Not that this thread has gone ot enough already, just a couple of points...
No, RIPE hasn't run out of IPs. Just being selective with assignments and need to be an LIR/member. Somewhat costly but very easy. Exactly what I've done.
As for the split tunneling argument...
One, a good policy should NOT allow users' home PCs to connect. That's just asking for problems. Only devices that should connect are corporate owned and managed devices. Period.
Two, productivity should not be affected as a good security policy would dictate a user would not have any files, applications, etc relating to the company anywhere other than on the device itself or on company managed storage. Where do breaches in security come from mostly? Oh yeah, employees.
Three, if you have some other pc on a user's network infected, it cannot get into your network, assuming that pc isn't infected already. The hope is you have a good AV policy to address that.
Four, bandwidth should not be a concern. If your making compromises to security because you don't have a big enough pipe, then you need to rethink your strategy, or fire your information security folks. Either disallow that traffic on your VPN policy, get a sufficient pipe, or if you absolutely need to do it, create your policy similar to your internal policy (assuming you restrict website access) and only allow access to their local Internet pipe with the same restrictions (controlled by whatever soft FW you may use).
Five, every VPN environment should be DMZ'd. Whether on the appliance itself or some FW/UTM behind the termination point, in no way should outside connectivity not be monitored, controlled or otherwise have some ability to know what the traffic is before it gets inside any further where it may possibly do damage.
The only reason to allow it is for convenience. Nothing more.
Argue for it all you want, but it's a huge risk. Maybe your company can take that risk, most cannot.