Omniscience, Foreknowledge, & Free Will

[crashtestdummy]

Unless this is purely a philosophical discussion, I think atheists have a significant burden to prove...that having knowledge itself is a prohibition to free-will.

I think it's a tricky statement to figure out: does knowledge of events mean that those events are predetermined?

I think the easy analogy is that of a time traveler (because, you know, who hasn't tried that). If a person is able to move forward in five years, see the future, and return back, they know what will happen (i.e. they have foreknowledge), but there is no reason to suppose that future is predetermined. Free will and time travel are not inherently incompatible.

Free will becomes far more difficult to defend in the presence of a deterministic universe. (There is no evidence such is the case, but follow me down the rabbit hole for a minute.) In that scenario, all events are inextricably linked and there is only one possible path all things in the universe will take. In such a case, a person (or some super-smart creature) can know all future events by properly understanding all present information.

Oddly enough, despite the fact that this is the most intuitive way to see the universe (we tend to see the world in terms of well-defined cause and effect), there's strong evidence that this isn't the case. It does appear that there are some truly random events that occur in the universe that are not controlled by hidden variables (see Bell's Inequalities). You can make a case for superdeterminism, but there ceases to be any practical (i.e. testable) sense of the idea at that point.

The last piece, then, is whether you define an omniscient God as more of the time traveler above, someone who can observe all events in all time frames simultaneously, or as the puzzle solver who can take in all the information in the universe in the present and understand all outcomes. At that point, I can't help you much more, as I can't give you any reason to suspect that one notion of God is superior to another.

 

[Retro Rob]

Lets do this as a thought experiment. Let us say that you go the other way with your prediction and you predict that your son will eat the bowl of dog crap. No, if your knowledge is infallible that means your son must eat the bowl of crap, no matter what he would prefer to do. If this is true then he has no freewill, as he can only do what he was foreordained to do. If he can choose not to eat the bowl of crap then he has freewill and you do not have omniscience.

If you know what choice he will make and you will always be right then you have omniscience. But if you already know every thing he will do then the choices were already made and he never had an opportunity to make a choice. Therefor no Freewill.

If he can do something other then what was foreknown then he has freewill. But If he does something other then what was foreknown then you are missing knowledge and so don't have omniscience.

This is a false dicotomy, because you're presenting a simple "Yes or No" type of answer, and keeping in mind that you're an atheist, I think your example has far more implict conseqences, namely, God cannot exists under your model.

You're saying that if we have free will, the God doesn't isn't omniscient, therefore, he cannot be God. On the other hand, if we don't have free-will, God isn't omnipotent, and cannot do something (create beings with "free-will).

This is under the assumption that you have correctly defined free-will, but it seems to suggest you're arguing from a position of incredulity, to be honest.

 

[soulcougher73]

This is a false dicotomy, because you're presenting a simple "Yes or No" type of answer, and keeping in mind that you're an atheist, I think your example has far more implict conseqences, namely, God cannot exists under your model.

You're saying that if we have free will, the God doesn't isn't omniscient, therefore, he cannot be God. On the other hand, if we don't have free-will, God isn't omnipotent, and cannot do something (create beings with "free-will).

This is under the assumption that you have correctly defined free-will, but it seems to suggest you're arguing from a position of incredulity, to be honest.

The only thing i would add speaking for myself. I would believe if we truely had free will than god isnt omniscient. But that doesnt mean he couldnt still be god and be all powerful. He just isnt all knowing. Which i would be fine with if such a god were to exist.

 

[SMOGZINN]

This is a false dicotomy, because you're presenting a simple "Yes or No" type of answer, and keeping in mind that you're an atheist, I think your example has far more implict conseqences, namely, God cannot exists under your model.

You're saying that if we have free will, the God doesn't isn't omniscient, therefore, he cannot be God. On the other hand, if we don't have free-will, God isn't omnipotent, and cannot do something (create beings with "free-will).

This is under the assumption that you have correctly defined free-will, but it seems to suggest you're arguing from a position of incredulity, to be honest.

