Facts are that Iran was explicitly forbidden to enrich uranium. They claim they want nuclear power and the 5+1 are apparently willing to compromise and allow LEU production contingent on Iran reversing its illegal enrichment scheme and subverting the inspection process. If Iran isn't lying then it can what it says it needs, nuclear power. I suggest they take the offer and save themselves much grief.Says the guy who immediately stated his opinion as fact...
Depends on how much legalistic hair splitting you're willing to entertain.Iran isn't legally entitled to enrich uranium.
Really? This is the post in question-Says the guy who immediately stated his opinion as fact...
If you have any evidence contradicting any of that, post it. Otherwise, you're working with strawman equivalency.You're stating your opinion as fact, and attempted to equate a minor production purity overrun with deliberate creation of weapons grade material of a much, much higher purity. That's dishonest.
You're trying to build your usual strawman, too. I'm in no position to accurately gauge Iranian intentions, nor are you. What I'm confident about is that nuclear weapons cannot exist w/o weapons grade materials, and that there is no evidence to suggest that Iran has ever created any significant amounts of it. Ongoing IAEA efforts assure us of that, and serve to keep Iran honest in that regard, even if they might act differently under other circumstances.
Iran effectively entered into a contract when it signed the NPT. That makes it subject to the rules and judgments and subsequent decisions of the governing bodies responsible for its compliance. Iran was explicitly told to stop enriching uranium because in the judgement of those authorities Iran was not meeting its obligations. You can disagree with the decision just like you could with any court judgement but that does not change that it is legal and binding. You know I can produce references to those decisions and rulings if needed but you are informed so you know of what I speak. Signatories have rights, but rights are contingent on fulfilling responsibilities as determined by those in legal authority. Just as you have the right to walk about, it is not unlimited and it can be removed if the powers that be determine you are of a sufficient threat. Disliking that fact changes nothing.Depends on how much legalistic hair splitting you're willing to entertain.
In principle, all signatories to the treaty have that right. In practice, nations having the tech have generally refused to share it.
Any nation seeking to rely on nuclear energy for generation of electricity will reasonably want it, international politics being what they are.
Rules & judgments don't carry the same weight as treaty obligations, particularly not ones formulated after the fact or ones addressing peripheral issues. As you seem to realize, it would be a mistake for Iran to suspend enrichment, because it would bolster the perception that their efforts are illegitimate entirely, and would also open the door to endless investigations into possibilities outside the scope of the original treaty. Suspicions & accusations can be fabricated at will, regardless of their veracity.Iran effectively entered into a contract when it signed the NPT. That makes it subject to the rules and judgments and subsequent decisions of the governing bodies responsible for its compliance. Iran was explicitly told to stop enriching uranium because in the judgement of those authorities Iran was not meeting its obligations. You can disagree with the decision just like you could with any court judgement but that does not change that it is legal and binding. You know I can produce references to those decisions and rulings if needed but you are informed so you know of what I speak. Signatories have rights, but rights are contingent on fulfilling responsibilities as determined by those in legal authority. Just as you have the right to walk about, it is not unlimited and it can be removed if the powers that be determine you are of a sufficient threat. Disliking that fact changes nothing.
If Iran complies to the satisfaction of the 5+1 then there is an offer to permit enrichment sufficient to allow for nuclear power. Irans nuclear energy needs are addressed as well as the concerns of others. That would allow a lifting of sanctions and everyone can stand down.
The truth is far simpler still.Rules & judgments don't carry the same weight as treaty obligations, particularly not ones formulated after the fact or ones addressing peripheral issues. As you seem to realize, it would be a mistake for Iran to suspend enrichment, because it would bolster the perception that their efforts are illegitimate entirely, and would also open the door to endless investigations into possibilities outside the scope of the original treaty. Suspicions & accusations can be fabricated at will, regardless of their veracity.
If the true intentions of the 5+1 are to recognize the legitimacy of fuel grade enrichment, then there is no reason for enrichment to cease beforehand, given that the IAEA already monitors it & has found no violations in that regard. The demand is an obvious ploy, and an indicator of insincerity. It's been the sticking point all along.
Regardless of any peripheral Iranian actions of the past or all the smoke being blown, it seems obvious that they have not created significant quantities of weapons grade materials & that the IAEA would quickly detect any efforts to do so. Which brings us full circle, to the underlying rationale of the NPT, that nuclear weapons cannot exist w/o weapons grade materials.
