question about technology

[gorcorps]

Why can I get live Direct TV perfectly fine in an airplane moving hundreds of miles an hour, yet have issues in a windstorm on something anchored to a building?

 

[Dr. Zaus]

In what follows we shall be questioning concerning technology. Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on iso* lated sentences and topics. The way is a way of thinking. All ways of thinking, more or less perceptibly, lead through language in a manner that is extraordinary. We shall be questioning con* cerning technology, and in so doing we should like to prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology.

Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology. When we are seeking the essence of "tree," we have to become aware that That which pervades every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree that can be encountered among all the other trees.
Likewise, the essence of technology is by no means any* thing technological. Thus we shall never experience our relation* ship to the essence of technology so long as we merely conceive and push forward the technological, put up with it, or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as some* thing neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we par* ticularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.

According to ancient doctrine, the essence of a thing is con* sidered to be what the thing is. We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is. Everyone knows the two statements that answer our question. One says : Technology is a means to an end. The other says : Technology is a human activity. The two definitions of technology belong together. For to posit ends and procure and utilize the means to them is a human activity.

The current conception of technology, according to which it is a means and a human activity, can therefore be called the in* strumental and anthropological definition of technology.

Who would ever deny that it is correct? It is in obvious con* formity with what we are envisioning when we talk about tech* nology. The instrumental definition of technology is indeed so uncannily correct that it even holds for modern technology, of which, iil other respects, we maintain with some justification that it is, in contrast to the older handwork technology, some* thing completely diHerent and therefore new.

Even the power plant with its turbines and generators is a man-made means to an end established by man. Even the jet aircraft and the high* frequency apparatus are means to ends. A radar station is of course less simple than a weather vane. To be sure, the construc* tion of a high-frequency apparatus requires the interlocking of various processes of technical-industrial production. And cer* tainly a sawmill in a secluded valley of the Black Forest is a primitive means compared with the hydroelectric plant in the Rhine River.

But this much remains correct: modern technology too is a means to an end. That is why the instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology. Everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, Uget" technology "spiritually in hand." We will master it. The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control.

But suppose now that technology were no mere means, how would it stand with the will to master it? Yet we said, did we not, that the instrumental definition of technology is correct? To be sure. The correct always fixes upon something pertinent in whatever is under consideration. However, in order to be cor* rect, this fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in question in its essence. Only at the point where such an uncov* ering happens does the true come to pass.4 For that reason the merely correct is not yet the true. Only the true brings us into a free relationship with that which concerns us from out of its essence. Accordingly, the correct instrumental definition of tech* nology still does not show us technology's essence. In order that we may arrive at this, or at least come close to it, we must seek the true by way of the correct. We must ask :

What is the instru-mental itself? Within what do such things as means and end belong? A means is that whereby something is effected and thus attained. Whatever has an effect as its consequence is called a cause. But not only that by means of which something else is effected is a cause. The end in keeping with which the kind of means to be used is determined is also considered a cause. Wherever ends are pursued and means are employed, wherever instrumentality reigns, there reigns causality.

For centuries philosophy has taught that there are four causes : (1) the causa materialis, the material, the matter out of which, for example, a silver chalice is made; (2) the causa formalis, the form, the shape into which the material enters; (3) the causa finalis, the end, for example, the sacrificial rite in relation to which the chalice required is determined as to its form and mat* ter; (4) the causa efficiens, which brings about the effect that is the finished, actual chalice, in this instance, the silversmith. What technology is, when represented as a means, discloses itself when we trace instrumentality back to fourfold causality.

But suppose that causality, for its part, is veiled in darkness with respect to what it is? Certainly for centuries we have acted as though the doctrine of the four causes had fallen from heaven as a truth as clear as daylight. But it might be that the time has come to ask, Why are there just four causes? In relation to the aforementioned four, what does "cause" really mean? From whence does it come that the causal character of the four causes is so unifiedly determined that they belong together?

So long as we do not allow ourselves to go into these ques* tions, causality, and with it instrumentality, and with the latter the accepted definition of technology, remain obscure and groundless.

For a long time we have been accustomed to representing cause as that which brings something about. In this connection, to bring about means to obtain results, effects. The causa efficiens, but one among the four causes, sets the standard for all causality. This goes so far that we no longer even count the causa finalis, telic finality, as causality. Causa, casus, belongs to the verb cadere, "to fall," and means that which brings it about that some* thing falls out as a result in such and such a way. The doctrine of the four causes goes back to Aristotle. But everything that later ages seek in Greek thought under the conception and rubric "causality," in the realm of Greek thought and for Greek thought per se has simply nothing at all to do with bringing about and effecting. What we call cause [Ursache] and the Romans call causa is called aition by the Greeks, that to which something else is indebted [das, was ein anderes verschuldetJ. The four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else. An example can clarify this.

