It's amazing how much thinking you can get done on long road trips when you're driving alone. 
As some of you probably noticed, I was gone all weekend on such a road trip and basically had an argument with myself on an issue that I consider to be of fundamental importance in any society: who should be granted rights? In retrospect, I think that the conclusion is extremely obvious, though I never really thought of it before going through this exercise, so I think the obviousness of it comes somewhere during the journey. Anyway, here it is. Let me know if you agree with this assessment. If people think it's worthwhile, I'll type up the rest of the story. I don't to present it together with this because it would possibly spoil the ending, plus make it prohibitively long to read.
Many efforts have been undertaken by various parties to set out criteria by which a person (i.e. an entity who may be attributed rights) must be defined. I will lay out my own personal argument for this case here.
Many arguments have been put for asserting that humanity is not sufficient cause for the granting of personhood and, therefore, rights. The arguments typically revolve around several points regarding the abilities of the embryo/fetus. A list of these arguments is provided below.
1. An embryo/fetus is only a person when it develops a heartbeat.
? This statement infers that a person is defined by having a heartbeat. Thus, rights cannot be conferred on someone suffering from cardiac arrest. Since society confers rights on those suffering from cardiac arrest, it is obvious that this is not a necessary criterion for the conferring of rights. Further, as many animals have a heartbeat but are not given rights, it is clear that this criterion is not sufficient for personhood.
2. An embryo/fetus is only a person when it develops brainwaves.
? This statement infers that a person is defined by having brainwaves. Thus, people whose brainwaves stop for any reason would be deprived rights. Obviously, this is not the case.
i. http://www.near-death.com/experiences/evidence01.html
ii. http://www.cryonics.org/surgery.html
iii. http://my.webmd.com/hw/epileps...2249.asp?printing=true
? Since society confers rights on those suffering from a lapse in brain activity, it is obvious that this is not a necessary criterion for the conferring of rights. Further, as all animals have brainwaves but are not given rights, it is clear that this criterion is not sufficient for personhood.
3. An embryo/fetus is only a person when it develops the ability to feel pain.
? This statement infers that a person is defined by having the ability to feel pain. Thus, people who cannot feel pain would be deprived rights. Since society confers rights on those suffering from a lack of the ability to feel pain (such as those lacking brain activity and under anesthesia), it is obvious that this is not a necessary criterion for the conferring of rights. Further, as many animals have the ability to feel pain but are not given rights, it is clear that this criterion is not sufficient for personhood.
So, there must be some quality that is more innate to a person than any of these quantifiable things. It is clear that society bestows rights on the condition of human life. Indeed, rights are even accorded to the human dead in most societies. Thus, it appears that humanity is sufficient for the conferment of rights, and being a member of this species appears sufficient for personhood. However, it stands to reason that society might grant rights to an alien species that have ?intelligence? similar to our own. So, then, it is necessary to determine how to quantify ?intelligence? above and beyond the level of instinctual behavior.
One might argue that ?intelligence? is the understanding of one?s surroundings.
Objection: All animals must have some level of understanding of their surroundings to survive. Thus, this criterion is obviously insufficient for personhood.
So, perhaps ?intelligence? is the development of this understanding.
Objection: All animals develop understanding of their surroundings as they mature. Thus, this criterion is obviously insufficient for personhood.
?Intelligence? is the self-motivated development of understanding.
Objection: Survival of animals seems to motivate their development of understanding of surroundings and is therefore self-motivated. Thus, this criterion is obviously insufficient for personhood.
At this point, it is clear that some distinction between the cursory ?intellect? of the common animal be differentiated from that of a person. So, perhaps the prior terminology needs adjustment and self-motivated should be replaced with conscious. Thus, ?intelligence? is the conscious development of understanding. This seems reasonable, but is heavily dependent on the definition of conscious. As previously stated, this term is used to differentiate between the instinctual behavior of a mere animal and the behavior of a person.
What, then, is this distinction? Human and animal actions are both suggested by instinct. Thus, the difference between humans and animals must be that humans have some mechanism for acting contrary to their own instinct. This mechanism must be logic, or the ability to render a choice. Combining this realization with the previously derived result (that being a member of an intelligent species is sufficient for personhood), the conclusion is obvious: personhood is warranted by all members of a species that exhibits the ability to choose.