I'm trying hard not to frame this as a religious discussion, because I don't believe it needs to be one. I think that we could very easily state that the future does not exist until it is created by us (or by your God, or both together), and in either case omniscience would not need to include knowledge of it since omniscience can be defined as knowledge of all that exists, and the future does not yet exist. In that case freewill could exist as long as the future is being created by us (or us and God assuming that God is not binding our choices).

That is why I tried to re-frame the question into one of a time traveler a few posts back. I think that the main questions surrounding freewill is:

Does the future already exist?
Is it possible to have knowledge of it?
If it exists is it immutable?

I think that freewill is not compatible with any arguments that would answer all three of those questions yes.

 

[Cerpin Taxt]

My apologies for not being clear, Taxt, but what I mean is that one could choose utilize foreknowledge or not. In other words, I would refrain from looking into the future to predict a path...though I am able.

And I had posted a series of questions trying to flesh out the significance of your idea. Consider this:

If I flip a coin in the air, and then conceal the upward face when I catch it, you don't know the result of the coin flip, because it is hidden from you. If I reveal the face, and you observe it, then you know the result. If I reveal the face and you refuse to look at it, you don't know the result... though you are able to know it because it is there for you to see if you choose.

In the last case, however, the reason you are able to look at the upward face of the coin and know the result is because that result has been determined. The coin has been flipped. Its upward face is there waiting for you to look at it. Whether you look at it or not does not change the fact that the result of the coin flip has been determined. In fact, the only reason you are able to decide to look and observe that there is a singular result is precisely because the coin flip is over, and the result has been determined.

So my remaining question is this: what difference does it make if god chooses to look at the future or not? If he is able, it must be because, like the result of the coin flip, the future has already been determined. It is waiting there, like the flipped coin, for anyone who can see to know the finished result.

If you do not agree (and I expect that you will not) I think you will need to explain exactly what it is that god looks at in the future, and how he can know anything about it without the fact(s) he observes being determined.

Basically, my point was that since God, Biblically speaking, can know everything, that doesn't explicitly mean we as individuals don't have free will.

It may be the case that this is what the Bible describes, and I'm willing to accept that for now, but my primary focus in this thread is really to decide independently whether or not foreknowledge and free will can co-exist. I realize that I'm the one that asked if it was Biblical or not, and I thank you for your response, but I'm not really going to try to debate that or argue that you're wrong with regard to things in that arena.

{snip}

Unless this is just a mind-stimulating exercise, I don't think this is possible.

If there really exists a god, it is likely impossible, like you suggest. I think that we can still come to some reasonably certain conclusions about certain hypothetical characteristics of hypothetical gods. In other words, we won't ever decide that no gods exist, but we might be able to decide that a god-who-has-infallible-foreknowledge-and-gave-humans-free-will doesn't exist, because it may be that those two characteristics are mutually exclusive. In the same way, we can say with confidence that the god-who-draws-square-circles-and-created-married-bachelors doesn't exist, because this god is logically contradictory.

I don't think we can know if God foreknew whether or not Noah would stay that way for sure, but I would say that God didn't. Let me explain using another Bible account.

With Adam and Eve, he gave them the command to not eat from the tree of knowledge under penalty of death. If he foreknew they'd do it, then that command would be meaningless, pointless, and would be awfully cruel to tell them not to do something that he had full knowledge that they would do.

I'd say that the fact that God set some guidelines out as regards that tree means that he didn't know what they would do, or there wouldn't have been a point to the guidelines. Why lay out guidelines that would serve no purpose? How could anyone justify God's punishment if he "foreknew"?

So I apply this to Noah as God giving humans individual freedom, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

Again, your response is noted and appreciated, and it may become more germane later in the thread, but for now I'm going to try to pursue the more academic side of the subject.

 

[Cerpin Taxt]

I think the use of the prefix "fore" is potentially problematic in and of itself. If one postulates the existence of a deity (or other omniscient being), then why would this deity be constrained by time? Indeed, proposed theories which successfully mathematically unite quantum and relativistic physics have thus far had to invoke additional dimensions which would potentially allow such beings to operate without regard for constraints imposed by time and/or space.