Silver is that out of which the silver chalice is made. As this matter (hyle), it is co-responsible for the chalice. The chalice is indebted to, i.e., owes thanks to, the silver for that out of which it consists. But the sacrificial vessel is indebted not only to the silver. As a chalice, that which is indebted to the silver appears in the aspect of a chalice and not in that of a brooch or a ring. Thus the sacrificial vessel is at the same time indebted to the aspect (eidos) of chaliceness. Both the silver into which the aspect is admitted as chalice and the aspect in which the silver appears are in their respective ways co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel.

 

[Markbnj]

Why can I get live Direct TV perfectly fine in an airplane moving hundreds of miles an hour, yet have issues in a windstorm on something anchored to a building?

Radio waves propagate at the speed of light in a vacuum, so it doesn't matter how fast the vehicle you're in is moving. What does matter is that the vehicle is at 35k or so feet above sea level, with a lot less air and disturbances between the receiver and the transmitter on the satellite.

 

[Gunslinger08]

Planes and RVs probably have automated tracking systems that keep the dish pointed at the satellites. Your home typically doesn't move, so the dish is bolted directly to it. When the wind blows, it moves slightly. If you already had a poor signal lock, this could result in outage.

Planes also may be above cloud cover, avoiding signal strength loss due to storm cloud density.

 

[Fritzo]

Satellite has everything to do with line of sight. If you have anything blocking signal propagation, you're screwed. This can include trees, buildings, mountains, etc. When you're in a plane, you're actually in the best location to receive a signal because there's nothing blocking it.

 

[LTC8K6]

Planes and RVs probably have automated tracking systems that keep the dish pointed at the satellites. Your home typically doesn't move, so the dish is bolted directly to it. When the wind blows, it moves slightly. If you already had a poor signal lock, this could result in outage.

Planes also may be above cloud cover, avoiding signal strength loss due to storm cloud density.

Yes, the airliner's sat antenna is a tracking antenna, and a very good one. :biggrin:

 

[jagec]

Yes, the airliner's sat antenna is a tracking antenna, and a very good one. :biggrin:

One of the jobs of the copilot is to manually adjust the satellite dish from time to time to make sure that the passengers don't lose reception during the flight.

 

[techs]

It's God

 

[zCypher]

It's God

Indeed. In this case, the flying spaghetti monster.

 

[AstroManLuca]

In what follows we shall be questioning concerning technology. Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on iso* lated sentences and topics. The way is a way of thinking. All ways of thinking, more or less perceptibly, lead through language in a manner that is extraordinary. We shall be questioning con* cerning technology, and in so doing we should like to prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology.

Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology. When we are seeking the essence of "tree," we have to become aware that That which pervades every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree that can be encountered among all the other trees.
Likewise, the essence of technology is by no means any* thing technological. Thus we shall never experience our relation* ship to the essence of technology so long as we merely conceive and push forward the technological, put up with it, or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as some* thing neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we par* ticularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.

According to ancient doctrine, the essence of a thing is con* sidered to be what the thing is. We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is. Everyone knows the two statements that answer our question. One says : Technology is a means to an end. The other says : Technology is a human activity. The two definitions of technology belong together. For to posit ends and procure and utilize the means to them is a human activity.

The current conception of technology, according to which it is a means and a human activity, can therefore be called the in* strumental and anthropological definition of technology.

Who would ever deny that it is correct? It is in obvious con* formity with what we are envisioning when we talk about tech* nology. The instrumental definition of technology is indeed so uncannily correct that it even holds for modern technology, of which, iil other respects, we maintain with some justification that it is, in contrast to the older handwork technology, some* thing completely diHerent and therefore new.

Even the power plant with its turbines and generators is a man-made means to an end established by man. Even the jet aircraft and the high* frequency apparatus are means to ends. A radar station is of course less simple than a weather vane. To be sure, the construc* tion of a high-frequency apparatus requires the interlocking of various processes of technical-industrial production. And cer* tainly a sawmill in a secluded valley of the Black Forest is a primitive means compared with the hydroelectric plant in the Rhine River.

But this much remains correct: modern technology too is a means to an end. That is why the instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology. Everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, Uget" technology "spiritually in hand." We will master it. The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control.

