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LegendKiller

Lifer
Mar 5, 2001
18,256
68
86
Originally posted by: Skoorb
Good Lord, you are truly the most patronizing person on Anandtech. How's the bailout and it being a "boon for the world" working out? You are constantly pwned and yet constantly tell others they don't know sh*t, you are a legend, minus the killer bit.

Is there a trophy or something we can give this guy?[/quote]

The bailout did what it was meant to do, bolster the banks. The system didn't utterly collapse after Lehman fell and, in many areas, has recovered. ABCP spreads have come down significantly, conduit programs have been rolling (rather than largely contracting).

Our measurements of success are different, largely because you have no insight into what was happening in the market and what is happening now.
 

StageLeft

No Lifer
Sep 29, 2000
70,150
5
0
Originally posted by: LegendKiller
Our measurements of success are different, largely because you have no insight into what was happening in the market and what is happening now.
Hence the learning bit; I think it's simply shameful that you do what is really amounting to telling lay people they are too stupid to understand this so don't bother, somebody else will fvck it up--er, sorry Freudian slip--figure it out for them.

 

LegendKiller

Lifer
Mar 5, 2001
18,256
68
86
Originally posted by: Skoorb
Originally posted by: LegendKiller
Our measurements of success are different, largely because you have no insight into what was happening in the market and what is happening now.
Hence the learning bit; I think it's simply shameful that you do what is really amounting to telling lay people they are too stupid to understand this so don't bother, somebody else will fvck it up--er, sorry Freudian slip--figure it out for them.

That's because while many lay people will ask questions and learn, you make statements and refuse to listen. There is a fundamental difference there.
 

StageLeft

No Lifer
Sep 29, 2000
70,150
5
0
Originally posted by: LegendKiller
Originally posted by: Skoorb
Originally posted by: LegendKiller
Our measurements of success are different, largely because you have no insight into what was happening in the market and what is happening now.
Hence the learning bit; I think it's simply shameful that you do what is really amounting to telling lay people they are too stupid to understand this so don't bother, somebody else will fvck it up--er, sorry Freudian slip--figure it out for them.

That's because while many lay people will ask questions and learn, you make statements and refuse to listen. There is a fundamental difference there.
Says the guy who on 3/4 refutes the head of the FDIC and then two days later is mysteriously missing from the thread where legislation is pushed to give the FDIC access to $500B more. Just helping to clear up some of your BS before people in this thread take it too seriously. I will let you carry on and not hijack it further. Sorry, Lord Segan :eek:
 

halik

Lifer
Oct 10, 2000
25,696
1
0
You should pick up a copy of "Manias, Panics and Crashes : A history of Financial Crises" by Kindelberger and Aliber, you'll get a historical perspective on what happened and how it's not that different than all the other crisis.

Also it's much more informative than drive like How Wall Street Caused the Mortgage and Credit Crisis or anything by Huffington.
 
D

Deleted member 4644

I would be interested in hearing a bit more about the practical side of things, LegendKiller.
 

LegendKiller

Lifer
Mar 5, 2001
18,256
68
86
Originally posted by: Skoorb
Says the guy who on 3/4 refutes the head of the FDIC and then two days later is mysteriously missing from the thread where legislation is pushed to give the FDIC access to $500B more. Just helping to clear up some of your BS before people in this thread take it too seriously. I will let you carry on and not hijack it further. Sorry, Lord Segan :eek:

lol. I didn't refute anything, I merely provided the clarification. You guys are making it seem like she said it WILL fail, when, in fact, it MIGHT fail. Right now FDIC has barely had to dip into their reserves. Planning for contingencies is never a bad thing.

Ohhh no, I didn't get to post in every thread. Gosh, I didn't know that I was a slave to the forums...

Quoting fixed.
 

Dari

Lifer
Oct 25, 2002
17,133
38
91
Originally posted by: LegendKiller
Originally posted by: Skoorb
That's because while many lay people will ask questions and learn, you make statements and refuse to listen. There is a fundamental difference there.
Says the guy who on 3/4 refutes the head of the FDIC and then two days later is mysteriously missing from the thread where legislation is pushed to give the FDIC access to $500B more. Just helping to clear up some of your BS before people in this thread take it too seriously. I will let you carry on and not hijack it further. Sorry, Lord Segan :eek:

lol. I didn't refute anything, I merely provided the clarification. You guys are making it seem like she said it WILL fail, when, in fact, it MIGHT fail. Right now FDIC has barely had to dip into their reserves. Planning for contingencies is never a bad thing.