Any time that simple truth emerges, the usual obfuscations emerge full force as if they could somehow override it. They can't.
Note that this was never rescinded and the bolded part especially.Board of Governors
Date: 4 February 2006
For official use only
The adopted agenda
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Resolution adopted on 4 February 2006
The Board of Governors,
(a) Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Board on Iran's nuclear programme,
(b) Recalling also the Director Generals reports,
(c) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all
the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty,
(d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial
efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding safeguards issues
in Iran and to verify the implementation by Iran of the suspension,
(e) Recalling the Director Generals description of this as a special verification case,
(f) Recalling that in reports referred to above, the Director General noted that after nearly
three years of intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some
important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme or to conclude that there are no
undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
(g) Recalling Irans many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT
Safeguards Agreement and the absence of confidence that Irans nuclear programme is
exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of concealment of Irans nuclear
activities, the nature of those activities and other issues arising from the Agencys verification
of declarations made by Iran since September 2002,
(h) Recalling that the Director General has stated that Iran's full transparency is indispensable
and overdue for the Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues (GOV/2005/67),
International Atomic Energy Agency
Derestricted 4 February 2006
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 4 February 2006)GOV/2006/14
(i) Recalling the requests of the Agency for Iran's cooperation in following up on reports
relating to equipment, materials and activities which have applications in the conventional
military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area (as indicated by the
Director General in GOV/2005/67),
(j) Recalling that in November 2005 the Director General reported (GOV/2005/87) that Iran
possesses a document related to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 to metal
in small quantities, and on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium
metal into hemispherical forms,
(k) Expressing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear programme, and agreeing that an
extensive period of confidence-building is required from Iran,
(l) Reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the
Iranian nuclear issue, and
(m) Recognising that a solution to the Iranian issue would contribute to global nonproliferation efforts and to realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass
destruction, including their means of delivery,
1. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to the calls for
confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran, and in this context deems it
necessary for Iran to:
re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol;
pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional
Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003;
implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in
GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement
and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to
procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and
development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations;
2. Requests the Director General to report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these
steps are required of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and
resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue;
3. Expresses serious concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important
issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in its possession a
document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this
process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components; and, noting that the decision to put
this document under Agency seal is a positive step, requests Iran to maintain this document under
Agency seal and to provide a full copy to the Agency;
4. Deeply regrets that, despite repeated calls from the Board for the maintaining of the suspension
of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities which the Board has declared essential to
addressing outstanding issues, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility on
8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment activities on 10 January 2006; GOV/2006/14
5. Calls on Iran to understand that there is a lack of confidence in Irans intentions in seeking to
develop a fissile material production capability against the background of Iran's record on safeguards
as recorded in previous Resolutions, and outstanding issues; and to reconsider its position in relation to
confidence-building measures, which are voluntary, and non legally binding, and to adopt a
constructive approach in relation to negotiations that can result in increased confidence;
6. Requests Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to the Agency, which the Director General
deems indispensable and overdue, and in particular to help the Agency clarify possible activities
which could have a military nuclear dimension;
7. Underlines that the Agencys work on verifying Irans declarations is ongoing and requests the
Director General to continue with his efforts to implement the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with
Iran, to implement the Additional Protocol to that Agreement pending its entry into force, with a view
to providing credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in
Iran, and to pursue additional transparency measures required for the Agency to be able to resolve
outstanding issues and reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's past nuclear activities;
8. Requests the Director General to report on the implementation of this and previous resolutions
to the next regular session of the Board, for its consideration, and immediately thereafter to convey,
together with any Resolution from the March Board, that report to the Security Council; and
9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
The sarcasm in my argument was obviously lost on you. Conspiracy theorist rationalization techniques 102...A metaphor a form of analogy where one asserts that one thing is another, Shakespeare's "all the world's a stage" being one classic example. On the other hand, a strawman is when one misrepresents another's position rather than actually addressing it, such as your "Iran is perfectly innocent" nonsense. I don't presume to be in a potion to know if Iran is innocent, perfectly or otherwise, but I do know that no publicly available evidence proves them guilty of working to develop nuclear weapons.
Still obfuscating, following the lead of the US, Israel, and the IAEA.The truth is far simpler still.
