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Machine caught changing votes in real time

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And then your vote gets changed immediately after you get that receipt, or once it gets aggregated with everyone in your district and if it's changed you have no idea. "Paper ballot receipts" are the ultimate in a false sense of security. If a machine can "change your vote on the screen" or changes your vote before you cast it, then it can certainly print off a receipt that erroneously shows you voted for Candidate A when you really voted for Candidate B. The "paper receipt" you're getting for your vote isn't like one from a store where you can simply return the physical product you bought and the retailer gives you a refund. Again if that's what you need to give you the warm fuzzies about voting that's fine, but I don't see where it does what you think it does.
That may be true but if there ever is a question paper ballots can be gathered and a statistical analysis can be done to see if the results actually make sense.
 
And then your vote gets changed immediately after you get that receipt, or once it gets aggregated with everyone in your district and if it's changed you have no idea. "Paper ballot receipts" are the ultimate in a false sense of security. If a machine can "change your vote on the screen" or changes your vote before you cast it, then it can certainly print off a receipt that erroneously shows you voted for Candidate A when you really voted for Candidate B. The "paper receipt" you're getting for your vote isn't like one from a store where you can simply return the physical product you bought and the retailer gives you a refund. Again if that's what you need to give you the warm fuzzies about voting that's fine, but I don't see where it does what you think it does.

You're right, as far as it goes. Having a paper receipt is pointless, other than if you're selling your vote. Having an auditable paper trail in the hands of election takers is, however, an excellent safeguard. Hand counting random batches of ballots after they go thru the scanners is, or should be, standard practice. Electronic voting machines are bullshit because paper actually works better, particularly when voters can just mail in their ballots. It's hugely successful here in CO & everywhere it's been implemented.
 
You're right, as far as it goes. Having a paper receipt is pointless, other than if you're selling your vote. Having an auditable paper trail in the hands of election takers is, however, an excellent safeguard. Hand counting random batches of ballots after they go thru the scanners is, or should be, standard practice. Electronic voting machines are bullshit because paper actually works better, particularly when voters can just mail in their ballots. It's hugely successful here in CO & everywhere it's been implemented.

If an auditable record is what you're looking for, then the method for the voter making their selection is immaterial. You can produce an audit trail with someone using a touchscreen just as easily as you can with using paper "fill in the bubble" ballots. It's not like physical ballots are super infallible either, see the "butterfly ballot" and "hanging chads" fiascoes from the 2000 election in Florida. You seem to have learned the wrong lessons from that election and cling to the idea that paper ballots have some magic talismanic power to ward off fraud beyond what they're capable of offering. I have no huge love for electronic voting machines and if you want to use paper ballots that's fine, but saying they're the best (or even only) way of protecting against election fraud is dumb.
 
If an auditable record is what you're looking for, then the method for the voter making their selection is immaterial. You can produce an audit trail with someone using a touchscreen just as easily as you can with using paper "fill in the bubble" ballots. It's not like physical ballots are super infallible either, see the "butterfly ballot" and "hanging chads" fiascoes from the 2000 election in Florida. You seem to have learned the wrong lessons from that election and cling to the idea that paper ballots have some magic talismanic power to ward off fraud beyond what they're capable of offering. I have no huge love for electronic voting machines and if you want to use paper ballots that's fine, but saying they're the best (or even only) way of protecting against election fraud is dumb.

Yeah, I’d like to see some general guidelines as to what a paper ballot should look like as in:

Recommended font & spacing
Recommended total size of the ballot
Recommended formats for boxes, bubbles, lines or arrows to fill in
Recommended paper stock

Nuts and bolts type stuff, sometimes it feels like some State dude gets fascinated with a new high tech or seemingly elegant solution and that solution sucks, now all the funds are gone to get a better solution.
 
If an auditable record is what you're looking for, then the method for the voter making their selection is immaterial. You can produce an audit trail with someone using a touchscreen just as easily as you can with using paper "fill in the bubble" ballots. It's not like physical ballots are super infallible either, see the "butterfly ballot" and "hanging chads" fiascoes from the 2000 election in Florida. You seem to have learned the wrong lessons from that election and cling to the idea that paper ballots have some magic talismanic power to ward off fraud beyond what they're capable of offering. I have no huge love for electronic voting machines and if you want to use paper ballots that's fine, but saying they're the best (or even only) way of protecting against election fraud is dumb.
The benefit of a paper ballot is that there is an original, reviewable record. Just because there have been poor implementations of paper ballots in the past does not mean the problem is inherent to paper ballots, but rather that it was simply a poor implementation. And how is it dumb to say that paper ballots are the best way to protect against election fraud when experts agree it is the best way to protect against election fraud.

https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2018/...n-in-person-voting-machines-and-vote-by-mail/
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/us/election-security-expert-panel.html
 
The benefit of a paper ballot is that there is an original, reviewable record. Just because there have been poor implementations of paper ballots in the past does not mean the problem is inherent to paper ballots, but rather that it was simply a poor implementation. And how is it dumb to say that paper ballots are the best way to protect against election fraud when experts agree it is the best way to protect against election fraud.

https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2018/...n-in-person-voting-machines-and-vote-by-mail/
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/us/election-security-expert-panel.html

I'd much rather we move forward to a blockchain based capture system with multifactor authentication with physical token for identification and complete transparency for both sides in perpetuity. The idea of using pieces of paper in the 21st century is the 19th century's backasswards way to make elections "secure."
 