Ohhh no, I didn't get to post in every thread. Gosh, I didn't know that I was a slave to the forums...[/quote]

Nevermind, the nested quotes are really fucked up here.
 

LegendKiller

Lifer
Mar 5, 2001
18,256
68
86
Originally posted by: Deleted member 4644
So first the transferor deposits the assets into an SPE. This is the first sale and meant to be a true sale. As per paragraph 83(a) of FAS140 the first transfer of interest to a special-purpose entity is designed to be a true sale. The transfered assets are likely to be judged beyond the reach of the transferor or its creditors even in a bankruptcy.

Then it sounds like that SPE then transfers the assets to another entity that allows an increased amount of credit protection. This level of protection does not allow for a true sale (hence why you did not want to have the first transferor directly linked to this stage). The protection is provided by retaining a junior beneficial interest which I assume means that the creditors could reach the holder of that interest.

This second stage is done to get the high rating so that it is actually investment grade (or something close) and can attract third parties.

Can this be elimited? As for the changes, I assume you are referring to "Qualifying Special-Purpose Entities and Isolation of Transferred Assets" amendments to FAS140.. which states "This proposed Statement would prohibit an entity from being a qualifying special-purpose entity (SPE) if it enters into an agreement that obligates a transferor, its affiliates, or its agents to deliver additional cash or other assets to fulfill the SPE's obligations to beneficial interest holders"..



and further "Finally, this proposed Statement also would: a. Require that a two-step transfer used to achieve legal isolation from transferred assets involve a qualifying SPE as the second step if the result of the transfer is issuance of"...

So I would think no, the two steps cant be eliminated.

The second step can actually be removed, there was a law passed in Delaware (IIRC), that allows for the elimination of the 2nd step. While the true-sale can fail on the 2nd step (considering the credit enhancement is provided by the 2nd step), it has never been successfully challenged.

FAS140: "The Board understands that the "two-step" securitizations described above, taken as a whole, generally would be judged under present U.S. law as having isolated the assets beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other receivership."

^^ The above is damn important.

The most important part of FAS140 is Paragraph 9b, which is the actual qualifications for the QSPE. Most importantly is separate existence. However, other factors include the ROAPs provisions, which further isolates the assets in ensuring that the Seller/Transferor does not have a call on the assets. Essentially, assets can only be "put" back to the Seller/Transferor upon the actions of a 3rd party (delinquency, default) or, upon the realization of a breach of Representation and Warranty in the Servicing and Selling documents (false conveyance, secured chattle paper having incorrect secured priority due to UCC-1 filing problems...etc).

This is the heart of the current problem. If Servicer/Sellers modify mortgages too much it could be seen as a violation of the ROAPs provisions, especially if the S/S benefits from that modification (which they technically would if they hold the equity tranche or get a servicing right). However, current opinions are that the ultimate benefactors of the modifications would be the ultimate benefactors of the trust, the bondholders.

As for asset recognition.. Well Assets are benefits that are controlled by an entity, that have arisen from a past event, and future economic benefits are expected to flow. Assets should be recognized, according to the AASB Framework, when it is probable that future economic benefits will flow to the entity, and the asset has a cost or value that can be measured reliably.

FAS140: Derecognition of transferred assets is appropriate only if the available evidence provides reasonable assurance that the transferred assets would be beyond the reach of the powers of a bankruptcy trustee or other receiver for the transferor or any consolidated affiliate of the transferor that is not a special-purpose corporation or other entity designed to make remote the possibility that it would enter bankruptcy or other receivership (paragraph 83(c))."

FAS140 attempts to separate out the pieces of the pie. Each person who has a benefit of a piece of pie must recognize that piece. The common pieces of the pie are the Servicing asset, the Equity tranche (enhancement), the Interest Only strip, and the actual bonds themselves. The Equity tranche and the IO strip could technically be considered on and the same, but if they are separated by purchaser of each distinct piece, then they must be recognized separately.

Naturally, the problem with this situation is that the remaining pieces are subject to modeling risk which are highly assumptive. The equity tranche had to be rated by the Rating Agencies and have a certain amount of capital held against them. However, what if the enhancement levels are wrong?

The IO strip is usually present-valued based upon many assumptions (excess spread, prepayments, term, losses, delinquencies...etc), thus, it can go up or down in value dramatically. This is one huge reason why many companies get addicted to the FAS140 crack.