Note that this was never rescinded and the bolded part especially.
In response Iran says it has the right to do so and although it has not satisfied the IAEA, the watchdog agency mentioned in the NPT, it just keeps repeating over and over that it has the right.
If it wants to be obdurate, then there are consequences. They can have embargoes and be sat on by the international community who are also happy to exercise their rights to do so.
So Iran says it has an unalienable right regardless of treaty obligations and the world at large disagrees with Iran. It can say in essence "I paid my child support" if a court says it hasn't and keep repeating that over and over, but it will lose.
Makes sense for it to comply and get what it claims it needs rather than face consequences which might be far worse than it has to date.
Every signatory of the NPT is legally entitled to enrich uranium, Iran included. The Board of Governors resolution you cited in a more recent post, which lists "suspension of all enrichment" simply as one step by which "outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built", does nothing to change that fact.Iran isn't legally entitled to enrich uranium.
If you had an actual argument, it would be more useful to present that rather than your incessant ad hominem and strawmanning.I'm not going to argue Iran with you because it will be of no use.
Contrary to this strawman, there are actually many things which could convince me that a country wants a nuke short of them actually getting it. Inspectors finding evidence of uranium enrichment far below that of weapons grade is simply not one of them.You've made up your mind and nothing on this planet short of Iran getting a nuke will convince you that they want a nuke.
Missing my point then inserting one I didn't make won't work. I'm not falling into the trap others have. If you don't think a legal judgement is binding so be it.Still obfuscating, following the lead of the US, Israel, and the IAEA.
When I point out that you're supporting a dishonest position, you merely repeat it, appeal to authority as if such arguments are valid & as if that authority weren't the author of the dishonest position in the first place. It's completely circular, actually disregarding the copious evidence provided by the IAEA that diversion of materials has not occurred & their assertions that it cannot occur w/o their detecting it.
And as I clarified:Rules & judgments don't carry the same weight as treaty obligations, particularly not ones formulated after the fact or ones addressing peripheral issues.
As for your question: Iran not only should but also has cooperated on its obligations under the NPT. There have been some noncompliance issues in the past, but at least according to all the publicly available evidence, Iran has never actually violated the treaty.Every signatory of the NPT is legally entitled to enrich uranium, Iran included. The Board of Governors resolution you cited in a more recent post, which lists "suspension of all enrichment" simply as one step by which "outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built", does nothing to change that fact.
Ooooo, look out everyone! Kyle's trying to sound all intellectual. It's cute isn't it?If you had an actual argument, it would be more useful to present that rather than your incessant ad hominem and strawmanning.
Contrary to this strawman, there are actually many things which could convince me that a country wants a nuke short of them actually getting it. Inspectors finding evidence of uranium enrichment far below that of weapons grade is simply not one of them.
The ban is meaningless in the context that nations having veto power over enforcement will likely do so, making military action illegal. Attempting to enforce the rules by breaking even greater ones is doublespeak.Missing my point then inserting one I didn't make won't work. I'm not falling into the trap others have. If you don't think a legal judgement is binding so be it.
The ban was issued by a legal authority.
The ban was not removed.
Therefore the enrichment is illegal by the terms provided for. No means no.
Argue against the decision, but as I said before you don't have to like a courts ruling but wishing it away doesn't work.
Now should Iran cooperate or not? That's a yes or no answer.
Huh. It seems Iran isn't having a grand time with those sanctions and if they continue as it seems you want them too then expect that it will get worse. So be it. You don't have to pay the price.The ban is meaningless in the context that nations having veto power over enforcement will likely do so, making military action illegal. Attempting to enforce the rules by breaking even greater ones is doublespeak.
Inserting factual information you pointedly ignore won't work? Not in your head, apparently, but I suspect it's having an effect on the thinking of those who matter.
For what it is worth, Iran bases its claims on the right to enrich uranium on the terms of the NPT, while powers like the USA and Israel base their refusal more on the authority of the IAEA. The same flawed IAEA who claimed that Saddam had WMD.
Then I note so many on this forum base their claims on legally constituted authority as if legally constituted authority always gets it right and is never biased.
As I remind this forum, Hitler was the legally constituted government of Germany post 1933, Charles Taylor and a large number of people now charged with or convicted of international war crimes were legally constituted, we can add in Qaddafi and Assad too, if we somehow lack examples of the how biased that argument is, or we can be individual thinkers and evaluate these kind of questions on the basis of what we think is fair and just.
