We really don't know how many civilian deaths there have been, and we don't know how many of them can be attributed to coalition action, as opposed to action on the part of Iraqi armed forces as they defended themselves," Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said in a BBC interview Sunday.
Historically, the Pentagon has not tried to count civilian casualties and losses resulting from U.S. military action. Military officials have given various reasons for this, citing principally the time and resources involved and the difficulty of separating damage caused by U.S. forces from damage caused by the enemy.
But this time, the Bush administration is facing greater pressure to undertake at least some kind of accounting for what military authorities call "collateral damage." Before and during the war, U.S. officials repeatedly stressed the extent to which American forces were trying to avoid civilian losses by employing precision weapons, computerized target planning and restrictive rules of engagement. More than 70 percent of the bombs and missiles used in this war were either satellite- or laser-guided, according to the Pentagon.
"Because this administration has put so much emphasis on the care that it has taken, it would be very difficult for them to avoid coming to some kind of assessment of how they did in this regard," said Sarah Sewall, who served in the Pentagon during the Clinton administration and now directs a study on civilian suffering in war being conducted under the auspices of Harvard University.
Sewall added that it would be "unrealistic" to expect the Pentagon to come up with "a reliable figure" for civilian casualties given the "size, intensity and speed" of the U.S. campaign. But she said investigating at least some incidents would not only bolster U.S. credibility but also contribute to better military planning next time by understanding the actual effects of particular U.S. battlefield decisions.
One Air Force general, asked why the military has not done such postwar accounting in the past, said it has been more cost-effective to pour resources into increasingly sophisticated weaponry and intelligence-gathering equipment.
"The best way of limiting collateral damage is knowing what you're going after and being able to hit what you go after," the officer said.
He suggested that once the Pentagon started down the track of studying collateral damage caused by bombs, it could lead to endless assessments.
"I do wonder if we're going to do this every time the Army fires an artillery shell or every time a Special Forces soldier fires a 50-caliber" gun, he said.
But he also acknowledged the practical value of validating the Pentagon's damage-control models by counting the number of civilians who died.
"Maybe that's our next task someday -- to try to get that kind of information so that we can feed it back into the process," he said.
Another senior military officer noted that during the 1999 Kosovo war, U.S. military officials developed a computer program to track every weapon employed. This assisted peacekeeping troops who later entered Kosovo, providing them with information about what munitions had been dropped where -- and especially what ordnance may not have exploded. The program has been in use in the Iraq war, he said.
"So we now have a better system of tracking every weapon delivered, and if we go into an area, we can assess what's in there, what the potential duds might be and how we're going to go about cleaning them up," the officer said.