Just how advanced was the space shuttle?

[beer]

From the outside, it does not seem that complicated. The airframe, propulsion and electronics all seem fairly basic.

But as any engineer knows, looks can be extraordinarily deceiving. So I was wondering today, just how much research and money went into the shuttle? And is it as advanced as some people make it out to be?

And, assuming there was funding, how difficult would it be to fund a replacement, and how much more advanced would it be?

 

[BigNeko]

I know it would be able to lift a lot more if they had built the cargo variant, which would be fully automated without crew. Some might say it could not land then, but NASA has remote-operator landed commercial size jets in tests years ago.

 

[The Dancing Peacock]

at one point, wasn't it the most complex thing ever built, maybe it still is?

I'm not crazy, here: http://home.teleport.com/~stff/shuttle.htm

 

[Hayabusa Rider]

You only want something like this to be as complicated as in necessary

Keep

It

Simple

Stupid

KISS- the engineers acronym.

In general, the more complicated a piece of equipment is, the more likely it will fail, simply because there is more to go wrong. You may want advanced materials in the hatch, but the hatch itself should not be like that in Mystery Science Theater 3000

A replacement cost? As Card Sagan used to say "Billions and billions" How "advanced"? It would not look a lot different from the outside, but there would be changes under the hood.

 

[Ausm]

Originally posted by: The Dancing Peacock
at one point, wasn't it the most complex thing ever built, maybe it still is? I'm not crazy, here: http://home.teleport.com/~stff/shuttle.htm

Your're not crazy it is a fact.


Ausm

 

[Zugzwang152]

At launch, the shuttle?s two solid rockets consume more than 9.07 metric tons (10 tons) of fuel each second and produce 44 million horsepower, equal to 14,700 locomotives

:Q


thats seriously unreal


:Q

 

[tcsenter]

"The most complex thing ever built" is one of those statements like "the greatest songwriter that ever lived", not easily supported and probably is more of a reflection of a person's particular interest in that area.

A modern airliner is pretty damned complex, so is a sophisticated fighter jet. The Space Shuttle isn't dramatically different from either of them, its all aerospace engineering. A highly competent aerospace engineer at Boeing should find almost natural the transition to NASA.

Milspec standards by their nature limit the use of the "latest" technology because it is better to go with something that is proven exhaustively. You still find old rocker and toggle type switches of the same old designs used in the Apollo missions being used in the Space Shuttle because they are reliable as hell and do not fail. If it ain't broken, don't fix it.

Of course, necessity is the mother of invention and so you develop only what you need to develop because nothing currently existing is up to the task the application or mission will ask of it.

 

[blackhawk]

Remember its 20 years old so the technology is older than that but its solid. The good thing about older designs is the 'fudge factor' built into the safety specs to ensure its on the good side of the envelope.

The other thing to remember is that its a first and one and only hand built design. Its an incredible feat that it works as well as it does and can do the job it does. A credit to the designer/builders of the last generation.

The automated units would make more sense for straightforward jobs and its easily doable but not as versatile as 'manned' flights.

 

[charrison]

So what would it cost to build a few more of them until suitable replacements are available?

 

[guyver01]

Originally posted by: charrison
So what would it cost to build a few more of them until suitable replacements are available?

Space Shuttle Endeavour, the replacement orbiter for Space Shuttle Challenger , cost approximately $2.1 billion.

 

[charrison]

Originally posted by: guyver01

Originally posted by: charrison
So what would it cost to build a few more of them until suitable replacements are available?

Space Shuttle Endeavour, the replacement orbiter for Space Shuttle Challenger , cost approximately $2.1 billion.

Yes, but what is todays price? It is always real expensive to make one.

 

[guyver01]

Originally posted by: charrison

Originally posted by: guyver01

Originally posted by: charrison
So what would it cost to build a few more of them until suitable replacements are available?

Space Shuttle Endeavour, the replacement orbiter for Space Shuttle Challenger , cost approximately $2.1 billion.

Yes, but what is todays price? It is always real expensive to make one.

It was 2.1 billion in 1992.. i'd imagine it wouldn't be much more expensive than that...

 

[guyver01]

NASA/Lockheed Martin X-33 prototype was failed multi-billion dollar bid to prove a single-stage-to-orbit vehicle could wing its way to low-cost, routine access to space.