But suppose now that technology were no mere means, how would it stand with the will to master it? Yet we said, did we not, that the instrumental definition of technology is correct? To be sure. The correct always fixes upon something pertinent in whatever is under consideration. However, in order to be cor* rect, this fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in question in its essence. Only at the point where such an uncov* ering happens does the true come to pass.4 For that reason the merely correct is not yet the true. Only the true brings us into a free relationship with that which concerns us from out of its essence. Accordingly, the correct instrumental definition of tech* nology still does not show us technology's essence. In order that we may arrive at this, or at least come close to it, we must seek the true by way of the correct. We must ask :

What is the instru-mental itself? Within what do such things as means and end belong? A means is that whereby something is effected and thus attained. Whatever has an effect as its consequence is called a cause. But not only that by means of which something else is effected is a cause. The end in keeping with which the kind of means to be used is determined is also considered a cause. Wherever ends are pursued and means are employed, wherever instrumentality reigns, there reigns causality.

For centuries philosophy has taught that there are four causes : (1) the causa materialis, the material, the matter out of which, for example, a silver chalice is made; (2) the causa formalis, the form, the shape into which the material enters; (3) the causa finalis, the end, for example, the sacrificial rite in relation to which the chalice required is determined as to its form and mat* ter; (4) the causa efficiens, which brings about the effect that is the finished, actual chalice, in this instance, the silversmith. What technology is, when represented as a means, discloses itself when we trace instrumentality back to fourfold causality.

But suppose that causality, for its part, is veiled in darkness with respect to what it is? Certainly for centuries we have acted as though the doctrine of the four causes had fallen from heaven as a truth as clear as daylight. But it might be that the time has come to ask, Why are there just four causes? In relation to the aforementioned four, what does "cause" really mean? From whence does it come that the causal character of the four causes is so unifiedly determined that they belong together?

So long as we do not allow ourselves to go into these ques* tions, causality, and with it instrumentality, and with the latter the accepted definition of technology, remain obscure and groundless.

For a long time we have been accustomed to representing cause as that which brings something about. In this connection, to bring about means to obtain results, effects. The causa efficiens, but one among the four causes, sets the standard for all causality. This goes so far that we no longer even count the causa finalis, telic finality, as causality. Causa, casus, belongs to the verb cadere, "to fall," and means that which brings it about that some* thing falls out as a result in such and such a way. The doctrine of the four causes goes back to Aristotle. But everything that later ages seek in Greek thought under the conception and rubric "causality," in the realm of Greek thought and for Greek thought per se has simply nothing at all to do with bringing about and effecting. What we call cause [Ursache] and the Romans call causa is called aition by the Greeks, that to which something else is indebted [das, was ein anderes verschuldetJ. The four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else. An example can clarify this.

Silver is that out of which the silver chalice is made. As this matter (hyle), it is co-responsible for the chalice. The chalice is indebted to, i.e., owes thanks to, the silver for that out of which it consists. But the sacrificial vessel is indebted not only to the silver. As a chalice, that which is indebted to the silver appears in the aspect of a chalice and not in that of a brooch or a ring. Thus the sacrificial vessel is at the same time indebted to the aspect (eidos) of chaliceness. Both the silver into which the aspect is admitted as chalice and the aspect in which the silver appears are in their respective ways co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel.

wat

 

[imagoon]

It is also called "properly mounting your land based dish so the wind doesn't move it" also.

 

[gorcorps]

One of the jobs of the copilot is to manually adjust the satellite dish from time to time to make sure that the passengers don't lose reception during the flight.

I thought that's what the flight attendants were doing when they seem to disappear

 

[Leros]

Satellite has everything to do with line of sight. If you have anything blocking signal propagation, you're screwed. This can include trees, buildings, mountains, etc. When you're in a plane, you're actually in the best location to receive a signal because there's nothing blocking it.

That's why my dish is on a drone that hovers 50k feet above my house.

 

[lxskllr]

Trees

 

[jagec]

I thought that's what the flight attendants were doing when they seem to disappear

Nope, they have another job in the cockpit.

 

[wirednuts]

good question op, because you think it would be a worse signal on a plane. i guess the 30k ft advantage is fairly meaningful....

 

[LTC8K6]

One of the jobs of the copilot is to manually adjust the satellite dish from time to time to make sure that the passengers don't lose reception during the flight.

It uses a fast tracking antenna as far as I have ever heard.

This is a similar system for bizjets

http://www.ellipsedirect.com/ellipse_direct_introduction.pdf

 

[LTC8K6]

http://www.kvh.com/ViewAttachment.aspx?guidID={B1481D0E-2BBB-49C7-9660-6D54B943F877}

KVH uses basically this same tracking antenna on airliners.

http://www.kvh.com/Commercial-and-O...vision-Systems/Aeronautical-Satellite-TV.aspx