--Inspired by the airborne laser thread--
The 2010 QDR is out and it seems to be a do-it-all assessment that would prove to be totally unaffordable. Something has to give. The airborne laser is an example of a cutting edge R&D program that a lot of people would like to see continued, yet there are hundreds of interesting -and some very important- funding requirements. It's easy to say "keep the program" without regard to the big picture and cutting costs in other areas.
The QDR keeps the "fighting two large-scale wars simultaneously" scenario, but it also recommends a force that can handle a much wider range of missions in numerous global hotspots, continued perimeter security, peacekeeping, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions, while also planning for the big one, developing new technologies, and basically trying to prepare for every potential threat and contingency that the military is likely to face.
It's not realistic and it's impossible to determine what the priority is... there is nothing there that forces the services to make hard decisions. Instead of being critical and strategic about our force posture, the QDR seems to just say "do everything!" So when those decisions have to be made -and they will have to be made- there will be no basis or plan... it'll be a random mixture of cuts and adjustments, and that's not a way to shape the US military.
The 2010 QDR is out and it seems to be a do-it-all assessment that would prove to be totally unaffordable. Something has to give. The airborne laser is an example of a cutting edge R&D program that a lot of people would like to see continued, yet there are hundreds of interesting -and some very important- funding requirements. It's easy to say "keep the program" without regard to the big picture and cutting costs in other areas.
The QDR keeps the "fighting two large-scale wars simultaneously" scenario, but it also recommends a force that can handle a much wider range of missions in numerous global hotspots, continued perimeter security, peacekeeping, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions, while also planning for the big one, developing new technologies, and basically trying to prepare for every potential threat and contingency that the military is likely to face.
It's not realistic and it's impossible to determine what the priority is... there is nothing there that forces the services to make hard decisions. Instead of being critical and strategic about our force posture, the QDR seems to just say "do everything!" So when those decisions have to be made -and they will have to be made- there will be no basis or plan... it'll be a random mixture of cuts and adjustments, and that's not a way to shape the US military.