They can make "loose" assumptions of the IO strip for Gain on Sale (GOS) purposes initially. They take a huge revenue recognition up-front. However, over time, as the assumptions start to unwind (current situation), they try to play "catch up", thus they issue more and more GOS securitizations, recognizing more revenue. This crack addict experience is actually pretty common among large companies who securitize assets.

However, when the music stops you have a bigger problem than you initially started with.

The Servicing Right also introduces problems in the current environment. Since there are more troubled assets you spend more to service them.

So if you have the wrong type of transfer (no reasonable assurance that the assets are beyond reach), and still hold a beneficial interest, your risk profile is extremely high?

Correct. If you transfer the assets incorrectly (invalidating the true-sale), you place the assets within reach of creditors. If your QSPE doesn't follow all of 9b, or you violate other areas (9a or 9c) you can invalidate the sale treatment and bring them back on BS (which doesn't mean that you are completely as risk of consolidation for legal/creditor purposes).

Maintenance of the true sale is very important.


In further reading, I found that retained interests normally have a different risk profile compared to assets transferred in securitization.


Correct, the remaining BI is pretty risky as it is usually the first-loss piece.
And I have no idea how you estimate the residual piece, but I assume it has something to do with CDO2 ? As for the servicing rights.. can't they be sold to anyone?

CDO^2 is something that they use to de-recognize the first loss piece (equity tranche and(sometimes) the IO strip)

On a side note, I found literature that states that FAS140 requires that any derivative "pertain" to third-party beneficial interest holders. What does that mean?

The question of derivatives is an interesting one. Many trusts will utilize interest rate swaps to mitigate fixed-rate assets causing interest rate exposure when the bonds are floating rate. If the swap if for the benefit of the trust it is OK. However, considering that the Servicer/Seller still has benefit of the IO strip, they can also benefit from the swap. The determination is where the swap is in the waterfall of the documents. If it is at the top, then it's usually construed as being for the benefit of the bondholders. If it is towards the bottom of the waterfall, particularily after the interest on the bonds is paid, it can be considered to benefit the Servicer/Seller and could violate FAS140 treatment.

Please be a bit more specific about capital implications.

The main benefit to FAS140 treatment is consideration of assets off of a bank's balance sheet. If all assets are recognized, capital must be held against ALL assets. Banks have targeted reserve amounts, different risk categories of assets will have different treatment. A AAA asset, according to BASEL II, will have a 7% Risk-Weighted-Asset consideration if it is a senior tranche. Capital must be held against that, determined by the target capital ratio, if it is, say, 10%, then you have to hold .7% of capital against the position (7%*10%).

As you can see, if you can de-recognize the assets, the less capital you have to hold (and more another entity has to hold).

Additionally, assets have loss provisions set aside to account for defaults. The bank doesn't have to hold any reserves for those potential defaults if they get it off-bs.

Thus, a S/S only has to hold capital for the retained BI, usually the equity tranche. They went one step further by CDO'ing out those pieces, further limiting their capital requirements.

And as for an SPE vs a QSPE, I think the most impt difference is that a QSPE can't hold equities, enter into a derivative transaction with a transferor, or an agreement that commits the transferor to deliver cash or other assets to the QSPE or any beneficial interest holders. (Servicing advances are OK).

It isn't just that they can't hold equities. They can't hold almost anything. They can only hold homes, cars, or other non-financial instruments for a short period of time for foreclosure and sale. Otherwise the maintenance, insurance, and other "active" points they have to do to maintain those assets, performed by the Servicer/Seller, could violate the "brain dead" aspect of the QSPE. That is of utmost importance, the QSPE cannot be any type of "real" corporation, it has to be completely inert.

You see now why I consider FAS140 to be a huge piece of the current problem. It doesn't put recognition of the assets into the hands of really anybody, it shuffles the hot potato. It encourages riskier loan origination (to get more GOS). It hides actual potential losses. It undermines capital positions.

This is why reading a book, or a regulation, isn't enough. You have to live, breath, work this stuff to understand the full implications of such policies. Most importantly, you have to be honest with yourself and your morals to understand the problems with what may or may not be happening. That can only be found in actual first-hand experience in working in the field.

It is one reason why most books on these subjects fail, they aren't written by people who really understand the situation. It's also one reason why I have been considering writing a book on this stuff.
 