It is my understanding that in at least a few of these multidimensional models, the dimension of time is regarded in the same way as the 3 spatial dimensions, and that the total collection of time coordinates exist simultaneously in the same way that the totality of spatial coordinates exist simultaneously. That is to say, tomorrow and yesterday exist simultaneously in the same way that New York and Los Angeles exist simultaneously. The spatio-temporal relationship between tomorrow and yesterday is fundamentally identical to that of the relationship between New York and Los Angeles. All we can meaningfully say is that each are separated by a space-time interval.

That aside, I don't think omniscience precludes free will. If I put food in my (wife's) cat's timed feeder and it rotates at its scheduled time, he has a choice to continue sleeping or wake up, sprint across the house, and scarf it down. I know he will do the latter but that knowledge doesn't imply he's not making that decision. Knowing the outcome of a choice doesn't imply that the choice need not be made.

This type of "knowledge" is precisely why I asked a bunch of questions about what "knowledge" really means. There is a difference between saying you "know" your cat will conform to a certain habit of his, and saying that you know that the US President is Barack Obama. In reality, what you know is that your cat has exhibited a certain habitual behavior, perhaps very, very reliably. For that reason you are "betting" that he will exhibit this behavior again in the future. You are projecting an observed pattern into the future, but you are not observing it in the same way you did observe the present fact that Barack Obama is the US President.

The more relevant question might be whether a being who is both omnipotent and omniscient can create a being with free will. It seems that creating someone at that level while knowing exactly which choices he will make and what the outcomes of those choices will be creates a closed system devoid of free will by creating someone specifically such that (or, at least, knowing full well that) those choices will be made and what the consequences will be.

I agree with this, with a clarification like SMOGZINN made that "omniscience" doesn't necessarily have to include knowledge of the future, if the future simply doesn't exist or is otherwise unknowable in principle.

 

[Paul98]

There isn't a single "now", what for you is happening "now" is reliant on distance, relative speed, and direction of motion. The only ones that agree on "now" are at rest with respect to each other. The "now" for a planet a million light years away moving quickly towards or away from earth would be far in the future or far in the past compared to what I think of as "now." If to me two events happen at the same time, for someone else moving relative to me those events will happen at different times. Those far way won't know what happened till after it's already happened since it takes time for light to travel from one point to another.

With there being no single "now" shouldn't an all knowing being be able to see all "now's" thus all of time.

 

[OverVolt]

I was actually thinking about this very thing the other day. First, I do have a problem with your thinking on the matter of there being no choice b/c there was no clear understanding of the choice. I think that you are confusing not having a clear understanding of the consequences of the choice as opposed to the understanding that "I am doing what God told me not to do." Consequences are completely irrelevant at this point- the only thing that matters is the choice to obey or disobey which she seemed to understand.

Anyway, my thinking on this is that God could have started over or not created the very first world in place of an instance in which the wrong choice was not made, but then the concept of free will would have lost all meaning in that God would have asserted control upon knowing the outcome and skipped over all possible instances and creating the instance where the sin was not committed.

Does this mean that there could have been an initial instance of creation where man did not sin? Possibly, however in order for there to actually be freewill, God let the first instance go down the way it went down. God did not use "God Mode" in other words.

Yea I think along these same lines. The option to chose is what makes what we do in life meaningful. There is no point in creating a universe where everything is predetermined.

 

[Mursilis]

This type of "knowledge" is precisely why I asked a bunch of questions about what "knowledge" really means. There is a difference between saying you "know" your cat will conform to a certain habit of his, and saying that you know that the US President is Barack Obama. In reality, what you know is that your cat has exhibited a certain habitual behavior, perhaps very, very reliably. For that reason you are "betting" that he will exhibit this behavior again in the future. You are projecting an observed pattern into the future, but you are not observing it in the same way you did observe the present fact that Barack Obama is the US President.

But in a reality governed by observable norms, can't at least some future "facts" be as knowable as present facts? If I were to take a standard baseball in my hand in a standard lab and drop the baseball, and if all variables have been controlled, can't I know, in the same sense I know Obama is president, it's going to fall to the floor, even if that event hasn't happened yet?