 

[Nohr]

Originally posted by: Zugzwang152

At launch, the shuttle?s two solid rockets consume more than 9.07 metric tons (10 tons) of fuel each second and produce 44 million horsepower, equal to 14,700 locomotives

:Q


thats seriously unreal


:Q

Throw on some R-Type stickers and a spoiler and then you're talking some serious horsepower!

 

[Tiger]

Each one of the five onboard computers has only 256K of memory.
You have more computing power under the hood of your car than the orbiters have.

 

[Evadman]

Originally posted by: Tiger
Each one of the five onboard computers has only 256K of memory.
You have more computing power under the hood of your car than the orbiters have.

that is because you can not pull to the side of the road to change a broken computer. they use "proven" technology.

 

[EndGame]

The shuttles are definately the most advanced complex thing ever built and used, but, it seems there were "tell-tale" signs for quite some time and many were concerned this could happen:

• Nasa chiefs 'repeatedly ignored' safety warnings
  
  Peter Beaumont
  Sunday February 2, 2003
  
  
  Fears of a catastrophic shuttle accident were raised last summer with the White House by a former Nasa engineer who pleaded for a presidential order to halt all further shuttle flights until safety issues had been addressed.
  In a letter to the White House, Don Nelson, who served with Nasa for 36 years until he retired in 1999, wrote to President George W. Bush warning that his 'intervention' was necessary to 'prevent another catastrophic space shuttle accident'.
  
  During his last 11 years at Nasa, Nelson served as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation projects. He was on the initial design team for the space shuttle. He participated in every shuttle upgrade until his retirement.
  
  Listing a series of mishaps with shuttle missions since 1999, Nelson warned in his letter that Nasa management and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel have failed to respond to the growing warning signs of another shuttle accident. Since 1999 the vehicle had experienced a number of potentially disastrous problems:
  
  · 1999 - Columbia's launch was delayed by a hydrogen leak and Discovery was grounded with damaged wiring, contaminated engine and dented fuel line;
  
  · January 2000 - Endeavor was delayed because of wiring and computer failures;
  
  · August 2000 - inspection of Columbia revealed 3,500 defects in wiring;
  
  · October 2000 - the 100th flight of the shuttle was delayed because of a misplaced safety pin and concerns with the external tank;
  
  · April 2002 - a hydrogen leak forced the cancellation of the Atlantis flight;
  
  · July 2002 - the inspector general reported that the shuttle safety programme was not properly managed;
  
  · August 2002 - the shuttle launch system was grounded after fuel line cracks were discovered.
  
  White House officials rejected Nelson's plea for a moratorium. He tried to talk again to Nasa's administration about his worries in October but was again rebuffed.
  
  Yesterday Nelson told The Observer that he feared the Columbia disaster was the culmination of 'disastrous mismanagement' by Nasa's most senior officials and would inevitably lead to the moratorium he was calling for.
  
  'I became concerned about safety issues in Nasa after Challenger. I think what happened is that very slowly over the years Nasa's culture of safety became eroded.
  
  'But when I tried to raise my concerns with Nasa's new administrator, I received two reprimands for not going through the proper channels, which discouraged other people from coming forward with their concerns. When it came to an argument between a middle-ranking engineer and the astronauts and administration, guess who won.
  
  'One of my biggest complaints has been that we should have been looking for ways to develop crew escape modules, which Nasa has constantly rejected.'
  
  His claims emerged against a background of growing concern over the management of safety issues by Nasa.
  
  They followed similar warnings last April by the former chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory panel, Richard Bloomberg, who said: 'In all of the years of my involvement, I have never been as concerned for space shuttle safety as now.'
  
  Bloomberg blamed the deferral or elimination of planned safety upgrades, a diminished workforce as a result of hiring freezes, and an ageing infrastructure for the advisory panel's findings.
  
  His warning echoed earlier concern about key shuttle safety issues. In September 2001 at a Senate hearing into shuttle safety, senators and independent experts warned that budget and management problems were putting astronauts lives at risk. At the centre of concern were claims that a budget overspend of almost $5 billion (£3bn) had led to a culture in Nasa whereby senior managers treated shuttle safety upgrades as optional.
  
  Among those who spoke out were Democratic Senator Bill Nelson of Florida, who warned: 'I fear that if we don't provide the space shuttle programme with the resources it needs for safety upgrades, our country is going to pay a price we can't bear.
  
  'We're starving Nasa's shuttle budget and thus greatly increasing the chance of a catastrophic loss.'
  
  Although Nasa officials said that improvements were being made they admitted that more needed to be done.
  