As some of you probably noticed, I was gone all weekend on such a road trip and basically had an argument with myself on an issue that I consider to be of fundamental importance in any society: who should be granted rights? In retrospect, I think that the conclusion is extremely obvious, though I never really thought of it before going through this exercise, so I think the obviousness of it comes somewhere during the journey. Anyway, here it is. Let me know if you agree with this assessment. If people think it's worthwhile, I'll type up the rest of the story. I don't to present it together with this because it would possibly spoil the ending, plus make it prohibitively long to read.
Many efforts have been undertaken by various parties to set out criteria by which a person (i.e. an entity who may be attributed rights) must be defined. I will lay out my own personal argument for this case here.
Many arguments have been put for asserting that humanity is not sufficient cause for the granting of personhood and, therefore, rights. The arguments typically revolve around several points regarding the abilities of the embryo/fetus. A list of these arguments is provided below.
1. An embryo/fetus is only a person when it develops a heartbeat.
? This statement infers that a person is defined by having a heartbeat. Thus, rights cannot be conferred on someone suffering from cardiac arrest. Since society confers rights on those suffering from cardiac arrest, it is obvious that this is not a necessary criterion for the conferring of rights. Further, as many animals have a heartbeat but are not given rights, it is clear that this criterion is not sufficient for personhood.
2. An embryo/fetus is only a person when it develops brainwaves.
? This statement infers that a person is defined by having brainwaves. Thus, people whose brainwaves stop for any reason would be deprived rights. Obviously, this is not the case.
i. http://www.near-death.com/experiences/evidence01.html
ii. http://www.cryonics.org/surgery.html
iii. http://my.webmd.com/hw/epileps...2249.asp?printing=true
? Since society confers rights on those suffering from a lapse in brain activity, it is obvious that this is not a necessary criterion for the conferring of rights. Further, as all animals have brainwaves but are not given rights, it is clear that this criterion is not sufficient for personhood.
3. An embryo/fetus is only a person when it develops the ability to feel pain.
? This statement infers that a person is defined by having the ability to feel pain. Thus, people who cannot feel pain would be deprived rights. Since society confers rights on those suffering from a lack of the ability to feel pain (such as those lacking brain activity and under anesthesia), it is obvious that this is not a necessary criterion for the conferring of rights. Further, as many animals have the ability to feel pain but are not given rights, it is clear that this criterion is not sufficient for personhood.
So, there must be some quality that is more innate to a person than any of these quantifiable things. It is clear that society bestows rights on the condition of human life. Indeed, rights are even accorded to the human dead in most societies. Thus, it appears that humanity is sufficient for the conferment of rights, and being a member of this species appears sufficient for personhood. However, it stands to reason that society might grant rights to an alien species that have ?intelligence? similar to our own. So, then, it is necessary to determine how to quantify ?intelligence? above and beyond the level of instinctual behavior.
One might argue that ?intelligence? is the understanding of one?s surroundings.
Objection: All animals must have some level of understanding of their surroundings to survive. Thus, this criterion is obviously insufficient for personhood.
So, perhaps ?intelligence? is the development of this understanding.
Objection: All animals develop understanding of their surroundings as they mature. Thus, this criterion is obviously insufficient for personhood.
?Intelligence? is the self-motivated development of understanding.
Objection: Survival of animals seems to motivate their development of understanding of surroundings and is therefore self-motivated. Thus, this criterion is obviously insufficient for personhood.
At this point, it is clear that some distinction between the cursory ?intellect? of the common animal be differentiated from that of a person. So, perhaps the prior terminology needs adjustment and self-motivated should be replaced with conscious. Thus, ?intelligence? is the conscious development of understanding. This seems reasonable, but is heavily dependent on the definition of conscious. As previously stated, this term is used to differentiate between the instinctual behavior of a mere animal and the behavior of a person.
What, then, is this distinction? Human and animal actions are both suggested by instinct. Thus, the difference between humans and animals must be that humans have some mechanism for acting contrary to their own instinct. This mechanism must be logic, or the ability to render a choice. Combining this realization with the previously derived result (that being a member of an intelligent species is sufficient for personhood), the conclusion is obvious: personhood is warranted by all members of a species that exhibits the ability to choose.
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