Well, put me on that list of those opposed to the war before it began. I argued here that:
Sadaam was efectively contained by no-fly zones, sanctions, and weapons inspectors.
And while not beeing privy to government intel, it seemed obvious that the mantra of "we know he has them and we know where" was pure BS. As soon as the inspectors had unfettered access GWB could have told them where to look and for what. Even a dim bulb would have seen the value in displaying actual weapons to the world to cement his case. Instead, as soon as they had all the access they needed, GWB announced a war, ending their search. It seemed quite clear that his knowledge of WMD was not a sure thing.
I also questioned the "imminent threat" angle as well. The very use of the drone program in Iraq as an example indicated that they were grasping at straws to make the case.
The first Gulf War brought several Arab nations in with us because they saw a threat. The second time around, it did not appear that saw any threat. It would seem that detecting and countering any threat from Iraq would be of great national interest to these countries. They had a great pool of Arab personel who could operate in Iraq to gather information while we did not. Yet, they did not seem to share our concern.
The "greeted as liberators" and "flowers in the streets" lines seemed to be a fairy tale to me in light of previously demonstrated attitudes about the U.S. in the M.E..
I still feel that a policy of pre-emptive war (as opposed to a pre-emptive strike on a known target) is a terrible idea. It paints us as less moral, law abiding, and predictable than ever before. When other countries follow our example, it will come back to bite us on the ass.
So, no, I didn't have any special intel. I am not an expert on the M.E.. But I took the available imformation, ran it through a common sense filter, and reached the above conclusions before the war. And I expressed those views here and elsewhere at the time.