With that other codicil, later there will be a judgment of history, do we want to be found on the wrong side of the question later? During the time, the Spanish inquisition seemed to be correctly applied justice, and now its almost universally condemned as a massive abuse of human rights. And similar events are easy to find, especially with the IAEA who keep acting like lying sacks of shits to pander to existing power. Is that legally constituted authority or a monument to illogical?
While they ignore the the number one abuser the room in Israel, who has nuclear weapons on the sneak. As chicken shit hypocrisy rides again. Because in the fuller working of history, stupidity and lack of logic always leads to a bad end.
The ROTW is having a grand time, too, with elevated oil prices. And if the claim of "uncertainty" as being bad for domestic business is to be believed, then we have to believe the same wrt international business.Huh. It seems Iran isn't having a grand time with those sanctions and if they continue as it seems you want them too then expect that it will get worse. So be it. You don't have to pay the price.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------So how is Godwin these days?
Ok I understand your position. Iran should continue to alienate itself by refusing to change even if offered a chance to have nuclear energy and have sanctions lifted. No problem. As for the rest of your post it's fluff. Be prepared for military options next year if they bravely embrace their stupidity as you wish. That's what you want and that's what's likely. I'm pretty much done with this exchange. I wanted to know if you thought Iran ought to cooperate (you'll protest that they have of course) and the answer is a resounding no.The ROTW is having a grand time, too, with elevated oil prices. And if the claim of "uncertainty" as being bad for domestic business is to be believed, then we have to believe the same wrt international business.
Completion of the Fordow facility, stockpiling of 20% enriched fuel & continued threats of illegal action by Israel seem to be convincing the ROTW that it's time to make a deal, particularly in light of IAEA assurances that there has been no diversion of materials. The emphasis has shifted from demands to stop all enrichment to demands to stop enrichment of material to 20% & shutting down the Fordow facility. That shift is huge.
Their nuclear program is wildly popular in Iran, all across the political spectrum, so it seems likely that they'll do what they have to do to keep it going, regardless of sanctions or threats.
It's also impossible for us to judge the effectiveness of sanctions, given the thirst for Iranian oil in China & India, just for starters, and the tendency of western media to be easily led...
So long as negotiations are continuing & painted in a positive light, Israel will find little support for attack, particularly from the Obama Admin for an attack any time before the election.
Amano has shown willingness to play ball, to be political, all along, and he'll likely play ball any way that the 5+1 tells him to play.
Consider- I've been right and you've been consistently wrong. Now that is a personal score so I'll broaden it.-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As for me, I have no idea, I never believed in Godwin or the tooth fairy either.
But if you Hayabususa want to base YOUR argument on Godwin, and then apply it to to the Spanish Inquisition and Charles Taylor too, it IMHO does not imply you are very rational. And again, IMHO, quite the opposite.
For what it is worth, Iran bases its claims on the right to enrich uranium on the terms of the NPT, while powers like the USA and Israel base their refusal more on the authority of the IAEA. The same flawed IAEA who claimed that Saddam had WMD.
Well where does the IAEA say that Saddam had WMDs? They say they have no evidence to that, point out the forgeries regarding yellowcake and correctly identify the purpose of the aluminum tubes. Not once did they say as you claim. They expressed frustration at Saddams cat and mouse game, but like you, the US did everything it could to discredit or misrepresent the IAEA as Negroponte did in the section I underlined.Iraq's history with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons is a long and winding path that eventually ended in an American invasion of the country.
Related Iraq Timelines
Timeline: The CIA Leak Case
July 2, 2007
Timeline: Saddam's Violent Road to Trial
Dec. 29, 2006
In between Saddam Hussein's rise and fall from power, Iraq developed and used so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It also reluctantly submitted to international inspections and destroyed its stockpiles and means of WMD production.
In the end, though, the government's opaque and obstinate nature made it difficult for outsiders to tell exactly what Iraq was doing, if anything, in the realm of WMD.
Saddam Becomes President ::: July 16, 1979
Saddam Hussein becomes president of Iraq after pushing his cousin Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr to resign.
Iran-Iraq War Begins ::: Sept. 22, 1980
Iraq invades Iran, beginning a war that ends in stalemate eight years later.