  A year earlier, a General Accounting Office report had warned that the loss of experienced engineers and technicians in the space shuttle programme was threatening the safety of future missions just as Nasa was preparing to increase its annual number of launches to build the International Space Station.
  
  The GAO cited internal Nasa documents showing 'workforce reductions are jeopardising Nasa's ability to safely support the shuttle's planned flight rate'.
  
  Space agency officials discovered in late 1999 that many employees didn't have the necessary skills to properly manage avionics, mechanical engineering and computer systems, according to the GAO report.
  
  The GAO assembled a composite portrait of the shuttle programme's workforce that showed twice as many workers over 60 years of age than under 30. It assessed that the number of workers then nearing retirement could jeopardise the programme's ability to transfer leadership roles to the next generation to support the higher flight rate necessary to build the space station.
  
  

 

[JohnCU]

It is amazing how we can build stuff like that and it actually works, it just blows my mind. I mean, 100 years ago, we had nothing. Now, we have stuff that seems too complex to be able to work, but it does...

 

[Pastfinder]

Originally posted by: EndGame
The shuttles are definately the most advanced complex thing ever built and used, but, it seems there were "tell-tale" signs for quite some time and many were concerned this could happen:

• Nasa chiefs 'repeatedly ignored' safety warnings
  
  Peter Beaumont
  Sunday February 2, 2003
  
  
  Fears of a catastrophic shuttle accident were raised last summer with the White House by a former Nasa engineer who pleaded for a presidential order to halt all further shuttle flights until safety issues had been addressed.
  In a letter to the White House, Don Nelson, who served with Nasa for 36 years until he retired in 1999, wrote to President George W. Bush warning that his 'intervention' was necessary to 'prevent another catastrophic space shuttle accident'.
  
  During his last 11 years at Nasa, Nelson served as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation projects. He was on the initial design team for the space shuttle. He participated in every shuttle upgrade until his retirement.
  
  Listing a series of mishaps with shuttle missions since 1999, Nelson warned in his letter that Nasa management and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel have failed to respond to the growing warning signs of another shuttle accident. Since 1999 the vehicle had experienced a number of potentially disastrous problems:
  
  · 1999 - Columbia's launch was delayed by a hydrogen leak and Discovery was grounded with damaged wiring, contaminated engine and dented fuel line;
  
  · January 2000 - Endeavor was delayed because of wiring and computer failures;
  
  · August 2000 - inspection of Columbia revealed 3,500 defects in wiring;
  
  · October 2000 - the 100th flight of the shuttle was delayed because of a misplaced safety pin and concerns with the external tank;
  
  · April 2002 - a hydrogen leak forced the cancellation of the Atlantis flight;
  
  · July 2002 - the inspector general reported that the shuttle safety programme was not properly managed;
  
  · August 2002 - the shuttle launch system was grounded after fuel line cracks were discovered.
  
  White House officials rejected Nelson's plea for a moratorium. He tried to talk again to Nasa's administration about his worries in October but was again rebuffed.
  
  Yesterday Nelson told The Observer that he feared the Columbia disaster was the culmination of 'disastrous mismanagement' by Nasa's most senior officials and would inevitably lead to the moratorium he was calling for.
  
  'I became concerned about safety issues in Nasa after Challenger. I think what happened is that very slowly over the years Nasa's culture of safety became eroded.
  
  'But when I tried to raise my concerns with Nasa's new administrator, I received two reprimands for not going through the proper channels, which discouraged other people from coming forward with their concerns. When it came to an argument between a middle-ranking engineer and the astronauts and administration, guess who won.
  
  'One of my biggest complaints has been that we should have been looking for ways to develop crew escape modules, which Nasa has constantly rejected.'
  
  His claims emerged against a background of growing concern over the management of safety issues by Nasa.
  
  They followed similar warnings last April by the former chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory panel, Richard Bloomberg, who said: 'In all of the years of my involvement, I have never been as concerned for space shuttle safety as now.'
  
  Bloomberg blamed the deferral or elimination of planned safety upgrades, a diminished workforce as a result of hiring freezes, and an ageing infrastructure for the advisory panel's findings.
  
  His warning echoed earlier concern about key shuttle safety issues. In September 2001 at a Senate hearing into shuttle safety, senators and independent experts warned that budget and management problems were putting astronauts lives at risk. At the centre of concern were claims that a budget overspend of almost $5 billion (£3bn) had led to a culture in Nasa whereby senior managers treated shuttle safety upgrades as optional.
  
