Originally posted by: Vic
Originally posted by: LegendKiller
Originally posted by: Vic
Originally posted by: LegendKiller
Originally posted by: Vic
Originally posted by: LegendKiller
Funny, who tosses the personal attacks constantly? You accuse others of doing exactly what you do. Look in the mirror sparky and quit trying to play righteous indignation, it's tired.
They may not approve it, as I mentioned LOs, but they push it through and are often the first ones to jam things.
Right... "me and my ilk" will keep that in mind while you keep making sh!t. Mortgage brokers and LOs are mostly just order-takers. They don't approve anything, and them "pushing it through" doesn't make a deal anymore likely to be approved. That's just a comical argument on your part.
From what I have read, they did enough pushing to keep things moving. As I said, I may not be listing out underwriters or any of the other structure, but it's all the same. You're trying to bog down in technicalities when you know that isn't a truthful way of doing things.
Again, don't claim righteous indignation if you're running around calling people scum. You have no high-ground, no safe place to call people out on name calling, or tossing insults.
:roll:
I know all about independent credit approval and officers involved in that area. Believe it or not when I structure a $200m securitization deal I have to write a credit application discussing the company and the structure. This then goes to an independent credit commitee where I have to get approval, sometimes it has to go to two different international sites depending on the credit type, quality, structure and amount. Even with this credit approval it has to be looked at by the Rating Agencies who determine what types of additional credit enhancement it has to have before it is put into our conduit. These credit enhancement, which includes a bank committment and a Letter of Credit, which provides additional support for the conduit if credit declines too much.
Thus, I have to know every company in and out and every structural feature, down to the delinquency ratio for the last 6 months, in my head. I then have to stick with each credit, checking every servicer report month by month, investigating any changes in credit quality, looking at individual line-item in a 200+ line servicer report. This happens for anywhere between 1-8 years, which is our longest deal. On top of that, I have to keep on top of any credit amendments, voting requirements, annual reviews, and annual due-diligence where I fly out to meet the company.
I have to live and breath a 100M+ deal every month of my life for multiple years and I have to know everything about it.
I know credit better than most people because I don't underwrite and spin-off. You can get off your fekkin high-horse and stop trying to think that you're the only one who deals with debt. In fact, you can just step down and STFU because, unlike you, I actually continually deal with this rather than just spinning it off.
Well (taking your usual pompousity at face value and assuming you're actually telling the truth for once), your group should be the ones to deal with it, O Mighty Internet Cage Fighter. You wrote the guidelines as to what was saleable and what was not.
Not having worked on an MBS deal before and not having any MBS conduits in our structure, but I can make some guesses.
MBS structure must be akin to some of the other mortgage-ish products I have worked with in the past. As such, there are limited eligibility criteria built into the deal. Those criteria are nothing more than gross pool-based metrics, they do not discuss or even get as granular as you think. For example, more general criteria would be "Originated within the standard company Credit and Collection Policies and Procedures". Other ones that are more specific would be "Cannot be a Delinquent Contract", which normally is 30+ days late past invoice. Another standard one is "Cannot be a Defaulted Contract", which normally would mean a 120+ day delinquent contract, or one that has been otherwise written-off due to bankruptcy or breach of Representations and Warranties. Many deals have seasoning break-offs, FICO floors, or have dynamic enhancement rate calculations or over-concentration factors for loans of specific types (geographical or obligor concentrations). However, the very nature of the pool system dictates that small numbers of bad loans are diversified away through the gross pool.
The very nature of a pool based structure minimizes the need for specific obligor investigations. Normally a statistical sample is taken during the Agreed Upon Procedures (AUP) by an independent auditing firm. It will take a look at a pre-determined amount of contracts to and check them against the physical loan files (whether those be imaged or paper) and compare them to the loan servicing portfolio. For a pool of 30,000 loans, that might amount to maybe 200 loans.
If those 200 randomly sampled loans have no material problems the auditors issue a letter stating that there were no material findings. If there is a systemic problem it can be traced. If it is later found that the loans were in breach of the R&W, they must be repurchased by the Servicer/Seller.
Once the pool is determined information on delinquencies and defaults are used to stress the structure to set optimal enhancement levels, which determines how much money the seller will get up-front. These rates are overseen by the Rating Agency to determine adequacy. The RA then issues an opinion on the rating which investors may or may not agree with.
Through this whole period it is up to the Seller to maintain the status of their pool. The collateral is girded by the power and solvency of the servicer. Gross portfolio attributes, such as CLTV, FICO...etc are known. However, the ability to pay for the actual loan, such as debt/income ratios are solely the responsibility of the Servicer Seller, who must follow the R&W of their credit policies. This is where the problem lies. If the S/S does not abide by their policies they are material breach of their covenants and can be held liable. However, this is usually futile.
The biggest problem is the determination of the CLTV and the usage of Option Arms and other exotic mortgages. RA and other parties (underwriters and such) can make estimations of the performance of the loans, but they cannot know how it will perform. Their enhancement levels are set as such.
The underwriters can to a certain degree control the make up of the pool. If they see a poor pool they just reduce enhancement and the $$ the seller gets from those loans. If the seller is so enticed to underwrite crap loans, they'll get less money. However, the underwriter still needs the best ability of the servicer to create proper loans and service them properly.
Herein lies the biggest problem. The underwriter or the purchasers have no control over the viability of that loan. That is up to the underwriter/originator to understand the nature of the property, the viability of the obligor in repayment. They are the first and middle line of defense, the last line is the structuring of the deal. They need to determine the wherewithal to repay and the ability of the collateral (house) to sustain the mortgage in positive balance.
However, those two lines failed in these cases. The last line, the structuring of the deal, hasn't performed all that well either, which isn't surprising considering the nature of the situation we were in in the last 5 years. Prolific uses of exotic mortgages and high CLTV loans resulted in a situation unseen before in the MBS market. You can only based structures on factual information, anything beyond that is an educated guess.
At no point have I said Wall Street is blameless. However, I firmly believe the first two lines is where this silliness should have stopped. Truth in Lending, reasonable credit and collection policies, reasonable underwriting, and elimination of greed from a commissions standpoint was the undermining of the system. Mortgage brokers and companies in general knew that they had a reasonable pipeline to sell loans, even if they got less money for them, so they engaged in a lot of deception, of Wall Street and also of the obligors. To deny this is to deny reality as we see these situations pop up more often.
Anything in this world can be sold, it's how much it can be sold for that's important. The Street tried to adjust as much as possible for the "how much". The "what" was supposed to be controlled by the reasonableness and integrity of the system.