Israel Attacks ::: June 7, 1981
Israeli warplanes make a surprise attack on the French-built Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin says that his country had to act before Iraq could successfully build a nuclear weapon to use against the Jewish state. Saddam Hussein's Iraqi government says the reactor was not part of a plan to build nuclear weapons.
Chemical Attacks on Iran ::: 1983
Media reports describe Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces. Mustard gas is the first weapon used. In 1984 reports say Iraq uses the nerve agent Tabun.
Gassing the Kurds ::: March 1988
Iraq uses chemical weapons against its own population during an attack on the rebellious Kurdish city of Halabja.
Invading Kuwait ::: Aug. 2, 1990
Iraq invades Kuwait, easily overwhelming its tiny neighbor.
Resolution 687 Bans Iraq WMD ::: April 3, 1991
Shortly after Iraq is ejected from Kuwait by an international military coalition, the United Nations Security Council passes its first resolution addressing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Resolution 687 states that Iraq must destroy its presumed stockpile of WMD, and the means to produce them. It also limits the country's ballistic missile capability. The U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) is established to oversee the inspection, destruction and monitoring of chemical and biological weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency is asked to document and destroy Iraqi efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Iraq accepts the resolution three days later, agreeing to disclose the extent of its WMD program to inspectors.
Unilateral Destruction ::: Summer 1991
Iraq unilaterally destroys WMD equipment and documentation in an effort at concealment of pre-war work.
Resolution 715 Demands Compliance ::: Oct. 11, 1991
Responding to Iraq's consistent efforts to interrupt or block inspection teams, the U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 715. The resolution says Iraq must "accept unconditionally the inspectors and all other personnel designated by the Special Commission".
'Defensive' Biological Weapons ::: May 1992
Iraq officially admits to having had a "defensive" biological weapons program. Weeks later, UNSCOM begins the destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons program. Progress is halted in July when Iraq refuses an inspection team access to the Ministry of Agriculture.
Denial and Acceptance ::: 1993
Inspections are again held up when Iraq attempts to deny UNSCOM and the IAEA the use of their own aircraft in Iraq. In late 1993 Iraq accepts resolution 715.
Nuclear, Chemical Weapons Programs Destroyed ::: 1994
UNSCOM completes the destruction of Iraq's known chemical weapons and production equipment. IAEA teams largely complete their mandate to neutralize Iraq's nuclear program, including the destruction of facilities Iraq had not even declared to inspectors.
Defection and Revelation ::: Aug. 8, 1995
Hussein Kamel, the former director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, responsible for all WMD programs, defects to Jordan. As a result, Iraq admits to a far more developed biological weapons programs than it had previously disclosed. Saddam Hussein's government also hands over documents related to its nuclear weapons program and admits to the attempted recovery of highly-enriched uranium.
Al-Hakam Destroyed ::: May 1996
Iraq's main facility for the production of biological weapons, Al-Hakam, is destroyed through explosive demolition supervised by UNSCOM inspectors.
The Fight Against Proliferation ::: 1997
The Additional Protocol is added to the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), giving IAEA inspectors more authority to investigate programs in member states. The protocol is in response to the realization that Iraq a NPT signatory had been able to move swiftly and covertly toward the construction of a nuclear weapon in the late 1980s under the treaty's previous safeguards. Inspections in the 1990s revealed that Iraq was much closer to building a nuclear weapon in the 1980s than had been suspected by IAEA officials.
Resolution 1115 ::: June 1997
In another effort to end Iraq's interference with inspection teams, the U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 1115. The resolution again calls for Iraq to comply with all previous resolutions regarding WMD. By the end of 1997, a diplomatic stalemate forces UNSCOM to withdraw most of its staff from Iraq.
Memorandum of Understanding ::: Feb. 20-23, 1998
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan visits Iraq in an effort secure inspections of what Iraq terms "presidential sites." The U.N. and Iraq agree to support the terms of the newly drafted "Memorandum of Understanding." The Memorandum secures UNSCOM access to eight previously off-limits presidential sites.
Operation Desert Fox ::: 1998
Cooperation ends between Iraq and inspectors when the country demands the lifting of the U.N. oil embargo. UNSCOM and the IAEA pull their staffs out of Iraq in anticipation of a US-led air raid on Iraqi military targets. The four-day military offensive known as Operation Desert Fox begins on December 16, 1998. According to a U.S. military Web site, the mission of Desert Fox was "to strike military and security targets in Iraq that contribute to Iraq's ability to produce, store, maintain and deliver weapons of mass destruction." The operation is considered a success, largely finishing off what was left of Iraq' s WMD infrastructure.