  Among those who spoke out were Democratic Senator Bill Nelson of Florida, who warned: 'I fear that if we don't provide the space shuttle programme with the resources it needs for safety upgrades, our country is going to pay a price we can't bear.
  
  'We're starving Nasa's shuttle budget and thus greatly increasing the chance of a catastrophic loss.'
  
  Although Nasa officials said that improvements were being made they admitted that more needed to be done.
  
  A year earlier, a General Accounting Office report had warned that the loss of experienced engineers and technicians in the space shuttle programme was threatening the safety of future missions just as Nasa was preparing to increase its annual number of launches to build the International Space Station.
  
  The GAO cited internal Nasa documents showing 'workforce reductions are jeopardising Nasa's ability to safely support the shuttle's planned flight rate'.
  
  Space agency officials discovered in late 1999 that many employees didn't have the necessary skills to properly manage avionics, mechanical engineering and computer systems, according to the GAO report.
  
  The GAO assembled a composite portrait of the shuttle programme's workforce that showed twice as many workers over 60 years of age than under 30. It assessed that the number of workers then nearing retirement could jeopardise the programme's ability to transfer leadership roles to the next generation to support the higher flight rate necessary to build the space station.
  
  

NASA needs more funding. We waste money on all sorts of non-productive endeavors, why can't we give NASA a funding raise? Space in many respects is the future of mankind...

 

[EndGame]

Originally posted by: Pastfinder

Originally posted by: EndGame
The shuttles are definately the most advanced complex thing ever built and used, but, it seems there were "tell-tale" signs for quite some time and many were concerned this could happen:

• Nasa chiefs 'repeatedly ignored' safety warnings
  
  Peter Beaumont
  Sunday February 2, 2003
  
  
  Fears of a catastrophic shuttle accident were raised last summer with the White House by a former Nasa engineer who pleaded for a presidential order to halt all further shuttle flights until safety issues had been addressed.
  In a letter to the White House, Don Nelson, who served with Nasa for 36 years until he retired in 1999, wrote to President George W. Bush warning that his 'intervention' was necessary to 'prevent another catastrophic space shuttle accident'.
  
  During his last 11 years at Nasa, Nelson served as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation projects. He was on the initial design team for the space shuttle. He participated in every shuttle upgrade until his retirement.
  
  Listing a series of mishaps with shuttle missions since 1999, Nelson warned in his letter that Nasa management and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel have failed to respond to the growing warning signs of another shuttle accident. Since 1999 the vehicle had experienced a number of potentially disastrous problems:
  
  · 1999 - Columbia's launch was delayed by a hydrogen leak and Discovery was grounded with damaged wiring, contaminated engine and dented fuel line;
  
  · January 2000 - Endeavor was delayed because of wiring and computer failures;
  
  · August 2000 - inspection of Columbia revealed 3,500 defects in wiring;
  
  · October 2000 - the 100th flight of the shuttle was delayed because of a misplaced safety pin and concerns with the external tank;
  
  · April 2002 - a hydrogen leak forced the cancellation of the Atlantis flight;
  
  · July 2002 - the inspector general reported that the shuttle safety programme was not properly managed;
  
  · August 2002 - the shuttle launch system was grounded after fuel line cracks were discovered.
  
  White House officials rejected Nelson's plea for a moratorium. He tried to talk again to Nasa's administration about his worries in October but was again rebuffed.
  
  Yesterday Nelson told The Observer that he feared the Columbia disaster was the culmination of 'disastrous mismanagement' by Nasa's most senior officials and would inevitably lead to the moratorium he was calling for.
  
  'I became concerned about safety issues in Nasa after Challenger. I think what happened is that very slowly over the years Nasa's culture of safety became eroded.
  
  'But when I tried to raise my concerns with Nasa's new administrator, I received two reprimands for not going through the proper channels, which discouraged other people from coming forward with their concerns. When it came to an argument between a middle-ranking engineer and the astronauts and administration, guess who won.
  
  'One of my biggest complaints has been that we should have been looking for ways to develop crew escape modules, which Nasa has constantly rejected.'
  
  His claims emerged against a background of growing concern over the management of safety issues by Nasa.
  
  They followed similar warnings last April by the former chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory panel, Richard Bloomberg, who said: 'In all of the years of my involvement, I have never been as concerned for space shuttle safety as now.'
  
