Hacking taking on a worrisome trend. Real world damage.

[dwell]

I wrote a virus for research back in the DOS days that thrashes the HDD heads back and forth violently which could in some cases destroy the drive.

I almost took a job at McAffe when they were like 20 people there. In retrospect, not sure if that was a mistake or blessing.

 

[PowerEngineer]

Yeah, and good luck explaining that to the suits in the private sector, you ass.

Manager of power plant: "No, I don't want to upgrade to the latest Siemens control system, because older stuff is just SAFER."

General manager of utility company: "Oh yeah? Get the fuck out of here, you're fired."

Yep, I'm sure that's what would happen.

In order to make so many posts in so little time, I suppose you can't really think about each one very much. Has it occurred to you yet that I might just be one of those "suits in the private sector"?

The point I am making is that the adaption of new technologies to critical infrastructure needs to be more carefully considered. There are certainly some benefits gained by networking components together, however there are just as certainly some risks too. I am concerned that too many times the consideration of benefits verses risks are about as superficial as your hypothetical conversation. I am particularly skeptical of arguments to "modernize" communications by moving to routable protocols because those protocols add security risk.

 

[Locut0s]

I'll be interested in learning what you think the "smart grid" consists off, as well as how the capabilities of the "smart grid" will "massively improve their operation" and how the lack of a "smart grid" is holding back "long term growth and development".

"Smart grid" is a poorly defined catch-all term applied to all sorts of distributed monitoring and control technologies that can be applied to the distribution networks (the fundamental workings of which are unchanged). The value of applying these technologies is far from being firmly established, as also are its attendent costs and risks. Aside from possible reduction in utility operating costs (for meter reading and switching procedures), the biggest use may be allowing utility control of customer loads (in order to "shave peak loads" and offset the minute-by-minute unpredictability of renewable energy sources like wind and solar). It will be interesting to see to what degree utility customers will be willing to have their ability to use electricity somewhat restricted in return for somewhat lower electricity rates.

Don't take this to mean that I am against implementing new technologies on the distribution system. I'm just somewhat appalled the media hype promoting "smart grid" and am virtually certain that more is being promised than will be delivered.

I'm referring to a network that is monitored and load balanced by computer. Also one in which the fault tolerance is at least somewhat well understood. Currently the system is much more reactionary in nature and small disturbances in one part of the grid can ripple through the grid unpredictably causing spikes and valleys where they don't need to be. The topology of the network isn't that well understood either, for example it's not well understood which power distribution nodes are keystones that can cause major fail overs if taken out. This is my understanding anyway.

 

[scorp00]

I'm way more worried about the unmanned aircraft with weapons already on board. Funny no one is worried about the armed drones flying overhead.

 

[PowerEngineer]

Or looking at it from another angle, when it's time to cut costs, centralized monitoring of X devices takes a lot less time than a monkey walking from unit to unit.

Network everything = lower overhead.

Not that I don't agree with you, I just don't think it's as simple as you put it.

Yes, I agree with you that lower costs through more centralized monitoring is a benefit worth considering. What chaffs at me is the sense that we are sometimes only looking at benefits -- that we don't weigh these against the risks. And this is particularly dangerous (and irresponsible) for critical infrastructure applications.

And nothing is ever as simple as I (or any other ATOT poster) make any issue seem! The example I had in my mind as I jotted out my response involved a distance of just one floor in the same building.

 

[sandorski]

In the not too distant future we'll all be plugging our Genitals to the Net. On that day, China will have us by the balls.

 

[Locut0s]

In the not too distant future we'll all be plugging our Genitals to the Net. On that day, China will have us by the balls.

:thumbsup:

They kind of already do though.

 

[Locut0s]

Ok it seems the hackers were indeed not able to issue any destructive commands per se to the pump. But once into the SCADA system they were able to turn the pump on and off enough times to burn it out:

http://www.engadget.com/2011/11/20/water-pump-reportedly-destroyed-by-scada-hackers/

 

[PowerEngineer]

I'm referring to a network that is monitored and load balanced by computer. Also one in which the fault tolerance is at least somewhat well understood. Currently the system is much more reactionary in nature and small disturbances in one part of the grid can ripple through the grid unpredictably causing spikes and valleys where they don't need to be. The topology of the network isn't that well understood either, for example it's not well understood which power distribution nodes are keystones that can cause major fail overs if taken out. This is my understanding anyway.

"Smart grid" certainly includes better monitoring of the distribution system, and I have to presume that being "load balanced by computer" is a reference to the kind of control over customer loads that I described earlier.

Your suggestion that "fault tolerance" is not well understood is IMHO not correct. Despite the mind-boggling sizes of the electrical networks (the western interconnection spans the western half of North America and connects together everyone with electrical service), the utilities run sophisticated simulations to model the response of the electrical system to all sorts of disturbances (and combinations of disturbances) to ensure that any transient fluctuations that "ripple through the grid" are within established limits. We definitely know what the "keystones" are, and by their very nature, none of them are at the distribution level. That isn't to say, however, that a chain of unlikely disturbances can't lead to a serious outage (e.g. the recent San Diego blackout).

The kind of disturbances that occur on the distribution systems ("smart grid" territory) are by their nature localized and generally only affect other customers on that feeder. "Smart grid" may be able to shorten these impacts on other customers through quicker switching actions; the additional data should also help us troubelshoot probelms more quickly.

For better or worse, the electrical system will always need to be reactionary in the sense that it must respond gracefully to unexpected occurances. At least until we can accurately forecast which trees will fall during the next storm (whenever that will be) or which pole will be toppled by the next drunk driver. :\