reasons, but it's not quite as easy as just announcing 'we're going to war for our desire to increase our world power'.
They wrote up their views in a surprsingly candid document with their doctring that the US policy should be to prevent anyone else from ever becoming a military rival. In the document they discussed the middle east as a region it would enhance US power to politically dominate (not quite the founding fathers' defense of liberty for the middle easterners). It discussed that with the limitations of public opinion on war, it might take decades to gradually do that - unless 'another pearl harbor event' happened. Hello 9/11.
And so they rode the wave of 9/11 to warin Iraq. The problem was how the democratic processes were abused to fit the goal of war. Here's the promised analogy:
For good reasons, in custody situations, courts have protections for a parent to get custody when the other parent commits child abuse. The 'unintended consequence' of this is that parents who want custody for other reasons - they just want the kids, they want to beat their spouse in court, whatever - suddenly have this tool they can abuse, 'allegations of child abuse'. Nor surprisingly, that causes the rate of false accusations of abuse to skyrocket, because those are the rules of the game to manipulate.
Similarly, protections were put into place when the world, including the US, signed the UN charter promising not to start wars, with a few small exceptions - including 'imminent threat' from someone. Unable to get the UN to approve the use of force against Saddam, instead working on WMD inspections, the only justification the US could find for war without blatantly admitting it was violating its promise not to start wars was the 'imminent threat' exception. And so, suddenly, the massive resources of the US, from its intelligence and military agencies to the communications of senior officials, were put to the task of establishing that 'imminent threat' existed.
No rule is any better than its enforcement, its interpretation, and when you have a political will by the administration for war butting heads with the rules, you see this sort of thing.
Similarly, a normal such need is for war to be justified as defensive - 'the other guy started it', and you see in history nations go to some length to try to make that case.
As I've summarized before, you can go through a list of US wars and pretty much always find some claim of how 'they started it', however much that had to be arranged. Polk sent a few US military to sit around inside Mexican territory until the Mexican forces found them and attacked a patrol of four men. Lyndon Johnson cited the attack by North Vietnam on a US Destroyer (which happened to be escorting US-trained South Vietnamese terrorists into NVN), in international waters (it was actually in NVM waters IIUC). And so on.
I think your speculation about Gore is misguided and wrong. The Iraq war happened because an ideologically especially bent on war with Iraq for its agenda of blindly increasing US power even further got power. Gore was not a member of any such group with that sort of agenda, and no plausible case can be made that he would have targetted Iraq, only the most baseless specualtion, comparable to "well, Gore COULD buy a gun and COULD shoot someone", certainly far below the evidence needed to support your 50-50 type estimate of 'he might have, he might not'. As for your saying Bush regrets it, I haven't seen that anywhere, not that it would matter much. I've only say him say he regrets the intelligence failure, but not the war policy even if we'd known there were no WMD.
The real issue we need to deal with is how to prevent the next Bush from being able to ram through the next war - more than the simple period of time we need to wait for the recent experience to wear off. After Vietnam, new wars were pretty unthinkable, but over time and Reagan, the public support gradually warmed up, the Vietnam taboo gradually wore off. We need systemic strengthening of how to prevent bad wars. The thing is, that's not terribly easy to do. We might have thought we'd done it with the UN charter, but as the Iraq war and the claims of cropdusters as an imminent threat showed, it wasn't as effective as you might want.