D

Deleted member 4644

Originally posted by: LegendKiller
Originally posted by: Deleted member 4644
So first the transferor deposits the assets into an SPE. This is the first sale and meant to be a true sale. As per paragraph 83(a) of FAS140 the first transfer of interest to a special-purpose entity is designed to be a true sale. The transfered assets are likely to be judged beyond the reach of the transferor or its creditors even in a bankruptcy.

Then it sounds like that SPE then transfers the assets to another entity that allows an increased amount of credit protection. This level of protection does not allow for a true sale (hence why you did not want to have the first transferor directly linked to this stage). The protection is provided by retaining a junior beneficial interest which I assume means that the creditors could reach the holder of that interest.

This second stage is done to get the high rating so that it is actually investment grade (or something close) and can attract third parties.

Can this be elimited? As for the changes, I assume you are referring to "Qualifying Special-Purpose Entities and Isolation of Transferred Assets" amendments to FAS140.. which states "This proposed Statement would prohibit an entity from being a qualifying special-purpose entity (SPE) if it enters into an agreement that obligates a transferor, its affiliates, or its agents to deliver additional cash or other assets to fulfill the SPE's obligations to beneficial interest holders"..



and further "Finally, this proposed Statement also would: a. Require that a two-step transfer used to achieve legal isolation from transferred assets involve a qualifying SPE as the second step if the result of the transfer is issuance of"...

So I would think no, the two steps cant be eliminated.

The second step can actually be removed, there was a law passed in Delaware (IIRC), that allows for the elimination of the 2nd step. While the true-sale can fail on the 2nd step (considering the credit enhancement is provided by the 2nd step), it has never been successfully challenged.

FAS140: "The Board understands that the "two-step" securitizations described above, taken as a whole, generally would be judged under present U.S. law as having isolated the assets beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other receivership."

^^ The above is damn important.

The most important part of FAS140 is Paragraph 9b, which is the actual qualifications for the QSPE. Most importantly is separate existence. However, other factors include the ROAPs provisions, which further isolates the assets in ensuring that the Seller/Transferor does not have a call on the assets. Essentially, assets can only be "put" back to the Seller/Transferor upon the actions of a 3rd party (delinquency, default) or, upon the realization of a breach of Representation and Warranty in the Servicing and Selling documents (false conveyance, secured chattle paper having incorrect secured priority due to UCC-1 filing problems...etc).

This is the heart of the current problem. If Servicer/Sellers modify mortgages too much it could be seen as a violation of the ROAPs provisions, especially if the S/S benefits from that modification (which they technically would if they hold the equity tranche or get a servicing right). However, current opinions are that the ultimate benefactors of the modifications would be the ultimate benefactors of the trust, the bondholders.

As for asset recognition.. Well Assets are benefits that are controlled by an entity, that have arisen from a past event, and future economic benefits are expected to flow. Assets should be recognized, according to the AASB Framework, when it is probable that future economic benefits will flow to the entity, and the asset has a cost or value that can be measured reliably.

FAS140: Derecognition of transferred assets is appropriate only if the available evidence provides reasonable assurance that the transferred assets would be beyond the reach of the powers of a bankruptcy trustee or other receiver for the transferor or any consolidated affiliate of the transferor that is not a special-purpose corporation or other entity designed to make remote the possibility that it would enter bankruptcy or other receivership (paragraph 83(c))."

FAS140 attempts to separate out the pieces of the pie. Each person who has a benefit of a piece of pie must recognize that piece. The common pieces of the pie are the Servicing asset, the Equity tranche (enhancement), the Interest Only strip, and the actual bonds themselves. The Equity tranche and the IO strip could technically be considered on and the same, but if they are separated by purchaser of each distinct piece, then they must be recognized separately.

Naturally, the problem with this situation is that the remaining pieces are subject to modeling risk which are highly assumptive. The equity tranche had to be rated by the Rating Agencies and have a certain amount of capital held against them. However, what if the enhancement levels are wrong?

The IO strip is usually present-valued based upon many assumptions (excess spread, prepayments, term, losses, delinquencies...etc), thus, it can go up or down in value dramatically. This is one huge reason why many companies get addicted to the FAS140 crack.

They can make "loose" assumptions of the IO strip for Gain on Sale (GOS) purposes initially. They take a huge revenue recognition up-front. However, over time, as the assumptions start to unwind (current situation), they try to play "catch up", thus they issue more and more GOS securitizations, recognizing more revenue. This crack addict experience is actually pretty common among large companies who securitize assets.