From UNSCOM to UNMOVIC ::: Dec. 17, 1999
The U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 1284, replacing UNSCOM with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Hans Blix of Sweden is named to head the organization. UNMOVIC's staff are employees of the United Nations. UNSCOM's staff had been experts on loan from U.N.-member countries, calling into question the motives of individual team members.
World Trade Center Attacks ::: Sept. 11, 2001
Terrorists attack New York City and Washington, D.C., with passenger jets, radically altering America's view of national security issues.
'Axis of Evil' ::: Jan. 29, 2002
President Bush accuses Iraq of being part of an international "axis if evil" during his State of the Union address. Bush tells Congress:
"Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world."
'A Grave and Gathering Danger' ::: Sept. 12, 2002
President Bush accuses Iraq of failing to live up to its obligations to the U.N. during an address to the General Assembly. Bush tells the U.N.:
"We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger."
'Material Breach' ::: Nov. 8, 2002
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 says Iraq "remains in material breach of its obligations" under various U.N. resolutions and gives the country "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament" commitments.
The U.N. Moves Back In ::: Nov. 27, 2002
UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections begin again in Iraq, almost four years after the departure of inspectors prior to Operation Desert Fox.
Recycled Material ::: Dec. 7, 2002
Iraq delivers a 12,000-page WMD report to the U.N. in response to Resolution 1441. U.N. chief inspector Hans Blix says the information provided by Iraq is largely recycled material.
No 'Smoking Guns' ::: Jan. 9, 2003
UNMOVIC's Hans Blix and the IAEA's Director General Mohamed ElBaradei report their findings to the U.N. Security Council. Blix says inspectors have not found any "smoking guns" in Iraq. ElBaradei reports that aluminum tubes suspected by the U.S. to be components for uranium enrichment are more likely to be parts for rockets, as the Iraqis claim. John Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., says:
"There is still no evidence that Iraq has fundamentally changed its approach from one of deceit to a genuine attempt to be forthcoming in meeting the council's demand that it disarm."
Sixteen Words ::: Jan. 28, 2003
In his State of the Union address, President Bush continues to view Iraq is a WMD threat. He makes a statement that implies Iraq is trying to develop nuclear weapons. Bush says:
"The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."
It comes to light later that the president based his statement on discredited intelligence.
Powell's U.N. Appearance ::: Feb. 5, 2003
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell goes in person to the U.N. to make the case against Iraq. Citing evidence obtained by American intelligence, he tells the U.N. that Iraq has failed "to come clean and disarm." Powell adds:
"My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence."
The Burden is on Iraq ::: Feb. 14, 2003
The IAEA's ElBaradei and chief weapons inspector Blix report to the U.N. Security Council on Iraqi cooperation in the search for WMD. They say they have not discovered any biological, chemical or nuclear weapons activities. Proscribed missile programs are discovered and disabled. Blix does express frustration with Iraq's failure to account for its vast stores of chemical and biological agents it was known to have at one point. Blix says:
"This is perhaps the most important problem we are facing. Although I can understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it."
U.S. vs. U.N. ::: March 6-7, 2003
The night before Blix and ElBaradei are to report on inspection efforts in Iraq, President Bush gives a news conference in which he again says Iraq is hiding something. Bush says:
"These are not the actions of a regime that is disarming. These are the actions of a regime engaged in a willful charade. These are the actions of a regime that systematically and deliberately is defying the world."
Blix tells the U.N. the next day:
"Intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks, in particular that there are mobile production units for biological weapons [But] no evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found."
Appearing with Blix, ElBaradei tells the U.N. that the IAEA has concluded that documents appearing to show Iraq shopping for uranium in Niger are, in fact, forgeries.
Invading Iraq ::: March 20, 2003
The U.S. military and other members of an American-led coalition invade Iraq. Baghdad falls on April 9. President Bush declares an end to major combat operations on May 1. Shortly afterward, the Pentagon announces formation of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) to search for WMD.
