Originally posted by: conjur
Originally posted by: ntdz
Originally posted by: conjur
Hmm...I seem to have missed the part about liberal economic propaganda as well as me agreeing with all 9/11 conspiracies and I definitely never said the reason we went into Iraq was for oil (at least not 100%).
You are a walking economic propaganda machine...
Why? Because I post articles from various sources showing what lies beneath the numbers being published? You always take everything at face value?
😕
And I've seen you state many times the reason we went into Iraq was to provide profit for Halliburton and other defense contractors, which is a line many liberals use. You must've picked it up somewhere...
You forget I was *for* the war on Iraq in the beginning. It wasn't until the fall of 2003 I began doing some research on my own and digging into the PNAC and their stranglehold on US foreign policy. If you'd do the same, you'd see that invading Iraq had nothing to do with WMDs. It was all about establishing a US presence smack-dab in the middle of the Middle East. Also, it was to allow US companies access to Iraqi natural resources (oil being the biggie) and consumers in a way not available before. It was also supposed to secure and stabilize the region so the supply of oil wouldn't be interrupted and to keep the oil markets from going haywire after some supposed terrorist attack.
Doesn't take a rocket scientist to see that's what was under the veil of WMDs and "spreading democracy".
Russian intel had evidence leading up to the war that clearly stated Saddam was planning terrorist attacks on the US and her interests. Selective memory syndrome, common with the sheep on both sides of the political aisle.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060317/ap_...;_ylu=X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNlYwMlJVRPUCUl
In the U.S. government translation of the transcript, which apparently covered a conversation transcribed by the Iraqis, an official identified as "Comrade Husayn" talks to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and other officials about when it would be best to lie to weapons inspectors and U.N. Security Council members and when to be open.
He shows particular concern that outsiders will learn about the importation of material, including some from the U.S., apparently for chemical weapons.
"They have a bigger problem with the chemical program than the biological program," he says. "We have not told them that we used it on Iran, nor have we told them abut the size or kind of chemical weapons that we produced, and we have not told them the truth about the imported material."
He went on to say, "We imported a quantity from America and we imported a quantity from Europe. However, we did not come forth with the quantities."
On the overall question of weapons of mass destruction, he said: "I must say that it is in our best interest not to uncover it, not only in fear of exposing the technology that we have or that we possess or to hide it for future agendas."
The precise date of the conversation was not clear, but clues suggest it came at the end of Rolf Ekeus' leadership of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, which he headed from 1991 to 1997.
The documents show debates among Iraq's senior leadership about U.N. sanctions, inspections and resolutions ? and how to handle the country's economic and military security. They come in an era when U.S. officials now believe that Saddam's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction was diminishing, under pressure from international sanctions.
Although the Bush administration used the weapons programs as the main justification for the 2003 invasion, U.S. arms inspectors ultimately found no concrete evidence that Iraq produced weapons of mass destruction after 1991.
Yet the Iraqis apparently were far from forthcoming about their actions. Another conversation with Saddam from the mid-1990s indicates that officials knew they had problems with the weapons inspectors.
"On the nuclear file, sir, we are saying we disclosed everything? No, we have uncleared problems in the nuclear field, and I believe that they (the inspectors) know some of them," said a man identified as al-Sahhaf, possibly a reference to the former Iraqi diplomat and Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf. "Some teams work, and no one knows some of them."
He then apologized for speaking so clearly. "Everything is over. But, did they know? No, sir, they did not know, not all the methods, not all the means, not all the scientists and not all the places."
He tells Saddam that missing materials and equipment ? for biological and nuclear weapons ? would be a problem in dealing with the U.N. as it crafted resolutions against Iraq. "Really, sir, we must be frank so that the resolution will be straightforward," al-Sahaf said.