 

[SMOGZINN]

But in a reality governed by observable norms, can't at least some future "facts" be as knowable as present facts? If I were to take a standard baseball in my hand in a standard lab and drop the baseball, and if all variables have been controlled, can't I know, in the same sense I know Obama is president, it's going to fall to the floor, even if that event hasn't happened yet?

No. All you know is that it is statistically very probable that the baseball will fall. There is always that infinitesimal chance that something else will happen, like every particle in the baseball will suddenly all line up in a single vector and jump 3 feet to the left leaving it resting on a table.
Sure, the odds are unfathomably against that happening, but the probability is not zero.

 

[SMOGZINN]

There isn't a single "now", what for you is happening "now" is reliant on distance, relative speed, and direction of motion. The only ones that agree on "now" are at rest with respect to each other. The "now" for a planet a million light years away moving quickly towards or away from earth would be far in the future or far in the past compared to what I think of as "now." If to me two events happen at the same time, for someone else moving relative to me those events will happen at different times. Those far way won't know what happened till after it's already happened since it takes time for light to travel from one point to another.

With there being no single "now" shouldn't an all knowing being be able to see all "now's" thus all of time.

I have a fairly good grounding in relativity but I think that for this discussion all we really need to agree on is that no matter what point of view you choose everyone will agree that all the observed things happened in the past. In other words there is no relative point of view that would say that something he observed me doing happened in his future. Furthermore, we will always agree on causality. While we might not agree on when an event happened, we will always agree that a causal chain happened in the right order.

 

[crashtestdummy]

I have a fairly good grounding in relativity but I think that for this discussion all we really need to agree on is that no matter what point of view you choose everyone will agree that all the observed things happened in the past. In other words there is no relative point of view that would say that something he observed me doing happened in his future. Furthermore, we will always agree on causality. While we might not agree on when an event happened, we will always agree that a causal chain happened in the right order.

Your interpretation of relativity is correct, but this starts to break down in a few, very special circumstances. For two entangled particles, their states are indeterminate until measured, but always complementary (either the same or opposite depending on the system). This applies even when you measure the two particles at the same time (i.e. before information could move from one particle to the other at the speed of light).

This was proposed as the EPR paradox, and it requires that either 1) quantum mechanics is incomplete and there is a system of "hidden variables" that pre-determines the particles' states, 2) locality is broken (i.e. information can travel faster than the speed of light), or 3) causality is broken (an effect is not necessarily preceded by its cause). Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen insisted that the first conclusion was the only palatable one.

Bell's inequalities (see the video I posted earlier) provided a framework in which to test this theory. It stated that if you measured multiple different states, there was a difference in the way results in a hidden variable system would correlate from a truly undetermined system. With the exception of some very narrow loopholes, experiments testing this relationship have been shown to be inconsistent with the hidden variable hypothesis. This suggests, then, that we must accept one of the other two possibilities (or some other explanation we haven't yet thought of).

What does that mean? Well, it means that as far as relativity is concerned, we can create two different demonstrations of causality. In other words, if I have an electron-positron radioactive decay, and I measure the spin state along one axis of one of the particles, I then know the state of the other particle before it's been measured (from my POV). However, my friend Bob is also measuring the state of the other particle, and determines the state of mine before it has been measured (from his POV). There are thus two different causal orders as to how the quantum state of the system was determined. Crazy stuff.

 

[Paul98]

I have a fairly good grounding in relativity but I think that for this discussion all we really need to agree on is that no matter what point of view you choose everyone will agree that all the observed things happened in the past. In other words there is no relative point of view that would say that something he observed me doing happened in his future. Furthermore, we will always agree on causality. While we might not agree on when an event happened, we will always agree that a causal chain happened in the right order.

True, there is no problem with that, my point is how does an all knowing being see "now" if there isn't a single "now?" I would think it would work by the all knowing being knowing all of time.

 

[SMOGZINN]

True, there is no problem with that, my point is how does an all knowing being see "now" if there isn't a single "now?" I would think it would work by the all knowing being knowing all of time.

I think that is a inherent problem with an all knowing being. It would be a preferred POV and probably break locality. An omniscient being definitely would require information to travel faster then C.

 

[ThinClient]

My 2 generic replies are the truth.....read what you guys post and how you treat the "opposition" as I am sure you consider those who think differently.