A Different Niger Story ::: July 6, 2003
Former diplomat Joseph C. Wilson questions the Bush Administration's use of intelligence about Iraqi WMD programs with an opinion piece in the New York Times titled "What I Didn't Find in Africa." Wilson says he was sent to Africa by the CIA to investigate claims that Iraq had tried to buy uranium ore in Niger. He reports that he didn't find any evidence of Iraq attempting to procure uranium in Niger, contradicting regular statements from the White House that Saddam Hussein was after the radioactive material there.
Tenet Takes the Blame ::: July 11, 2003
Director George Tenet says that the CIA should not have allowed the president to say in his State of the Union address that Iraq was trying to procure uranium in Africa. Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley also accepts responsibility for failing to stop the president from using the information. Tenet says:
"These 16 words should never have been included in the text written for the President."
Novak Unmasks a CIA Agent ::: July 14, 2003
Robert Novak, in his syndicated commentary, reveals that Joseph Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, is a CIA operative. Novak attributes the information to "two senior administration officials."
No Weapons Found ::: Oct. 2, 2003
After three months of looking, Iraq Survey Group (ISG) inspector David Kay tells Congress in an interim report that his American team of weapons inspectors has yet to find any evidence of WMD. Kay says:
"We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist, or that they existed before the war."
Kay Resigns ::: Jan. 23, 2004
David Kay resigns as head of the ISG. CIA Director George Tenet names Charles Duelfer to replace Kay, whose team failed to find evidence of active WMD production or stockpiles. Kay tells NPR:
"My summary view, based on what I've seen, is that we are very unlikely to find large stockpiles of weapons. I don't think they exist."
Bush Responds to Kay ::: Feb. 3, 2004
With David Kay saying that he didn't believe WMD existed in Iraq, President Bush reiterates his belief that Saddam Hussein was dangerous. Bush says:
"We know from years of intelligence, not only our own intelligence services, but other intelligence-gathering organizations, that he had weapons. After all, he used them."
Hutton Inquiry ::: Feb. 4, 2004
The Hutton Inquiry into allegations from the BBC that the British government had hyped WMD intelligence reports before the war with Iraq finds no basis for the allegations. Tony Blair says:
"The allegation that I or anyone else lied to this House or deliberately misled the country by falsifying intelligence on weapons of mass destruction is itself the real lie."
Senate Intelligence Report ::: July 9, 2004
The Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq is released. It faults America's ability to gauge Iraq's capabilities before the war. Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) says:
"Before the war, the U.S. intelligence community told the president, as well as the Congress, that Saddam Hussein had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and if left unchecked, would probably have a nuclear weapon during this decade. Well, today we know these assessments were wrong. They were also unreasonable and largely unsupported by the available intelligence."
Britain's Butler Report ::: July 14, 2004
Britain releases the Butler Report, which concludes that Iraq did not have significant, if any, stocks of chemical or biological weapons ready for deployment. Blair responds to the report:
"On any basis, he [Saddam Hussein] retained complete strategic intent on weapons of mass destruction, and significant capability. The only reason he ever let the inspectors back into Iraq was that he had 180,000 U.S. and British troops on his doorstep. He had no intention of ever cooperating fully with the inspectors."
No Weapons Found ::: Sept. 30 - Oct. 6, 2004
The ISG releases its final report and chief inspector Charles Duelfer testifies before congress about his team's findings. After 16 months of investigation, Duelfer concludes that Saddam Hussein had no chemical weapons, no biological weapons and no capacity to make nuclear weapons. This effectively ends the hunt for WMD. Bush responds to the report:
"The Duelfer report showed that Saddam was systematically gaming the system, using the UN oil-for-food program to try to influence countries and companies in an effort to undermine sanctions. He was doing so with the intent of restarting his weapons program once the world looked away."
The Hunt is Over ::: Jan. 12, 2005
White House spokesman Scott McClellan tells reporters that the "physical search" for WMD, having found no weapons, is over.
Robb-Silberman Report ::: March 31, 2005
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction delivers its report to the president. Commonly known as the Robb-Silberman report in reference to the commission's co-chairmen the document describes the failure to find WMD in Iraq as one of the "most public and most damaging intelligence failures in recent American history." The report, which was commissioned by President Bush, asks what went wrong and conlcudes that wide-ranging reform of the intelligence bureaucracy is needed to guard against global WMD threats
This smacks of Saddam. He played games and it came back to bite not only him but the Iraqi people.