I'd much rather we move forward to a blockchain based capture system with multifactor authentication with physical token for identification and complete transparency for both sides in perpetuity. The idea of using pieces of paper in the 21st century is the 19th century's backasswards way to make elections "secure."
Yeah, I'll take your word for that over that of experts in the field.
 
I'd much rather we move forward to a blockchain based capture system with multifactor authentication with physical token for identification and complete transparency for both sides in perpetuity. The idea of using pieces of paper in the 21st century is the 19th century's backasswards way to make elections "secure."

It's happening sooner than you think...just not in this country. You'll probably see it first in Europe or certain developing countries that implement vote by phone.

https://followmyvote.com/blockchain-voting-the-end-to-end-process/

Also, it's not the panacea for election security we hope it will be.

https://www.coindesk.com/moscow-blockchain-voting-system-completely-insecure-says-researcher
 
I'd much rather we move forward to a blockchain based capture system with multifactor authentication with physical token for identification and complete transparency for both sides in perpetuity. The idea of using pieces of paper in the 21st century is the 19th century's backasswards way to make elections "secure."

Mail in paper ballots make for an extremely robust system. They're also something people can believe in. That last part is extremely important. It must not only be honest but must also appear to be so. If you think most attendees at Trump's rallies understood a single word that you said then you need to reconsider.
 
Voting verification is literally a perfect use-case for a transparent blockchain.
Well, many security experts disagree, including the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Perhaps one day, but the technology needs to prove itself and gain public trust before it should be implemented in something as significant as voting on a national scale. Rejecting a paper ballot simply because it is old is ridiculous.
 
And then your vote gets changed immediately after you get that receipt, or once it gets aggregated with everyone in your district and if it's changed you have no idea. "Paper ballot receipts" are the ultimate in a false sense of security. If a machine can "change your vote on the screen" or changes your vote before you cast it, then it can certainly print off a receipt that erroneously shows you voted for Candidate A when you really voted for Candidate B. The "paper receipt" you're getting for your vote isn't like one from a store where you can simply return the physical product you bought and the retailer gives you a refund. Again if that's what you need to give you the warm fuzzies about voting that's fine, but I don't see where it does what you think it does.
Gotta love your snowflakism. 😛 Anything to prevent a recordable record of an official event. Do you belong to the relect Trump 2020 campaign?😱😛
 
Well, many security experts disagree, including the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Perhaps one day, but the technology needs to prove itself and gain public trust before it should be implemented in something as significant as voting on a national scale. Rejecting a paper ballot simply because it is old is ridiculous.
The technology is proven, literally mathematically. Now the implementation is the tricky part. Note that I'm not saying 'use bitcoin', just a blockchain implementation where the US Gov controls the chain, but is completely transparent. That's exactly what people want for voting.

I never said reject paper ballots because they are old, I just personally think blockchain is better conceptually. I also think digital voting is madness, but I work in IT and I know how shit everything is. I really would rather just have a paper count than digital.
 
Would a calibration check screen before voting be too complicated? Touchscreens will fall out of calibration at some point. Run a calibration check before they vote. If it fails. Error them to a poll worker.
...or use a capacitive touch panel instead of the resistive type.
 
That machine took 18 votes and was removed from service.

I do agree touch screen voting is stupid. Far too many vulnerabilities and far to complex of a machine that is needed for the task.
All machines should have some sort of paper backup, IMO all machines should be some kind of scanner that reads a simple to read printed ballot, the type of ballot that says fill in the line or fill in the bubble.

We use cardboard ballot. Use Sharpie to complete arrow, put it in sleeve. Take it to scanner, feed to scanner face down, it gets scanned, tabulated and the ballot drops into box is kept for audit. Pretty simple and not all that expensive. Even if all the scanners go down at a polling station you can count manually. In place since 1990 I think.
 
We use cardboard ballot. Use Sharpie to complete arrow, put it in sleeve. Take it to scanner, feed to scanner face down, it gets scanned, tabulated and the ballot drops into box is kept for audit. Pretty simple and not all that expensive. Even if all the scanners go down at a polling station you can count manually. In place since 1990 I think.

Pretty much what happens in State except not a sharpie but a felt pen type thing.
Real heavy stock paper
 
I bet a bunch of voter ID laws and closing polling sites would fix this no problem.

Can't have your vote changed if you can't vote.

You're right, as far as it goes. Having a paper receipt is pointless, other than if you're selling your vote. Having an auditable paper trail in the hands of election takers is, however, an excellent safeguard. Hand counting random batches of ballots after they go thru the scanners is, or should be, standard practice. Electronic voting machines are bullshit because paper actually works better, particularly when voters can just mail in their ballots. It's hugely successful here in CO & everywhere it's been implemented.

I feel like you and I pop up in most of these threads saying how great it is. Works pretty well here in Oregon. Not sure why more states aren't doing it.
 
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