However, when the music stops you have a bigger problem than you initially started with.

The Servicing Right also introduces problems in the current environment. Since there are more troubled assets you spend more to service them.

So if you have the wrong type of transfer (no reasonable assurance that the assets are beyond reach), and still hold a beneficial interest, your risk profile is extremely high?

Correct. If you transfer the assets incorrectly (invalidating the true-sale), you place the assets within reach of creditors. If your QSPE doesn't follow all of 9b, or you violate other areas (9a or 9c) you can invalidate the sale treatment and bring them back on BS (which doesn't mean that you are completely as risk of consolidation for legal/creditor purposes).

Maintenance of the true sale is very important.


In further reading, I found that retained interests normally have a different risk profile compared to assets transferred in securitization.


Correct, the remaining BI is pretty risky as it is usually the first-loss piece.
And I have no idea how you estimate the residual piece, but I assume it has something to do with CDO2 ? As for the servicing rights.. can't they be sold to anyone?

CDO^2 is something that they use to de-recognize the first loss piece (equity tranche and(sometimes) the IO strip)

On a side note, I found literature that states that FAS140 requires that any derivative "pertain" to third-party beneficial interest holders. What does that mean?

The question of derivatives is an interesting one. Many trusts will utilize interest rate swaps to mitigate fixed-rate assets causing interest rate exposure when the bonds are floating rate. If the swap if for the benefit of the trust it is OK. However, considering that the Servicer/Seller still has benefit of the IO strip, they can also benefit from the swap. The determination is where the swap is in the waterfall of the documents. If it is at the top, then it's usually construed as being for the benefit of the bondholders. If it is towards the bottom of the waterfall, particularily after the interest on the bonds is paid, it can be considered to benefit the Servicer/Seller and could violate FAS140 treatment.

Please be a bit more specific about capital implications.

The main benefit to FAS140 treatment is consideration of assets off of a bank's balance sheet. If all assets are recognized, capital must be held against ALL assets. Banks have targeted reserve amounts, different risk categories of assets will have different treatment. A AAA asset, according to BASEL II, will have a 7% Risk-Weighted-Asset consideration if it is a senior tranche. Capital must be held against that, determined by the target capital ratio, if it is, say, 10%, then you have to hold .7% of capital against the position (7%*10%).

As you can see, if you can de-recognize the assets, the less capital you have to hold (and more another entity has to hold).

Additionally, assets have loss provisions set aside to account for defaults. The bank doesn't have to hold any reserves for those potential defaults if they get it off-bs.

Thus, a S/S only has to hold capital for the retained BI, usually the equity tranche. They went one step further by CDO'ing out those pieces, further limiting their capital requirements.

And as for an SPE vs a QSPE, I think the most impt difference is that a QSPE can't hold equities, enter into a derivative transaction with a transferor, or an agreement that commits the transferor to deliver cash or other assets to the QSPE or any beneficial interest holders. (Servicing advances are OK).

It isn't just that they can't hold equities. They can't hold almost anything. They can only hold homes, cars, or other non-financial instruments for a short period of time for foreclosure and sale. Otherwise the maintenance, insurance, and other "active" points they have to do to maintain those assets, performed by the Servicer/Seller, could violate the "brain dead" aspect of the QSPE. That is of utmost importance, the QSPE cannot be any type of "real" corporation, it has to be completely inert.

You see now why I consider FAS140 to be a huge piece of the current problem. It doesn't put recognition of the assets into the hands of really anybody, it shuffles the hot potato. It encourages riskier loan origination (to get more GOS). It hides actual potential losses. It undermines capital positions.

This is why reading a book, or a regulation, isn't enough. You have to live, breath, work this stuff to understand the full implications of such policies. Most importantly, you have to be honest with yourself and your morals to understand the problems with what may or may not be happening. That can only be found in actual first-hand experience in working in the field.

It is one reason why most books on these subjects fail, they aren't written by people who really understand the situation. It's also one reason why I have been considering writing a book on this stuff.


Thanks for the lengthy response! Writing a book would be great! I hope you do it.
 

The-Noid

Diamond Member
Nov 16, 2005
3,117
4
76
Anything by Wiley is usually pretty good. You realize the majority of this stuff is written at a high level and is used as Master's work, you more than likely will not get a background into any of the information unless you work in the industry or are actively seeking education in the area.

