“Popular understanding of the T.P.P. is very low,” Kevin G. Nealer, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote in a postelection analysis on Thursday. With its abandonment, he added, “The risk to America’s role as trade policy leader — and therefore to the global economy — is real and immediate.”
Mr. Obama and his team likewise emphasized the potential geopolitical blow, even as they promoted the economic benefits the trade agreement would offer American exporters by eliminating thousands of tariffs and other trade restrictions in the other countries.
Forsaking the agreement, the president insisted, would
undercut the United States’ standing in the fast-growing Asia-Pacific region as a reliable counterweight to an expansionary China, economically and militarily, for America’s allies there. The other countries have approved the pact or are in the process of doing so, but without the approval of the United States, it does not take effect.
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“In the absence of T.P.P., countries have already made it clear that they will move forward in negotiating their own trade agreements that exclude the United States,” Mr. Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers wrote days before the election. “These agreements would improve market access and trading opportunities for member countries while U.S. businesses would continue to face existing trade barriers.”
One example is a bilateral agreement between Australia and Japan, which gives Australian beef exporters a price advantage over American producers whose exports are subject to higher Japanese tariffs; those tariffs would ultimately have been removed under the Pacific agreement.
“We are experiencing lost sales without T.P.P.” of about $400,000 a day as a result, said Kevin Kester, a California cattle rancher and vice president of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association.
“Multiply that over several hundred more products and several dozen more free-trade relationships,” Mr. Froman said in an interview.
The T.P.P. would have phased out some 18,000 tariffs that the other 11 countries have on imports from the United States, thus reducing their cost to foreign buyers. Beyond such typical trade actions, it also would have established a number of precedents for international trade rules dealing with digital commerce, intellectual property rights, human rights and environmental protection.
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A number of countries had agreed to copyright protections, benefiting sectors like the film industry. The agreement would have assured an open internet among the 12 nations, including in Communist-run Vietnam, encouraging digital trade and serving as a contrast to China’s walls to internet traffic.
It included
commitments against wildlife trafficking — Vietnam, for example, is a major market for rhino horns and ivory — and against subsidies in that country and others on both sides of the Pacific that encourage overfishing.
For the first time in a trade agreement, state-owned businesses like those in Vietnam and Malaysia would have had to comply with commercial trade rules and labor and environmental standards. The agreement would have committed all parties to the International Labor Organization’s principles prohibiting
child labor, forced labor and excessive hours, and requiring collective bargaining, a minimum wage and safe workplaces.
While unions and human rights groups remained skeptical about enforcement, the United States reached separate agreements with Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam in which the three countries committed to specific labor changes, under penalty of the United States’ restoring tariffs for noncompliance. Those side agreements will fall along with the overall trade pact.
Election-year antitrade politics aside, the biggest hurdle to Republicans’ consideration of the Pacific pact was objections from some — led by Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, chairman of the committee responsible for trade — to intellectual-property provisions that would have
limited monopoly protections for brand-name pharmaceutical companies’ so-called biologics. Those are advanced drugs used, for instance, in cancer treatments.
The Obama administration — pressed by nearly every other nation, the generic drug industry and nonprofit health groups like Doctors Without Borders, all of which wanted quicker access to affordable lifesaving drugs — had agreed that drugmakers could keep production data secret for five to eight years, fewer than the 12 years in federal law. Mr. Hatch had demanded 12 years. But administration officials were hindered in how far they could go to appease Republicans given strong opposition in other countries to any change.
Without the trade agreement, however, drug companies have no monopoly protections for biologics data in some countries.
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Another innovation in the T.P.P. was provisions to help small businesses, which lack the resources of big corporations, to navigate export rules, trade barriers and red tape.