If this is the case, why does the DoD require at least 3 passes? Why do some of the security researchers out there have their own custom wipe protocols which can easily go to 10 passes? Are they all just crazy?
It's because the protocols are out of date.
In the 70s, the drive heads were moved by stepper motors and drive belts. Over time, the heads would go out of alignment, so that writing over a track, might actually only overwrite half of the track, because the alignment was off.
A skilled engineer, could realign the drive heads, and use modified firmware to try and recover un-overwritten data.
Using multiple passes, would gradually weaken the magnetic remnants to the side of the track where the head was actually tracking.
In reality, it's not clear whether this technique would ever have worked, or was ever used - even if it was a theoretical possibility.
By the time IDE drives were invented, hard drives had gone from stepper-motor control to servo control. This ensured that the heads always tracked precisely regardless of temperature, aging, impact/shock, etc. and that overwriting data, would always overwrite it completely with no hope of recovery.
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Things are more complicated these days, and simply running a piece of free software like "eraser" or DBAN can't guarantee that your drives are wiped. For example, when drives self-heal "bad" sectors, they actually move the data to a new area, and abandon the old sector. Unfortunately, this means that the data in the old sector, although corrupted, is still on the platter and cannot be removed by most software as the drive has silently remapped the sector to point somewhere else on the platter.
One government that has actually kept up with the times is the UK, and they have a list of specific criteria that disk wiping software must meet, before they can be approved for government use (if a software package has received a government certificate, they can also be used by private citizens and businesses for destruction of confidential data, and the user of the software has a defence in court, if they are accused of negligence in their data destruction protocol).
Such approved software must check the drive for bad sectors before and after wiping, and if bad sectors have been remapped during the wiping operation, the wipe must be aborted and the user informed that the drive is damaged and wiping cannot continue, and that the drive must be physically destroyed.
Additionally, the software needs to perform a search for "secret" partitions on the drive. Normally, these "secret" partitions are used by the BIOS for OEM system recovery, and the BIOS blocks access to them. Approved software must detect and remove any BIOS blocks, and any locks on the HD which are restricting access to these "secret" partitions.
There are many other requirements for approved software which cover all sorts of other corner cases, work around known bugs in various drive firmwares, etc. as well as general quality control, code inspection, etc.