"Angry Atheist" is a very appropriate term......or are you going to try to explain it away.....using logic and science...lolol

You're far more angry than any atheist on this board. Additionally, you don't actually contribute to these conversations. All you do is argue. Your replies amount to basically nothing more than "nuh uh!" and stop there.

 

[Mursilis]

No. All you know is that it is statistically very probable that the baseball will fall. There is always that infinitesimal chance that something else will happen, like every particle in the baseball will suddenly all line up in a single vector and jump 3 feet to the left leaving it resting on a table.
Sure, the odds are unfathomably against that happening, but the probability is not zero.

Fair enough, but using such rigid definitions, is the point of this tread even answerable?

Going back a step, what's your definition of free will, and for the typical person, does it actually exist?

 

[Paul98]

Your interpretation of relativity is correct, but this starts to break down in a few, very special circumstances. For two entangled particles, their states are indeterminate until measured, but always complementary (either the same or opposite depending on the system). This applies even when you measure the two particles at the same time (i.e. before information could move from one particle to the other at the speed of light).

This was proposed as the EPR paradox, and it requires that either 1) quantum mechanics is incomplete and there is a system of "hidden variables" that pre-determines the particles' states, 2) locality is broken (i.e. information can travel faster than the speed of light), or 3) causality is broken (an effect is not necessarily preceded by its cause). Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen insisted that the first conclusion was the only palatable one.

Bell's inequalities (see the video I posted earlier) provided a framework in which to test this theory. It stated that if you measured multiple different states, there was a difference in the way results in a hidden variable system would correlate from a truly undetermined system. With the exception of some very narrow loopholes, experiments testing this relationship have been shown to be inconsistent with the hidden variable hypothesis. This suggests, then, that we must accept one of the other two possibilities (or some other explanation we haven't yet thought of).

What does that mean? Well, it means that as far as relativity is concerned, we can create two different demonstrations of causality. In other words, if I have an electron-positron radioactive decay, and I measure the spin state along one axis of one of the particles, I then know the state of the other particle before it's been measured (from my POV). However, my friend Bob is also measuring the state of the other particle, and determines the state of mine before it has been measured (from his POV). There are thus two different causal orders as to how the quantum state of the system was determined. Crazy stuff.

I don't see this as a problem, it's still consistent. The measurement still gives a random results, we can't set the state of the entangled particle to something we want. Even after the "first" measurement, the other particle is still in superposition until it's measured. Who's to say which is cause and which is effect. We simply know that once both are measured they will be opposite. It doesn't make a difference, the results are the same.

But we are getting a bit off topic now

 

[SMOGZINN]

Fair enough, but using such rigid definitions, is the point of this tread even answerable?

Going back a step, what's your definition of free will, and for the typical person, does it actually exist?

This thread is firmly in the realm of philosophy. We can make arguments based on our own set of premises that come to answers but if we can't really agree on a single set of premises then we all end up with different answers.

That does not mean this thread is useless however. We can still find some agreement on how the different premise assumptions fit together.
If, for example, someone wants to start with a premises set of, 'there is an omniscient God and there is freewill' then we can talk about what else must be true to fit those things together.

 

[crashtestdummy]

I don't see this as a problem, it's still consistent. The measurement still gives a random results, we can't set the state of the entangled particle to something we want. Even after the "first" measurement, the other particle is still in superposition until it's measured. Who's to say which is cause and which is effect. We simply know that once both are measured they will be opposite. It doesn't make a difference, the results are the same.

But we are getting a bit off topic now

The particle's wavefunction (for that variable) effectively collapses when you measure the state of the other one, as there is only only possible outcome. This effect occurs instantaneously across a potentially infinite span of space, meaning that locality is no longer preserved.

"Who's to say which is the cause and which is the effect" is at the foundation of the predictive nature of science. It's like saying "which came first, the ball falling or my hand moving out from under it?" If I can't tell the difference between the two, then I'm missing something big. When you have exceptions to your theory, that's a strong indicator that your theory is fundamentally incomplete.