  Bloomberg blamed the deferral or elimination of planned safety upgrades, a diminished workforce as a result of hiring freezes, and an ageing infrastructure for the advisory panel's findings.
  
  His warning echoed earlier concern about key shuttle safety issues. In September 2001 at a Senate hearing into shuttle safety, senators and independent experts warned that budget and management problems were putting astronauts lives at risk. At the centre of concern were claims that a budget overspend of almost $5 billion (£3bn) had led to a culture in Nasa whereby senior managers treated shuttle safety upgrades as optional.
  
  Among those who spoke out were Democratic Senator Bill Nelson of Florida, who warned: 'I fear that if we don't provide the space shuttle programme with the resources it needs for safety upgrades, our country is going to pay a price we can't bear.
  
  'We're starving Nasa's shuttle budget and thus greatly increasing the chance of a catastrophic loss.'
  
  Although Nasa officials said that improvements were being made they admitted that more needed to be done.
  
  A year earlier, a General Accounting Office report had warned that the loss of experienced engineers and technicians in the space shuttle programme was threatening the safety of future missions just as Nasa was preparing to increase its annual number of launches to build the International Space Station.
  
  The GAO cited internal Nasa documents showing 'workforce reductions are jeopardising Nasa's ability to safely support the shuttle's planned flight rate'.
  
  Space agency officials discovered in late 1999 that many employees didn't have the necessary skills to properly manage avionics, mechanical engineering and computer systems, according to the GAO report.
  
  The GAO assembled a composite portrait of the shuttle programme's workforce that showed twice as many workers over 60 years of age than under 30. It assessed that the number of workers then nearing retirement could jeopardise the programme's ability to transfer leadership roles to the next generation to support the higher flight rate necessary to build the space station.
  
  

NASA needs more funding. We waste money on all sorts of non-productive endeavors, why can't we give NASA a funding raise? Space in many respects is the future of mankind...

No doubt! As I posted in another thread, what better tribute to those whom perished in the Columbia yesterday than to give NASA the funds it needs to move past this "shuttle" era we are now in to a vehicle which does not neccessitate booster engines and tanks but is reusable (i.e. Lockheed/NASA rejected design).

 

[tcsenter]

NASA needs more funding. We waste money on all sorts of non-productive endeavors, why can't we give NASA a funding raise? Space in many respects is the future of mankind...

Because by in large, there is so little public support for the space program that its really a wonder we have one to begin with. Despite short-lived 'surges' in public support of the space program after the moon landing and the first Columbia space flight, the public has overwhelmingly viewed the space program as one big waste of money.

Its the job of NASA officials, and the officials of every government agency for that matter, to make periodic "chicken little" pleas before Congress and the President, with the goal of not only protecting their budgets, but to increase them as much as possible. "People will die", "the future of humanity will hang in the balance", blah blah blah, unless we get another $100 billion. Its called job security.

Our annual budget would be $20 trillion if Congress or the President reached for the public wallet every time someone asked for more money.

 

[Tiger]

10 yeras of neglect and unimaginative management have caused the technolgy "malaise" we're in right now.
The FY '92 budget for NASA was $15 Billion. The FY '02 budget for NASA was $15 Billion. If you figure a modest 2% inflation per year their budget should have gone up by at least 20% to $18 Billion.

 

[Bignate603]

The shuttle is possibly one of the most amazing things EVER constructed. There is one slightly anerving thing.

Imagine sitting on something with over 100,000 moving parts, and that almost any part going wrong could kill you. Now imagine each part was built by the lowest bidder...

 

[EndGame]

Originally posted by: Tiger
10 yeras of neglect and unimaginative management have caused the technolgy "malaise" we're in right now.
The FY '92 budget for NASA was $15 Billion. The FY '02 budget for NASA was $15 Billion. If you figure a modest 2% inflation per year their budget should have gone up by at least 20% to $18 Billion.

And to add to that, that 15M was actually cut back during the 90's. It has only risen back to the 15M in the last 2 years.

 

[OS]

I think the fact that it's the only vehicle of it's type on the planet, is a pretty good indicator of how advanced it is, despite it's age.

It's also being constantly upgraded with new technology. A couple examples off my head are that the large exterior fuel tank has since been redesigned using newer materials, cutting weight. The monitors were also recently switched from CRTs to some kind flat panels.

That being said, you can only polish an old frame so much. It lacks safety systems common on military aircraft, namely an ejectible cockpit. You can be certain that the next generation shuttle will have some sort of ejection mechanism.