Fabozzi does a great job explaining credit and analysis of credit here: http://www.amazon.com/Fixed-In...qid=1236545041&sr=8-18

Derivatives explanation is good in this book:
http://www.amazon.com/Analysis...&qid=1236545094&sr=8-1

Anything written for the CFA program is pretty unbiased and written by an institute that has a worldwide connection in providing efficient security markets.
 

wwswimming

Banned
Jan 21, 2006
3,695
1
0
it took me about a year to understand, after asking people to explain it over and over.

one financial industry journalist & money manager that's been very helpful - John Mauldin. Mauldin manages money
for people that have lots of it, and has been for about 30, maybe 40 years. to get his reports you sign up at
http://www.investorsinsight.com/

another good resource is Satyajit Das, one of the mathematicians that helped create credit derivatives in the first place. he also wrote some of the textbooks on which the industry was originally based
http://www.amazon.com/s?ie=UTF...=Satyajit%20Das&page=1

one other journalist that has a good grip on how derivatives factor into the overall economy is Karl Denninger
http://market-ticker.denninger.net/

and finally, Chris Martenson has a 20-part video course that explains how money is created & how that relates to economic growth & the availability of cheap energy
http://www.chrismartenson.com/
 

Thump553

Lifer
Jun 2, 2000
12,837
2,622
136
Can anyone reccommend a good book on CDS and/or the current state of regulation on Wall Street? I'm interested in learning more, can handle moderately technical books (I have a BA in Economics but got it a four function calculator (add, subtract, multiple, divide) cost $100+ and was literally cutting edge.
 

Craig234

Lifer
May 1, 2006
38,548
350
126
Originally posted by: Thump553
Can anyone reccommend a good book on CDS and/or the current state of regulation on Wall Street? I'm interested in learning more, can handle moderately technical books (I have a BA in Economics but got it a four function calculator (add, subtract, multiple, divide) cost $100+ and was literally cutting edge.

I'm unaware of really good ones yet, though they might be out there. For now, I'd say you can find good info on some tv shows - interviews like Bill Moyers, or some 60 Minutes.
 

wwswimming

Banned
Jan 21, 2006
3,695
1
0
Originally posted by: Thump553
Can anyone reccommend a good book on CDS

already answered.


and/or the current state of regulation on Wall Street?

A. the example of NY Gov. Eliot Spitzer. a week after his call for more regulation of the financial services industry, he had his call-girl-disclosure experience.

safe to say, he's not the only DCer using the services of call girls. why did Spitzer get called out ?

American corporations do not like whistleblowers who interfere with the Crime du Jour.

B. Bernie Madoff is recently retired former SEC chairman.

those 2 pieces should provide a clue. but to make it clear -
there is no regulation. i'd put it in caps, but i don't feel like shouting.

for those who are old enough to have witnessed both of those incidents (Spitzer & Madoff) in the news, if you haven't made the connection, there's a reason. it's difficult to admit that organized crime in American corporations (and government) is as widespread as it is.

Karl Denninger at Market Ticker had a great editorial on it. can't find it right now. basically saying the problem is not underwater mortgages, or any other particular shenanigan, it's the lack of living politicians who have the courage to prosecute fraud in the financial services industry.

http://market-ticker.denninger.net/

if you want to understand the credit crisis, you have to understand the spread of organized crime from "Goodfella status" to American corporate boardrooms.
 

halik

Lifer
Oct 10, 2000
25,696
1
0
Originally posted by: K3N
There is a book written in 1999 called "Surviving The Cataclysm: Your Guide To The Worst Financial Crisis In Human History". The author ,Webster Tarpley, this month, released the 2nd edition.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-dSrnmutaE

Sensationalist Title ...check
Re-release book, because he was dead wrong last time ... check
You tube educational video ... check

Let me guess, some sort of ron paul tinfoil hattery?

Edit: BINGO! Not only ron paul, but the dude is a 9/11 conspiracy tinfoiler. Amazing!
Also the man got a bachelors in English and an MA in Humanities... ultimate authority on anything Finance related.
 

StageLeft

No Lifer
Sep 29, 2000
70,150
5
0
If you want to know what is going on, all you need are the right sources and 30 minutes.
Dead right, but the question is which are those sources and does everybody agree? :)
Sensationalist Title ...check
Re-release book, because he was dead wrong last time ... check
You tube educational video ... check
Hehe