More on topic, it states that perhaps there is a universal "now", but that, paradoxically, requires that physics has fundamentally different rules at different frames of reference. Relativity really only carries the following assumptions: 1) The speed of light is a universal constant, 2) physics is the same in all frames of reference, and 3) mathematics is fundamentally consistent and (arguably) 4) causality exists. Anything that shows there is a problem with relativity must violate one of these tenants.

There's a reason that Einstein called such ideas "spooky". They tear at the notion of a fundamentally rational universe, where everything obeys a single set of rules.

 

[JEDIYoda]

You're far more angry than any atheist on this board. Additionally, you don't actually contribute to these conversations. All you do is argue. Your replies amount to basically nothing more than "nuh uh!" and stop there.

hahahhaa...yeah right...I see for some reason you have decided not to participate in this discussion.....rofl....tired of getting bit in the ass huh???

Angry atheist is a very appropriate term in reference to some of you...especially those of you whose intentions are to troll and not discuss...
Others honestly want a dialogue and honestly try to understand.....I didn`t say they tried to understand as in are looking for answer, I said as in not being a troll....


Jesus Loves you!!

 

[jhbball]

hahahhaa...yeah right...I see for some reason you have decided not to participate in this discussion.....rofl....tired of getting bit in the ass huh???

Angry atheist is a very appropriate term in reference to some of you...especially those of you whose intentions are to troll and not discuss...
Others honestly want a dialogue and honestly try to understand.....I didn`t say they tried to understand as in are looking for answer, I said as in not being a troll....


Jesus Loves you!!

We're trying to have a dialogue. You're just incredibly defensive about others challenging your beliefs (which I'm guessing were passed down from your parents).

 

[piasabird]

Who uses words like putative? Where did you copy that from?

 

[piasabird]

No such thing as free will. I cant just decide I am rich and poof a giant pile of money appears. Good luck with that. Maybe try logical reasoning.

 

[Cerpin Taxt]

But in a reality governed by observable norms, can't at least some future "facts" be as knowable as present facts? If I were to take a standard baseball in my hand in a standard lab and drop the baseball, and if all variables have been controlled, can't I know, in the same sense I know Obama is president, it's going to fall to the floor, even if that event hasn't happened yet?

I join SMOGZINN with his comments.

In addition, let's revisit some questions I asked earlier in the thread about what knowledge is, or more particularly what knowing is.

To say that a person knows a fact is typically meant to indicate that a person has reasonably direct experience of a particular state of affairs in reality. I know that my car is grey because I have observed it directly. I know that it is daytime because I can see the sunlight outside my window. We even typically grant eachother certain implicit assumptions when making knowledge claims -- for example, I knew that Obama won the presidency because I read in the newspaper, or I saw it on TV (and thus I have assumed that the papers and television reports were truthful with regard to that state of affairs, and I expect you to stipulate that assumption).

In each case, there is an object of the knowledge which exists in reality. I do not "know" literally that Bilbo's sword glows blue when orcs are near. Bilbo and his sword don't exist. I know that there is a popular story where such is described of one of the characters, but that's all.

So when we consider a claim of "knowledge" of some future state of affairs, we must ask ourselves, "what is the object of that alleged knowledge?" Is the future behavior of your trained animal a state of affairs that actually exists? Surely we should say no, it is a state of affairs that is yet to exist. So it cannot be that this is real knowledge.

It is true, however, that probabilities are actual states of affairs that exist in the present. That is to say, we can compute the probabilities of certain future states of affairs and know those in the present, so I'm willing to accept that when you say "I know my dog will chase this ball when I throw it," you are using a casual shorthand instead of saying "I know that the probability my dog will chase this ball is incredibly high with respect to the likelihood that he will not." We must acknowledge that this is not actual knowledge of the future, however.

When we evaluate the idea that a being might have knowledge of the future, we should be very clear about what we're saying. If we say that God knows how the world will end, are we using the same shorthand instead of saying explicitly that God knows that a particular end-of-the-world circumstance is highly probable with respect to other possible futures, or are we saying that God has actually accessed an existent state of affairs in the future and possesses the same kind of certainty that I have when I say I know that the sun is shining?

 

[Cerpin Taxt]

Who uses words like putative? Where did you copy that from?

If you read more books you'd probably have a better vocabulary.