That's what I don't get about all this - why the desperation to stop Iran having nuclear weapons? The theory of 'deterrence' would say that as Israel aleady has them (and it's protector and patron, the US, has vast numbers of them) then Iran won't start a nuclear war. Either we're admitting deterrence is a flawed idea that can't be relied on, or the point is that this is not about fear of Iran using such weapons, it's about Israel and the West not being able to use them on Iran.
Nuclear non-proliferation has worked well in the 21st Century, and we want to keep it that way. It's much easier for 9 countries in this exclusive club to all understand MAD, than for a couple dozen countries where it just takes one madman that DGAF. As a thought experiment, what if every new entry to the nuclear club was like a North Korea and you added one per year? Would deterrence continue to work?
IIRC the most likely scenario of a nuclear war is between India and Pakistan. They're neighbors who hate each other, and India has the conventional strength advantage. If backed up against an "existential" wall, who knows for sure what Pakistan is willing to do? Is the status quo more likely with 9 countries or two dozen?
I don't know if desperation is the right term, but you can prevent Iran from getting nukes but you can't put the genie back in the bottle afterwards (i.e. NK will never give them up). The other concern is that if just a couple more countries get nukes, many others would reject non-proliferation.
To be clear, I'm not arguing for the U.S. strikes on Iran. I'm saying that deterrence does work, but NNP is even more important.
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